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INTRODUCTION

Thus, the question of the proper relationship between property and contract analyses of the lease is not surprisingly a dominant theme of
recent cases and commentary. The theme has generated two diA

lease is both a conveyance and a contract.'

vergent theses. The traditionalists argue that there is a significant
2
tension between the conveyance and contract views of a lease.
1. See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11, at 203 (AJ. Casner ed.
1952); R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.1 (1980).
As we hope to show in this article, the concept of a lease as a "conveyance" is
complex. Several constituents of this concept appear in our ensuing discussion,
and we return specifically to the question of what it means to call a lease a "conveyance" in Part IV-A.
2. "Traditionalists," in our use of the term, are those theorists who argue,
first, that property and contract rules for the decision of lease disputes are different from one another, property rules being essentially archaic and regressive;
and second, that the application of contract rules to landlord-tenant disputes
would effectuate necessary reforms. Those two ideas can be found, explicitly or
implicitly and usually passim, in the following commentary: 2 R. POWELL, THE
221[1], at 181-85 (P. Rohan ed. 1983); R. SCHOSHINLAW OF REAL PROPERTY
SKI, supra note 1; Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract(Damages for Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of Covenants), 16 TEX. L. REV. 47
(1937): Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 CORNELL L.Q 165 (1947);
Hicks, The ContractualNature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1972);
Lesar, The Landlord-TenantRelation in Perspective: From Status to Contractand Back in
900 Years? 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369 (1961); Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279 (1960); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A
Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225
(1969); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEo.
L.J. 519 (1966); Woodruff, Lessor and Lessee: Parties to a Contract or Landlord and
Tenant?, 8 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 35 (1939); Note, Contract Principles and Leases of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/1

2

Chase and Taylor: Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and Contract

1985]

LANDLORD AND TENANT

They assert that the conveyance view is archaic and ill-suited to
the needs of modern tenants, particularly residential tenants.
They advocate the outright rejection of the conveyance view and
the adoption of the view that "leases of urban dwelling units
should be interpreted and construed like any other contract." 3
This approach has been the cutting edge of much recent reform 4
and is supported by respected judges and commentators. 5
Lately, however, a revisionist thesis has emerged, which
questions much of the traditionalists' distinction between property and contract analyses. The revisionists demonstrate that
there are substantial similarities between property and contract
doctrines, and they deny the accuracy and utility of the view that
landlord and tenant law reflects any developmental movement
from property to contract principles. 6 Arguing, in short, that the
Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Contract Principles];
Note, The California Lease-Contractor Conveyance?, 4 STAN. L. REV. 244 (1952).
We do not contend that traditionalists never see points of contact or similarities between property and contract analyses. For example, traditionalists almost universally recognize that the property doctrine of eviction is a substitute
for the contract doctrine of dependency of covenants. See, e.g., Hicks, supra, at
460-64; Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, supra, at 29-33. However, as
we hope our discussion will indicate, it is fair to say that the traditionalists have
found fewer similarities than actually exist, and that they have neither seen the
extent of the similarities that they identify nor the differences that remain.
3. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted) (under contract principles, warranty of habitability similar to
warranty of merchantability should be implied in residential leases). Javins is
recognized as the seminal traditionalist case, but numerous other habitability
decisions have espoused its viewpoint. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.
3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d
208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
4. For cases that have found an implied warranty of habitability akin to a
warranty of merchantability in a sale of goods, see supra note 3. See also Sommer
v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977) (landlord is under duty to mitigate
losses by making reasonable efforts to relet premises wrongfully vacated by the
tenant); Ringwood Assocs. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 379
A.2d 508 (1977) (tenant's duty to pay rent is dependent upon landlord's performance of obligation not to unreasonably withhold consent to assignment of
lease; tenant entitled to terminate if landlord is in breach); Albert M. Greenfield
& Co. v. Kolea, 475 Pa. 351, 380 A.2d 758 (1977) (tenant's obligation to pay
rent is dependent on continued existence of buildings on leased premises; tenant excused upon destruction of the buildings by fire).
5. See supra notes 2 & 3.
6. See Chused, Contemporary Dilemmas of the Javins Defense: A Note on the Need
for ProceduralReform in Landlord-Tenant Law, 67 GEO. LJ. 1385 (1979); McGovern.
Dependent Promises in the History of Leases and Other Contracts, 52 TUL. L. REV. 659
(1978); Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Convevance?-A Historical Inquiry,
52J. URB. L. 649 (1975); Weinberg, From Contract to Conveyance: The Law of Landlord and Tenant, 1800-1920 (Part 1), 1980 S. ILL. U.LJ. 29.
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traditionalists' assertion of important differences between property and contract analyses is more rhetorical than real, the revisionists counsel either caution in the use of :he property-contract
dichotomy as a framework of analysis 7 or abandonment of the di8
chotomy altogether.
We think that both the traditionalists and the revisionists
have presented partial and in important ways incorrect accounts
of the property-contract theme, and that an accurate statement of
the utility of the theme requires a synthesis of the two perspectives. This article attempts such a synthesis. 9 In Parts I and II, we
analyze two doctrines that, according to the traditionalists, reveal
dramatic differences between property and contract law. In Part I
we discuss the doctrine of independency of covenants, which
states that a tenant is not discharged from his rent obligation by
the landlord's material breach of a covenant. In Part II we discuss
the doctrine that destruction of buildings on the lease premises
does not frustrate the tenant's purpose in entering the lease, and
hence does not terminate the lease or the tenant's obligations
under it. We shall attempt to show that these two doctrines are
not denials of contract law but rather expressions of it. While the
independency and destruction doctrines are often couched in a
unique property vocabulary, we suggest that both doctrines are in
essence understandable as facets of the contract law of constructive conditions. However, we also attempt to show that while
property law shares the concept of constructive conditions with
contract law, it implements that concept in unique and idiosyncratic ways. Our analysis is thus devoted to establishing that
there are important similarities between property and contract
analyses which traditionalists have overlooked, and, at the same
7. See McGovern, supra note 6, at 704; Weinberg, supra note 6, at 31.
8. See Chused, supra note 6, at 1386 & n.7; Siegel, supra note 6, at 687.
9. We are concerned in this article only with the impact of the propertycontract theme on the tenant's rights and obligations under the lease. No rigid
separation of the positions of landlord and tenant is possible, of course. The
determination, for example, that the tenant has no right to rescind for the landlord's breach, or upon destruction of the leased premises, necessarily indicates
that the landlord has a right to continue to enforce the tenant's rent obligation
after those occurrences. See infra Parts I & II. However, we consider the landlord's position only in that indirect sense. Specifically, for example, we do not
consider the question of the impact of the property-contract theme on the landlord's rights and remedies when the tenant wrongfully abandons the premises.
May the landlord claim anticipatory breach and must he seek to mitigate his
damages? See generally Love, Landlord's Remedies When the Tenant Abandons: Property, Contract, and Leases, 30 U. KAN. L. REv. 533 (1982).
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time, important differences that the revisionists have ignored in
their rush to assimilate property and contract analyses.
In Part III, we attempt to extend the essence of the traditionalist critique by showing that even recent decisions under the aegis of the view that a lease "should be interpreted and construed
like any other contract"' 0 bear the lingering imprint of conveyance reasoning. In Part III-A, we show that the warranty of habitability, despite its origins in a contractual view of the lease, has
been given a restrictive scope that denies much of that origin. In
Part III-B, we show that the obligation to deal in good faith,
which increasingly is being recognized in contract law, is almost
nonexistent in lease cases.
In Part IV, we attempt to summarize our discussion and to
state our position on the property-contract theme. Part IV-A will
generalize the point suggested in our consideration of the independency and destruction doctrines: that property and contract
reasoning are inescapably related because property reasoning can
readily be translated into, if it is not already expressed in, contract
categories. However, similarity is one thing, identity is another.
We suggest that there is not one form of conveyance reasoning,
but several, and that such reasoning has operated in lease cases to
limit or ignore vital considerations that could emerge were a full
contract perspective of the lease to prevail. We thus conclude
that as a corrective to the simplicity of the traditionalist position
the revisionist argument has immense value, but that the traditionalist insistence that there are differences between property
and contract reasoning in landlord-tenant cases is ultimately correct, even though the steps leading to that conclusion are more
complicated than the traditionalists have suggested.
In Part IV-B, we argue that the accuracy of the traditionalist
description of lease cases does not necessarily suggest the correctness of its prescription that the application of contract ideas to
leases is the necessary and sole means to achieve reform." To
10. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
For citations to other cases which apply contract principles to residential leases,
see supra notes 3 & 4.
11. The traditionalists' case for the superiority of contract over property
analysis can be assailed not just with the argument that property law is effective
to achieve reform, but also with the argument that the traditionalists' contract
law is often ineffective to achieve reform without important modification. We
have argued the latter point elsewhere. See Chase, The Property-ContractTheme in
Landlord and Tenant Law: A Critical Commentary on Schoshinski's American Law of
Landlord and Tenant, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 189 (1982). See also Browder, The Taming of
a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99, 100 (1982) ("the lit-
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the contrary, we argue that property analysis can accomplish the
reforms advocated by traditionalists in the areas that we canvassed in Parts I through III: independency of covenants, destruction of the premises, the scope of the warranty of
2
habitability, and the landlord's obligation to deal in good faith.'
This argument that property analysis can achieve the same reforms as the overt contractual approach advocated by the traditionalist literature should not be surprising, since we will already
have suggested that property reasoning is essentially contractual
reasoning, although often covert and limited contractual reasoning. Nevertheless, because of an unfortunate doctrinal facade, it
is often difficult to unmask conveyance concepts in order to identify their contractual bases. Consequently, we ultimately conclude that open recognition of the contract underpinnings of
lease law is desirable and offers the more attractive avenue to the
accomplishment of needed reforms in landlord-tenant law.
The possibility that creative lawyers can accomplish reform of
landlord-tenant law using either property or contract concepts
leads us in Part IV-C to reiterate briefly our conclusion that there
is both less to the property-contract theme than the traditionalists
have indicated, and more to it than either they or the revisionists
have noted.' 3 Whether that conclusion is correct is, of course,
any recited in many landlord-tenant cases that the solution to current problems
in this field depends on recognizing leases as contract, not property transactions" is a "bold and simplistic proposition"). In Part IV-B infra, we discuss the
argument that property law might be effective to achieve reform.
12. Indeed, throughout this article, we attempt to maintain a distinction between the descriptive point that there are differences between property and contract analyses in landlord-tenant cases, and the normative or prescriptive point
that contract reasoning is essential for the reform of landlord-tenant law. In
numerous instances we will point out that property reasoning obscures important considerations concerning the lease transaction that probably would not be
obscured were a contract perspective to prevail. However, we should make clear
our belief that property reasoning, as practiced by the cases, has been deficient; we
do not mean that reform could never be reached through a proper use of property reasoning. To the contrary, as we argue in Part IV-B, we think that property
reasoning is sufficiently flexible to accomplish reform of landlord-tenant law,
even though it remains true that contract reasoning, modified so as to avoid
pitfalls overlooked by traditionalists, is often preferable.
Because property law can achieve the reforms sought by traditionalists, see
infra Part IV-B, and the traditionalists' contract law sometimes does not, see supra
note 11, a case might be made for the superiority of property over contract reasoning-the exact opposite conclusion from that asserted by the traditionalists.
Professor Humbach has recently attempted to make that case. See Humbach, The
Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U.L.Q 1213 (1983). We do not think that the argument for the
superiority of property over contract reasoning can succeed, but that is a separate topic meriting an independent essay.
13. What separates us from the revisionists is our refusal to assimilate to-
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debatable. What is not debatable is that the property-contract
theme is a useful descriptive and heuristic device, that it has generated a rich and helpful discussion of a difficult and developing
corner of the law, and that in so doing it has cast light on important phases of property and contract law, and perhaps on law in
general.
I.

CONSTRUCTIVE CONDITIONS OF PERFORMANCE IN LANDLORDTENANT LAw: THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENT
COVENANTS

When a promisor expressly or impliedly promises to perform
an undertaking, and fails to perform, the question arises whether
that failure excuses the innocent party if the contract fails to address the matter. In a lease, for example, the landlord might
promise to repair the premises. If he fails to perform, would the
tenant be justified in vacating and rescinding the contract, and
denying liability for future rent?' 4 In technical terms, the question is whether, the lease contract being silent, the court will imply or construct a condition' 5 that the landlord's performance is a
prerequisite to the tenant's obligation to pay rent.' 6 If so, the
landlord's failure to perform is a failure of the condition, and the
tenant is excused.17
tally property and contract reasoning. What separates us from both the traditionalists and Professor Humbach is our refusal to agree that a choice between
property and contract analyses is necessary. See Humbach, supra note 12. We at
most suggest that such a choice may be desirable. See infra Parts IV-B & C.
14. "Rescission," as commonly used by courts in lease cases, does not carry
its technical contract meaning of nullification of the contract and restoration of
the status quo ante. See 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN & A. SMITH,
BASIC PROPERTY LAW 494-96 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BASIC PROPERTY
LAW]; 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 982 (1960); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 254 (1973). Rather, it refers to "a termination of contract elected by the victim of the other party's breach, ending all rights and obligations accruing after the rescission, and entitling the electing party to damages
for the breach (rather than restitution)." J. WINOKUR, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW:
CASES, HISTORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 425 (1982). We use the term "rescission" in this article in the sense indicated by Professor Winokur.
15. See 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, §§ 631-632 (distinguishing between
"implied in fact" conditions, based upon the parties' words or conduct, and
"constructive" conditions, based upon considerations ofjustice); id. § 633 (distinguishing between a promise, which "creates a legal duty in the promisor and a
right in the promisee" and a condition, which "creates no right or duty and is
merely a limiting or modifying factor"); id. § 653 (distinguishing constructive
conditions from implied conditions).
16. See id. §§ 700-712 (discussing the "substantial performance" doctrine,
which addresses the extent to which performance by one party is a condition of
the otner party's duty to render his performance).
17. See id. §§ 1252-1254 (discussing discharge of duty by the other party's
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The contract doctrine of independency of covenants denies
that constructive conditions can be created to relieve a party who
fails to incorporate a condition in the contract; it insists that such
conditions be express.' 8 Applying that view to our example, the
tenant's obligation to pay rent, if in terms unconditional, would in
fact be unconditional. The tenant would have a cause of action
for damages for the landlord's breach of promise; but, since performance of the landlord's promise does not operate as a condition, the tenant would have no excuse from his or her own
continuing obligation to perform.' 9
A standard doctrine in landlord-tenant law-indeed a centerpiece of the traditionalist critique-is that lease covenants are independent. 20 Traditionalists argue that this doctrine is rooted in
breach of contract). In landlord-tenant law, there is no straightforward determination as to whether the landlord has substantially performed so as to preclude a
claim of discharge by the tenant. See infra Part I-B.
18. See 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 637, at 45 ("[I]f the duty of rendering performance of one promise is conditional upon the antecedent performance of the other, or of a tender of such performance, the first mentioned
promise is said to be a 'dependent' promise."); id. § 653, at 133 ("[Als the law of
contract assumed increasing importance in human affairs, there was for some
centuries an increasing tendency to regard the intention of the parties as the
sole operative factor in determining the legal relations consequent upon agreement ....
[A] promise was held to be independent and unconditional unless
words were used to indicate otherwise."); E. FARNSWORTH, W. YOUNG & H.
JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 691 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG] ("To say that a promise ... is 'independent' ...
is still an intelligible way of saying that it is not subject to a constructive condition."). We follow these writers in reserving the term "independency" to denote the situation in which a party must have secured an express condition in
order to claim an excuse from the duty to perform when the other party to the
contract breaches. The concept of independency, however, can be, and indeed
often has been, used to denote other quite distinguishable situations. See infra
notes 20 & 21.
19. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE "LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-29, at 435
(2d ed. 1977) (tenant's duty to pay rent is generally independent of landlord's
duty to provide services); 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 654, at 136 (failure of
promisor to perform does not affect other party's duty); Rosett, ContractPerformance: Promises, Conditions and the Obligation to Communicate, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1083,
1086 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938) (landlord's duty to make repairs does not give tenant right to refuse to pay rent);

Meredith Mechanic Ass'n v. American Twist Drill Co., 67 N.H. 450, 39 A. 330
(1893) (landlord's breach of covenant to repair is not a defense to action for
payment of rent, but gives tenant a claim for damages); Stewart v. Childs Co., 86
N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (1914) (landlord's breach of covenant to keep cellar waterproof is not a defense in action for nonpayment of rent); Income Properties Inv.
Corp. v. Trefethen, 155 Wash. 493, 284 P. 782 (1930) (lessor's covenant to repair is independent of lessee's covenant to pay rent).
The assertion that covenants are independent can have several distinct
meanings in landlord-tenant law. In order to avoid confusion, we think it helpful to review the distinct meanings of independency in one place, even though
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property concepts, that it is "the most important logical incident
such a review anticipates much of our later analysis. For purposes of this discussion, we assume a situation in which the landlord has promised to repair the
leased premises, and either fails to perform the promise, or renders less than full
performance.
(1) In the modern, most useful, and probably only proper sense of the
term, the concept of independency is the converse or denial of the concept of
constructive conditions. Under this view, any conditions that limit or qualify a
party's duty to perform must be in writing, because courts will refuse to infer or
construct conditions to fill the contractual gap created by a party's failure to get
the conditions expressed. Thus, in our example, the landlord's total failure to
perform the repair promise would not excuse the tenant from his performance
obligations under the lease if covenants were independent in this sense.
Contract law has recognized constructive conditions at least from the eighteenth century. See Kinston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B.
1773); McGovern, supra note 6, at 663-76 (arguing that the concept of dependency of covenants appeared much earlier than the seventeenth century, and
that independency persisted thereafter). Therefore, it is incorrect to say that
covenants in contract law are generally independent. In fact, the presumption in
modern contract law is the opposite: covenants are dependent unless expressly
made independent or unconditional. See U.C.C. § 2-609 & comment 1 (1977)
(contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party to perform); 6 S.WILLISTON,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 813, at 6 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1962)

(in usual bilateral contract, failure to give performance on one side deprives
party in default of right to enforce the other party's promise). Similarly, landlord-tenant law excuses the tenant from the obligation to pay rent in some situations even though the tenant has not expressly bargained for the excuse,
including instances in which the landlord has defaulted on a promise to repair.
See infra Part I-B. Thus, it cannot be said that covenants in landlord-tenant law
are independent in this first sense of that term.
(2) The concept of independency is also used to describe substantial performance. When covenants are dependent, that is, when constructive conditions
are recognized, the promisee's ability to claim excuse from the obligation to
perform depends on whether the condition to the promisee's duty to perform
has been satisfied. Substantial performance by the promisor satisfies the condition of performance. If substantial performance has been rendered, the promisee loses his or her claim for excuse and is left with a claim for damages
resulting from the fact that substantial rather than exact performance has been
rendered. Conversely, since material breach is the antithesis of substantial performance, the promisee can be excused if the promisor is in material breach of
his or her obligation to perform. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19,
§ 11-22; 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 700, at 310, § 709, at 334, 338-39.
There are two ways to determine whether substantial performance has occurred.
In the case of multiple promises by a promisor, substantial performance of the
vital or important promises constitutes substantial performance of the contract;
incomplete performance of, or even total failure to perform, collateral or minor
promises is an immaterial breach. In our example, if the repair promise were
categorized as minor, even a total failure of performance by the landlord would
not excuse the tenant, since nonperformance of an immaterial promise, by definition, could not be a material breach. With respect to the vital promise or
promises in a contract, a small deviation from performance also is an immaterial
breach. In our example, if the landlord's repair promise were vital, the landlord's failure to perform it could be deemed insignificant in some circumstances- for example, were the landlord to fail to repair a single window pane.
See, e.g., Dittman v. McFadden, 159 Okla. 262, 263, 15 P.2d 139, 140 (1932)
(landlord's failure to make minor repairs is not eviction justifying abandonment
by tenant).
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flowing from the common law's conception of the lease as a conThe concept of independency can be used to describe both of these varieties of substantial performance. Thus, a collateral or minor promise can be
described as "independent" to indicate that failure to perform it does not excuse the promisee. Also, one might describe the fact that a promisor's incomplete performance of a vital promise is immaterial by saying that the promisee's
duty to perform became "independent," that is, unconditional, after receipt of
substantial performance of the vital promise. We prefer to avoid using the concept of independency to describe either variety of substantial performance. Instead, we prefer to say that the question in either case is not independency
proper-that is, whether conditions are recognized-but rather substantial performance-that is, whether the conditions have been satisfied.
(3) The concept of independency also can be used to explain the obligation of a tenant who affirms the lease after a material breach by the landlord. If
covenants are independent, a promisee remains obligated to perform even when
he or she has received no performance at all from the promisor. Similarly, even
if promises are dependent, a party who has received substantial but less than full
performance likewise is not relieved of his or her obligations by the immaterial
breach. However, if promises are dependent and a party does not receive substantial performance-that is, if a material breach has occurred-the promisee
has an election: terminate the contract and with it, his or her obligations to perform; or affirm the contract, in which case his or her own obligations under it
remain alive. The promisee who elects to affirm "waives" the material breach
and is relegated to the situation he or she would be in had only an immaterial
breach occurred (or, indeed, had the covenants been independent). The promisee has an action for damages, but no excuse from his or her own obligation to
perform. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 11-37; 3A A. CORBIN,
supra note 14, § 755.
Returning to our example, if the landlord failed to perform the promise to
repair, and if that failure constituted a material breach, the tenant would have
the election to vacate and rescind, thereby terminating his or her future liability
under the contract. However, if the tenant remained in possession and affirmed,
he or she vould continue to be liable. While it would be possible to state the
conclusion that the tenant who affirms must continue to perform his or her own
obligations by saying that these obligations are "independent," we see no merit
whatsoever in doing so. The conceptual explanation for the affirming tenant's
continued obligation to pay rent when the landlord commits a material breach is
that the tenant's election to affirm keeps the contract, and both parties' obligations under it, alive. See id. The policy explanation is that an unjust enrichment
would occur if the tenant were allowed to keep possession and avoid payment of
rent. See McGovern, supra note 6, at 681-82. Neither explanation requires resort
to the concept of independency. See Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory
Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L.
ANN. 3, 116 (1979). To the extent that difficult questions exist, they are procedural and focus on whether the tenant has a safe, effective and fair means to
offset his or her damages against the admitted liability for rent. As we have
argued elsewhere, the substantive doctrine of independency should be irrelevant
to those questions, and would be, were it not for the distorting effect of summary dispossess legislation. See Chase, supra note 11, at 206-25.
To summarize: In the strict and proper sense of the term, covenants in
leases are not independent, because landlord-tenant law allows the tenant to be
excused from her or his obligations to perform when the landlord commits a
material breach of contract, even though the tenant's duty to perform is not
made expressly conditional upon the landlord's performance. The proposition
that covenants in landlord-tenant law are "independent" could be used to describe the quite different conclusion that the tenant in a particular case has been
the beneficiary of substantial performance by the landlord, and hence must per-
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veyance of an interest in real estate." 2 ' Revisionists, although
form her or his own obligations under the lease. However, this latter proposition can be explained more effectively by conceding that covenants are
dependent and by discussing the adequacy of the landlord's performance under
the rubrics of substantial performance and material breach. See infra Part I-B.
Finally, the use of the term "independency" to explain the continuing obligation
of an affirming tenant to perform his or her duties under the contract should be
avoided as hopelessly confusing. The critical question for the tenant is whether
procedures are available to pursue a damages claim against the landlord, a question which, properly regarded, has nothing to do with the substantive doctrines
of independency and dependency.
21. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 195, 293 N.E.2d
831, 841 (1973). It seems clear that conceptualizing a lease as a conveyance
does have a restrictive impact on the questions of whether and when the tenant
can be excused for certain landlord breaches of covenant. To that extent, the
traditionalists' central claim of an important difference between property and
contract analyses is correct. See infra Part I-B. However, in attempting to differentiate property and contract analyses, we think it more accurate to say that the
conveyance view of a lease produces a particular (and perhaps peculiar) conception of substantial performance and material breach, rather than to say, as the
Hemingway court argues, that it produces the doctrine of independency, in supposed contrast to the contract doctrine of dependency. For a discussion of the
doctrine of independency, see supra note 20. In other words, we believe that the
essence of the conveyance view is that the landlord has substantially performed
his or her obligations under the lease when he or she conveys possession of the
land to the tenant and refrains from disturbing the tenant's possession thereafter. Consequently, any breach that does not affect the tenant's possession of the
land generally has not been regarded as material.
Indeed, inasmuch as traditionalists recognize that the doctrine of eviction is
a substitute for the contract doctrine of dependency of covenants, see supra note
2, their claim that property law burdens tenants in ways that contract law does
not, would have to take either of two forms, if it is to have any substance at all.
First, traditionalists might argue that there are important differences between
the property doctrine of eviction and the contract doctrine of material breach for
which it substitutes. Because of the difference, tenants who wish to rescind the
contract and be excused from further performance of it might be denied that
remedy under a property analysis when they might be granted it under a contract analysis. Second, instead of (or along with) arguing that property law is
more demanding than contract law on the question of the grounds for rescission, traditionalists might argue that the property doctrine of independency prevents the tenant who remains in possession and affirms the contract from
effectively offsetting his or her damages against the landlord's claim for rent. Of
these two arguments, we believe the first has merit, while the second does not.
See supra note 20.
Unfortunately, traditionalist literature fails to differentiate clearly between
the two questions of remedies we have identified: the question of whether property law places obstacles on the tenant who wishes to rescind after the landlord's
breach, and the separate question of whether property law prevents the tenant
who affirms from effectively setting off his or her damages against the landlord's
rent. For a discussion of traditionalist literature, see supra note 6. Some traditionalists argue the second point. See, e.g., R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, § § 6:11,
:17. Some argue both the rescission and affirmance points. See, e.g., Quinn &
Phillips, supra note 2, at 231-39; Note, Contract Principles, supra note 2, at 29-33,
47-50. We are not aware of any traditionalist writers who present what we regard to be a completely accurate assessment of the dependency of covenants
dispute, namely, that the question of rescission presents the sole instance in
which the independency-dependency distinction should matter, and also that
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they take different tacks, challenge the traditionalists' conclusion
that the independency of lease covenants illustrates important divergencies between property and contract law. 2 2 Instead, they
view independency as explainable in contract terms. The question thus framed by the dispute between traditionalists and revisionists is whether there are important differences between
property and contract analyses of conditional performance, and if
so, what they might be.
A.

The Traditionaland Revised Versions of Independency

At least on the surface, there is considerable merit to the traditionalist claim that property and contract analyses of the landlord's breach of lease covenants diverge markedly. Two landmark
cases, both decided in 1914, are illustrative. In University Club of
Chicago v. Deakin,2 3 the landlord sued for rent due on a one-year
lease after the tenant had vacated during the tenancy. The tenant, a jeweler, defended the suit on the ground that the rent obligation was excused, because the landlord had breached a promise
in the lease not to rent other parts of the building to tenants making a speciality of the sale of pearls. The landlord had leased a
neighboring storeroom, and had inserted in the lease a provision
forbidding the sale of pearls. The second tenant, however, violated that provision. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed a
judgment for the landlord. 24 In a refreshingly direct opinion, the
court held that the lease in question "was a bilateral contract," in
there are specific and important differences between the property and contract
law versions of rescission. We attempt in this article to provide that assessment.
Thus we reject the revisionists' claim that there are no relevant differences between property and contract analyses on the dependency question.
22. For example, Professor McGovern denies that there is any meaningful
conceptual connection between property reasoning and the question of the independency or dependency of lease covenants. See McGovern, supra note 6, at
679-80. Professor Siegel sees a connection, and argues that the supposed independency of lease covenants is an application of the contract doctrine of substantial performance. But he fails to find any meaningful differences between
the property and contract views of substantial performance and material breach.
See Siegel, supra note 6, at 663-70. While both theorists thus reject the traditionalist claim that there are important differences between property and contract
analyses on the question of independency, we will focus on Professor Siegel as
the primary exponent of the revisionist view. Even though, in our view, he overlooks important differences between property and contract analyses, his recognition that conveyance reasoning is at least relevant to the important issues that
are debated under the rubric of "independency" is accurate. For a further discussion of Professor McGovern's views, see infra note 128. For additional comments on Professor Siegel's views on independency, see infra notes 67 & 119.
23. 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914).
24. Id. at 262, 106 N.E. at 792.
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that it "contained covenants to be performed by each" party: the
landlord's covenant to protect the tenant from competition, and
the tenant's covenant to pay rent. 2 5 Although the contract did
not explicitly excuse the tenant in the event that the landlord
failed to perform his promise, the court stated that it would "be
presumed," that the parties intended the landlord's promise to be
one of the vital provisions of the lease, and that the tenant "would
not have entered into the contract if this clause had not been
made a part of it."26 The court held that the promise was "such
an essential provision of the contract that a breach of it would
warrant [the tenant] in rescinding the contract and surrendering
27
possession of the premises."
In contract terms, the Deakin court imposed upon the landlord a constructive condition of performance of the noncompetition promise. The court went on to find that the landlord had not
substantially satisfied that condition merely by inserting a restrictive covenant in the second lease. Because of the landlord's material breach the tenant was excused. 28 The court thus applied to a
lease the standard contract presumption of dependency in bilat29
eral contracts.
Stewart v. Childs Co. 3 0 lends marked contrast. There, as in
Deakin, the landlord sued a commercial tenant who had vacated
during the lease term and had ceased paying rent. The tenant
defended on the ground that the landlord had failed to perform
an express promise to waterproof the basement of the restaurant
building, resulting in substantial flooding of the leased premises. 3 1 The trial court directed a verdict for the landlord, holding
25. Id. at 260, 106 N.E. at 791.
26. Id. The court explained that when a contract provision is violated and
there is no express agreement that the breach should operate as a discharge, the
court must determine whether the violation concerned a matter "vital" to the
contract. Id.
27. Id.at 260-61, 106 N.E. at 791.
28. Id. at 261-62, 106 N.E. at 791-92. The court found that "[iut was incumbent upon [the landlord] to do more than insert this provision in the second
lease." Id.at 261, 106 N.E. at 792. Since the landlord contracted not to lease to
anyone in the tenant's line of business, if the landlord failed to prevent subsequent tenants from engaging in that speciality, he did so at the risk of the original tenant terminating the lease. Id. at 262, 106 N.E. at 792.
29. See 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 813, at 6 (if a contract is bilateral,
the failure to give performance will deprive that party of the right to enforce
performance by the other party).
30. 86 N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (1914).
31. Id. at 649, 92 A. at 393. In the lease the landlord promised that "[t]he
basement shall be waterproof, and not less than 7 feet high. And he does hereby
guarantee that he will at all times during the said lease keep the said cellar water-
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that the tenant's covenant to pay rent was independent of the
landlord's promise to waterproof the premises. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed. The court conceded that
"[t]he cellar was necessary for the conduct of the business" of the
tenant,3 2 thus suggesting that the covenant to waterproof was a
vital and material provision of the lease. Moreover, the court
found that the landlord had breached the covenant, since "[t]he
presence of the water in the cellar was wholly due to the fact that
the walls and foundation were not waterproof" in accordance
with the landlord's promise. 3 3 Nevertheless, the court refused to
condition the tenant's obligation to pay rent on the performance
of the landlord's covenant to waterproof. The court adopted
without discussion the trial court's view that the two covenants
were independent, stating simply and flatly that the landlord's
"breach of ... covenant was not a defense to the action." 3 4 In
contrast to the Deakin language of bilateral contracts, material
breach and rescission, the Stewart court spoke a pure property vocabulary: While the tenant could not be excused for the landlord's breach of an independent covenant, he might be excused if
the landlord's conduct amounted to a "constructive eviction" of
the tenant from the premises. 3 5 The court concluded, however,
that the landlord's conduct in the case did not amount to a con36
structive eviction.
The traditionalist claim that there are differences between
property and contract analyses appears to be borne out by a comparison of cases like Stewart and Deakin. In assessing basically simproof at his own expense." Id. At times the water in the basement was three feet
deep. Id. at 650, 92 A. at 393.
32. Id. at 650, 92 A. at 393. The premises were used as a restaurant. A
steam apparatus for brewing coffee as well as storage items were kept in the
cellar. Id.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 650-51, 92 A. at 393. The court reasoned that there was no evidence that the landlord intended to deprive the tenant of the use of the premises. Id. at 651, 92 A. at 393.
35. Id. at 650, 92 A. at 393. See 2 H. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT

§ 674, at 1137 (1912) ("An actual eviction as distinct

from a constructive eviction occurs when the landlord.., enters upon and takes
physical possession of the whole or of some part of the premises .... All other
evictions are constructive merely."). As we have suggested above, see supra notes
20 & 21, and shall develop more fully in Part I-B, the property doctrine of eviction is a substitute for the contract doctrine of dependency of covenants. Nonetheless, it is a substitute, and is in important ways different from the contract
doctrine.
36. 86 N.J.L. at 650-51, 92 A. at 393. For a discussion of the justifications
for the court's view that no eviction had occurred, see infra notes 81-113 and
accompanying text.
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ilar facts the two cases employ different methods and reach
different results. Deakin employs a straightforward contract approach, focusing on the materiality of the landlord's noncompetition promise and the extent to which the landlord's actions
constituted performance of that promise. Stewart, in contrast, eschews entirely the contract perspective. Instead, the court assesses the landlord's performance in terms of the property
doctrine of "constructive eviction," and concludes that no evic37
tion occurred on the facts of the case.
In spite of the foregoing distinctions, a strong recent revisionist critique has argued that the apparent differences between
property and contract analyses suggested by cases like Deakin and
Stewart are illusory, and that property and contract law in fact apply identical doctrine. Though joined on this point by other commentators, Professor Siegel has offered the most provocative
argument for the proposition that the lease doctrine of independency of covenants is not a rejection of modern contract doctrine,
as Stewart seems to indicate, but rather an expression of it.38 He
asserts that under contract doctrine, substantial performance
"can render covenants independent which theretofore have been
dependent." 39 By performing substantially, the promisor satisfies
the constructive condition of performance imposed in bilateral
contracts, 40 thus becoming entitled to the performance of the aggrieved party and precluding a claim of rescission. 4 1 Professor
Siegal quotes cases in which he suggests that the basis of the decision to deny rescission to the tenant is that the landlord has substantially performed his obligations under the lease. 42 He thus
37. For a discussion of the Stewart court's conclusion that the facts in that
case did not amount to a constructive eviction, see infra notes 81-113 and accompanying text.
38. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 663-70. See also Weinberg, supra note 6, at .6682.
39. Siegel, supra note 6, at 665 (footnote omitted). While we think that
Professor Siegel correctly indicates that the real question in landlord-tenant
cases is not independency of covenants but rather substantial performance,
which assumes a dependency view, we question his quoted statement concerning
substantial performance doctrine. See infra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of the doctrine of substantial performance, see supra
note 20.
41. Substantial performance of a condition makes absolute the duty of the
person whose performance was predicated on satisfaction of that condition. See
A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 709.
42. Siegel, supra note 6, at 665 (citing, inter alia, McCullogh v. Cox, 6 Barb.
386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849); Obermyer v. Nichols, 6 Binn. 159 (Pa. 1813)). For a
criticism of Professor Siegel's use of these cases in support of his thesis, see infra
note 67.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 571

concludes that "[i]n fact, the independence of lease covenants''
does not stand in contrast to modern contract law, but rather "results from a vigorous application of one branch of the contract
principle of constructive conditions, i.e., the doctrine of substan43
tial performance.''
We think that Professor Siegel's analysis, while it contains
significant insight, is flawed in important ways. On the one hand,
his analysis does not go far enough, and on the other, it goes too
far. Siegel does not go far enough in his important, and we think
correct, claim that the property doctrine of independency is actually an application of contract principles. In fact, in developing
that claim, Siegel appears to confuse two separate assertions
about the property doctrine of independency. His confusion diminishes the reader's ability to perceive his criticism of the traditionalist position and weakens his case.
The thrust of Siegel's argument is that the independence of
lease covenants is a function of the doctrine of substantial performance. One way in which he states that argument is his contention that "[p]art performance [i.e., substantial performance]
can render covenants independent which theretofore have been
dependent." 44 For our part, however, we see little merit and considerable danger, in an area already rife with confusion, in characterizing the situation that results from substantial performance of
a constructive condition as a kind of independency. 4 5 It is true
that substantial performance of a constructive condition makes
absolute (i.e., unconditional) the duty of a person whose own performance was contingent on the condition being satisfied. 46 And
it is true that the aggrieved party is left, after substantial performance, with only an action for damages for any shortfall resulting
from the fact that the performance he has received is partial
(though substantial) rather than complete. 4 7 Because the aggrieved party's duty is absolute after substantial performance, and
because he has only an action for damages, it is tempting to say
that his obligation to perform is "independent," since exactly
43. Siegel, supra note 6, at 664 (footnote omitted). Professor Siegel explains that whatever the motive for the substantial performance doctrine might
be, the doctrine represents nineteenth century contract law. Id. at 664 n.80.
44. Id. at 665 (footnote omitted).
45. For a discussion of the possible meanings of "independency of covenants," see supra note 20.
46. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19, §§ 11-22, at 407-12; 3A A.
CORBIN, supra note 14, § 709, at 334, 338-39.
47. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19, §§ 11-22, at 407-08; 3A A.
CORBIN, supra note 14, § 709, at 334.
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those consequences attach to an independent promise. 4 8 How-

ever, we would prefer to analyze the substantial performance situations by saying that the tenant's duty is unconditional because
the condition to his duty has been performed, 49 not that it is unconditional because it is an independent duty, that is, one to
which no condition of performance ever attached.
Lest this seem needlessly punctilious we should explain why
the two descriptions we have indicated are different. In a lease
case, the landlord might, as in Stewart, make a promise respecting
the condition of the premises. When the landlord fails to perform
that promise, property law asserts that the tenant is not discharged, because his duty to pay rent is independent of the landlord's performance of the repair promise. Professor Siegal
argues that the reason for the tenant's duty being absolute is that
the landlord has substantially performed the repair promise. The
assumption of that analysis would be that the rent obligation was
originally conditioned on performance of the repair promise, but
that the condition had been satisfied by part, i.e., substantial, performance, thus rendering the tenant's obligation "independent"
from that point on. We believe this is a misdescription of the situation. In Stewart, the landlord did not substantially perform the
covenant to waterproof the basement. He did not perform the
covenant at all. Yet despite the landlord's total breach of that
covenant, he was allowed to recover the rent. If it makes sense to
say that the tenant's duty to pay rent was independent, the reason
must be found in an explanation other than that the duty was "independent" because the condition to its performance-waterproofing of the basement by the landlord-had been satisfied.
Another explanation of the lease doctrine of independency is
available, and on occasion Professor Siegel hints at it. Like his
first explanation, this second one employs the concept of substantial performance, but in a sense different from that indicated so
48. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, §§ 11-29 (lease provisions
are generally construed as independent promises).
49. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 268 comment d (1932). Comment d
provides:
If two performances constitute the subjects of an agreed exchange, and
the duty to render one of them is conditional upon the antecedent or
simultaneous rendition of the other, the condition is performed when
that other subject of exchange is rendered substantially in full, in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary. The conditional duty
has now become unconditional, because the condition has been
performed.
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far. In the sentence immediately preceding his statement that
"[p]art performance can render convenants independent which
theretofore have been dependent," 50 Siegel quotes Williston for
the proposition that "breach of a separate collateral promise of
minor importance will not justify refusal by the other party to perform, if the main promise to him has been or is being substantially performed." 5' As illustration, Siegel cites and quotes
several cases in which, as in Stewart, tenants were refused exoneration from their rent obligation after the landlord breached various specific lease covenants. 52 The Williston quote and the
examples, however, do not illustrate the proposition that "part
performance can render covenants independent which theretofore have been dependent." Rather, they illustrate a separate
kind of "independency." The Williston quote in full is as follows:
Where several promises are made by one party, a breach
of one of them necessarily goes to only part of the consideration, but it may be a vital part, or it may be a minor
part. A breach of a separate collateral promise of minor
importance will not justify refusal by the other party to
perform if the main promise to him has been or is being
53
substantially performed.
Translated into our present discussion, this excerpt indicates that
in cases of multiple promises by a promisor, the promisee's reciprocal duty to perform is conditional upon substantial performance of the vital promise or promises by his promisor, but is not
conditional upon performance of "a separate collateral promise
of minor importance." That is, the promisee's duty is "independent" of the promisor's performance of such collateral promises.
Under this analysis of independency, the fact that a particular
promise has not been performed at all is irrelevant (except of
course insofar as nonperformance gives rise to a claim for damages), so long as the breached promise is classified as collateral or
minor. Thus, the promisee has to perform because his performance was not dependent at all upon the collateral promise. 54 This
50. Siegel, supra note 6, at 665 (footnote omitted).
51. 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 841, at 159, quoted in Siegel, supra note
6, at 664-65.
52. Siegel, supra note 6, at 665. See also supra note 42.
53. 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 841, at 159 (citations omitted).
54. We accept, for purposes of the textual discussion accompanying notes
50-53, the long tradition that refers to minor promises in the multiple promise
situation as "independent." However, modern contract writers prefer, as do we,
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contrasts with Professor Siegel's basic approach, in which the
promisee's obligation was "therefore" dependent upon the collateral promise and was "rendered independent" by the promisor's substantial part performance of it.
Had Professor Siegel separated the "independency" that results from substantial performance of an admittedly conditional
duty, and the "independency" that results from the distinction
between vital promises (which are dependent and require substantial performance) and collateral promises (which are "independent" and subject to no condition of performance at all) he
could have carried his analysis further. As it is, his analysis tells
us, instructively, that the property doctrine of independency is related to the doctrine of substantial performance in contract law.
However, by introducing the false note of "independency" result55
ing from substantial performance of a constructive condition,
he misses the opportunity to be precise; and in missing it, he fails
to draw the exact relevant parallel between property and contract
law.
Put in the terms we have now introduced, the decision in
Stewart would hold that the landlord's obligation to waterproof
the basement was not a "vital" part of the consideration for the
tenant's promise to pay rent, but was, rather, only a "collateral"
or "minor" convenant. 5 6 Because the waterproofing promise was
thus "independent," breach of it generated at best a claim for
damages but did not discharge the tenant's duty to pay rent.
Thus explained, the result in Stewart appears to be entirely
straightforward (if somewhat outdated) contract law. In modern
understanding, a covenant is "independent [i.e., unconditional] if
nothing but a lapse of time is necessary to make the promise enforceable." 5 7 Where, as in Stewart, a promisor makes several
promises, a minor promise might be regarded as independent in
the sense that the promisor's failure to perform it does not discharge the promisee. 58 However, since the concept of dependency does apply in this situation-because the promisor's failure
to avoid the terminology of independency entirely in the multiple promise situation. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of the analytical view that independency results from
substantial performance of a constructive condition, see supra notes 44-49 and
accompanying text.
56. For a further discussion of Stewart, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
57. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 11-29, at 432 (footnote
omitted).
58. Id. (citing S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 822, at 44 (in contract to sell a
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to substantially perform the "vital" promise or promises would
discharge the promisee-modern authorities prefer to say that
"the real question" in cases of multiple obligations "does not involve independent promises but [rather] substantial performance." 59 Thus, "[i]n a true sense a promise is independent in
cases to which the doctrine of constructive conditions does not
apply" at all, not in cases to which it does apply. 60
In effect, modern commentators on the law of contracts take
the position that promises are generally dependent, unless expressly made unconditional. 6 1 Whether a promisee has a duty to
perform thus depends on whether the promisor has substantialy
performed his or her obligations. 62 If the agreement involves
multiple obligations, the question in determining substantial performance "is not whether each promise is substantially performed
but whether there is overall substantial performance." 63 Thus,
multiple promises are considered as a package and the question is
whether the promisee has received substantial performance of the
entire package. Professor Siegel, it appears, has neglected this
refinement of the doctrine of substantial performance.
We conclude, then, that a thorough revisionist critique of the
traditionalist view should assert that the traditionalist emphasis
on independency as a property doctrine in contrast to the contract doctrine of dependency commits a double error. First, as
Professor Siegel seems to understand in a general sense, the traditionalist view overlooks the fact that the so-called "independency" doctrine of landlord-tenant law is not true independency
doctrine at all, but instead is an adaptation of the contract law of
dependency and substantial performance. The tenant in Stewart
did not lose because the landlord owed him no performance at all
as a precondition to recovery of rent, which would have been the
car and change a tire, performance of promise to change the tire is not a condition to buyer's duty to pay)).
59, J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 11-29, at 433 (footnote omit-

ted). See also E.

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS

580 n.21 (1982) ("Courts sometimes

revert to the notion of independence of promises when it would be less confusing to treat all promises as dependent and base the result on the immateriality of
the breach.").
60. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 11-29 at 433. See E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, supra note 18 ("To say that a promise ... is 'independent'
...is still an intelligible way of saying that it is not subject to a constructive
condition.").
61. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 59, at 580 n.21; 6 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 20, § 813, at 6.
62. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 59, at 580 n.21.
63. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 11-29, at 432 n.13.
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case if lease covenants in general were truly independent. 64
Rather, the tenant lost because the landlord had in fact substantially performed the package of obligations upon which rent depended. The fact that the promise to waterproof was totally
unperformed did not preclude substantial performance of the
package. 6 5 Second, the traditionalists overlook that the contract
law applied in cases like Stewart-which in essence labels minor
promises in the lease as "independent"-is dated contract law.
Modern commentators avoid the concept of independency entirely except to describe the situation in which no constructive
conditions of performance operate. 6 6 Yet in cases like Stewart, the
landlord is subject to the constructive condition that he substantially perform his package of promises in the lease. The question
of the significance of the promise to waterproof the basement
should thus be considered as a part of the question of the landlord's substantial performance. If the landlord's failure to perform does not discharge the tenant, the reason should be that
performance of the promise is immaterial to substantial performance of the landlord's total package of promises, not that it is an
"independent" promise.
As a final point to this portion of our discussion, we should
point out that we do not wish to be understood as agreeing ultimately with even a revised version of Professor Siegel's revisionist
analysis. 6 7 He regards his discussion of independency doctrine as
64. For a discussion of the possible interpretations of the "independency"
of lease covenants, see supra note 20. For a discussion of the facts and holding
of Stewart, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of the court's conclusion that the landlord's failure to
perform the waterproofing covenant in Stewart did not constitute a constructive
eviction, see infra notes 81-113 and accompanying text.
While we agree with the revisionists' rejection of independency as a proper
mode of analysis for cases like Stewart, we note that it is quite easy to appreciate
how independency came to be viewed as the explanation for such holdings. Any
one of the landlord's promises which, if completely unperformed, would not
excuse the tenant's rent obligation is, in practical effect, an independent promise. Yet, at the same time, if its nonperformance combined with the nonperformance of one or more other landlord promises would excuse the tenant's
rent obligation, it is also potentially dependent. While the dependency of such a
promise is only in combination with other promises, the potential for dependency is there nonetheless. Consequently, a labelling of these promises as independent, while often correct in practical effect, distorts the full analysis that
should occur in a case like Stewart.
66. For a discussion of modern views of the concept of an "independent"
covenant, see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
67. As we have indicated, we think that the central insight in Professor
Siegel's discussion is his translation of the question of the so-called independency of lease covenants into the question of substantial performance and material breach; the latter analysis assumes, of course, a dependency of convenants
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an illustration of his general thesis that "modern leasing law is
view. See Siegel, supra note 6. One who adopts that perspective, as we do, might
be expected to argue as follows: First, when a court determines, as in Stewart,
that a landlord's nonperformance, or partial performance, of a specific covenant
does not excuse a tenant from her or his own performance obligations, andjustifies that conclusion by saying that covenants are "independent," the court really
should be understood as saying that the landlord has committed only an immaterial breach, or (using the opposite side of the coin) that the tenant has received
substantial performance, and consequently must perform as promised. Under
this approach, the court should not be understood to mean that covenants are
independent in the sense that no failure of performance by the landlord could
ever excuse the tenant unless the tenant has contracted for the excuse. This is
because the tenant who has not contracted for the excuse nevertheless may be
able to be excused when the landlord's failure to perform constitutes an eviction
of the tenant. Second, the fact that property law covertly employs concepts of
substantial performance and material breach does not mean that it employs
them in the same way that contract law does. Whether it does or does not is a
question that must be explored. It may be that the doctrine of eviction is not an
exact parallel of the contract doctrine of dependency, and may in fact be a more
demanding doctrine. In Part I-A we argue the first point; and in Part I-B, we
argue the point that property and contract analysis of substantial performance
and material breach do in fact differ. Overall, we conclude that there is merit, as
well as some unfortunate partiality, to both the traditionalist and revisionist
positions.
Professor Siegel does not pursue his insight the way we have just suggested,
and as a result, his analysis presents difficulties beyond those we have identified
in the text. First, having suggested correctly that the property doctrine of independency is not a true independency doctrine, but rather a substantial performance doctrine, Professor Siegel should have undertaken to analyze the various
meanings that independency might have in lease cases, and the various fact situations in which it might matter what a court is saying when it speaks of covenants
being independent. See supra note 20. Conceptual clarity, of course, is at stake
here, and in an area as overrun with confusion as this, conceptual clarity is its
own reward. In addition, however, there is a practical problem with Professor
Siegel's failure to develop the various categories of independency because the
several explanations of independency can lead to different results in actual
cases. For example, all of the cases involving a breach by the landlord examined
by Professor Siegel in his treatment of independency are cases in which the tenant remained in possession and sought to avoid paying rent. See supra note 42.
Faced with a tenant in possession, a court might well want to conclude that the
tenant is not excused by the landlord's breach, in order to prevent the unjust
enrichment that could result from the tenant's remaining in possession without
obligation to pay. See McGovern, supra note 6, at 681-82 (the courts' distinction
between total and partial breach often is motivated by a desire to avoid unjust
enrichment). An imprecise court might well seize upon the concept that covenants are independent-in the sense that an excusing condition must be express, see supra note 20-to explain its conclusion that the tenant is obligated to
pay rent notwithstanding the landlord's breach. That explanation produces the
desired result, and the sort of result-oriented classification it represents is a frequently used technique in legal decision-making. See Taylor, H.L.A. Hart's Concept of Law in the Perspective of American Legal Realism, 35 MOD. L. REV. 606, 608-09
(1972) (discussing result-oriented categorizations). However, the suggestion
that covenants are independent in the sense that constructive conditions are not
recognized could come back to haunt the court if a tenant who has not expressly
contracted for an excuse has vacated the premises and is seeking to rescind.
There, the unjust enrichment problem is nonexistent, but the determination in
the previous case that covenants are independent could prevent rescission in the

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/1

22

Chase and Taylor: Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and Contract

1985]

LANDLORD AND TENANT

593

neither feudal, agrarian, nor grounded in real property doctrines," but rather is "modern, commercial, and already
grounded in contract doctrine," and in fact has a "dominant contract basis." 6 8 However, while Professor Siegel properly rejects
the extreme disunity of property and contract law posited by the
latter situation. Thus, in order to avoid prejudicing later (and different) cases,
the court should say that the reason the tenant remaining in possession is not
excused from the obligation to pay rent is either that the breach in question is
immaterial (if that is in fact the case), or that, even if a material failure to perform has occurred, the tenant has elected to treat the failure as immaterial. See
supra note 20. As between the second and third explanations for the result, the
court likewise should be careful. If the court-again being imprecise-states
that the landlord's breach was immaterial, when in fact it was significant, but had
been treated as a partial breach by the tenant, that determination could prejudice a later case in which the tenant vacates and seeks to use the same type of
landlord nonperformance to justify termination of the lease. Hence, if in fact
the tenant in the former case did not receive substantial performance, the court
should say so, and base its holding against the tenant on the ground that the
tenant by remaining in possession in the face of a material breach had elected to
affirm the lease.
If the tenant vacates and seeks to use the landlord's breach as a basis for
rescission, the first and second meanings of independency (express conditions
are required, or substantial performance has occurred) are relevant, rather than
the third (affirmance by the tenant). See supra note 20. If the court concludes
that the tenant is not entitled to rescind, it could justify that conclusion either by
saying that covenants are independent-meaning that the tenant is not excused
because he or she failed to contract expressly for an excuse-or that covenants
are "independent" in the sense that the landlord has not committed a material
breach. Again, precision is essential. The determination that covenants are independent in the sense that constructive conditions are not recognized would
mean that a tenant who failed to contract for an excuse could never rescind even
in the face of the landlord's material breach. In contrast, the determination that
covenants are "independent" in the sense that the tenant has in fact received
substantial performance leaves open the result that the tenant can rescind when
the landlord in fact commits a material breach. In this regard, Professor Siegel's
statement that "regardless of its origins, the independence of lease covenants
would accomplish 'perfect justice,' were it not for the nineteenth century legislation on summary proceedings for possession of real property" far overshoots
the mark. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 663. Independency in the sense that conditions must be express might accomplish perfect justice in cases in which the
tenant remains in possession, but it accomplishes far less than perfect justice in
cases in which the aggrieved tenant wishes to rescind rather than receive the
benefits of the landlord's performance while remaining in possession.
In short, Professor Siegel overlooks the range of meanings to the concept of
independency. By limiting his focus to tenant-in-possession cases, he fails to
make the important point that the court's choice of concept is-or should be-a
function of the fact situation before the court. Also, in addition to, if not because of, his limited concentration on tenant-in-possession cases, Professor
Siegel offers an unsatisfactory discussion of the relationship between the contract doctrine of dependency and the property doctrine of eviction that substitutes for it, a relationship that becomes apparent in cases in which the tenant
seeks to vacate and rescind because of the landlord's breach. We defer consideration of Professor Siegel's analysis of constructive eviction until we have discussed the basic doctrine more fully. See infra note 119.
68. Siegel, supra note 6, at 650.
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traditionalists, we question whether he has not gone too far in the
opposite direction, positing a complete "unity of modern leasing
and contract law" 6 9 in its stead. To say that property and contract
cases both work within the doctrinal framework of substantial performance, based upon the law of constructive conditions, does
not justify Professor Siegel's conclusion that property and contract analyses are identical. Unless the revisionists can demonstrate that property and contract law employ common doctrine in
a common way, they will at best have blunted some of the extreme rhetoric of the traditionalist position (substituting some extreme rhetoric of their own), without destroying the central point
of that position, that property and contract analyses are significantly different. Stated affirmatively, if there are important differences of method in the handling of common doctrine, a
substantial part of the traditionalist criticism remains sound.
Whether there are such differences is the question prompted by
the analysis thus far.
B.

Substantial Performance in Property and Contract Analyses

Professor Siegel's insightful revisionist critique answers one
question only to generate another. His analysis, as refined, correctly tells us that the property doctrine of "independency" announced in cases like Stewart is in fact an expression of the
contract doctrine of substantial performance: The tenant is
bound to pay rent because the landlord has substantially performed the package of promises vital to the lease transaction.
What his analysis fails to explain is why promises of relatively
equal significance are regarded so differently by the Stewart and
Deakin courts-why, that is, performance of the covenant to waterproof was regarded as immaterial to substantial performance
in Stewart while the noncompetition promise was regarded as vital
to the question of substantial performance in Deakin. Put in terms
we prefer, the issue is why the Deakin landlord was regarded as
having materially breached because he failed to perform the noncompetition promise, while the Stewart landlord was regarded as
having performed substantially even though he breached the covenant to waterproof the basement of the leased premises. The
69. Id. at 651. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 31 n.9 (Professor Siegel's "enthusiasm for his thesis may be excessive. His argument, that the lease was generally viewed as a contract throughout the nineteenth century, leads him to
overlook evidence of an estate frame of mind."). For a discussion of differences
between property and contract approaches to the determination of substantial
performance and material breach, see infra notes 104-13.
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question is whether property and contract analyses differ significantly in their determination of substantial performance, and if
so, how. We have an answer, but the question assumes that substantial performance doctrine does apply in landlord-tenant law.
We suspect that before the answer we offer will make sense, it will
be useful to backtrack a bit and show how substantial performance doctrine applies in a case like Stewart.
1. Dependency in Lease Cases: The Doctrine of Eviction
The law has held from very early times that the tenant's rent
obligation is excused if the landlord evicts the tenant from possession of the premises. 70 The source of this obligation to protect
the tenant's possession is the express or implied covenant of
quiet enjoyment. 7 ' The doctrinal basis for the discharge of the
rent obligation upon eviction is that the covenant of quiet enjoyment "is, in its nature, a condition precedent to the payment of

rent

....

"72

That language, of course, is reminiscent of Deakin,73

and establishes that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is, to use
70. McGovern, supra note 6, at 666 (in Roman law and medieval England,
lessor who evicted lessee was not entitled to rent). For a discussion of the dependency of promises and feudal rent theory as bases for the tenant's excuse
after the landlord evicts, see infra note 72.
71. See Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 595, 208 N.W. 255, 258 (1926)
(the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment "is a covenant relating to the possession of the property, and it is broken by an entry and expulsion from or actual
disturbance of such possession."); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1,
§§ 3.47-3.51.
72. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727, 730 (N.Y. 1826). See also Jackson v.
Eddy, 12 Mo. 209, 212 (1848); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1,
§ 3.47, at 272 & n.6;J. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD
AND TENANT 183 (1844) ("The quiet enjoyment of the premises, without any
molestation on the part of the landlord, is an implied condition on which the
tenant is to pay rent.").
As do we, these authorities view the rent obligation as promissory in origin,
arising either from the express promise to pay a stipulated amount that will exist
in most leases, or from the implied promise to pay fair rental value that will arise
by virtue of the tenant's taking possession of the premises. See 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.64 (duty to pay reasonable value for use of property); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 introductory note & comment
b (1977) (if landlord did not give use of land as a gift, tenant obligated to pay
rent). In the Dyett statement quoted in the text accompanying this note, that
promissory obligation, whether express or implied, is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his or her promise, either express or implied, to protect
the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises.
In an earlier formulation, however, the rent obligation was conceived in
nonpromissory terms. The obligation was viewed as "issuing from the land,"
and was conceptualized much like a species of affirmative easement that the
landlord reserved upon the transfer of the land to the tenant. See 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 9.41; Humbach, supra note 12, at 1226. This
conception no doubt accurately described early leases, in which landlords did
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contract terms, a "vital provision" of the lease, and that the tenant's covenant to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's substantial performance of it. The tenant's obligation to pay rent, in
short, is dependent on the landlord's maintenance of the tenant's
74
possession.
So much is generally conceded in property law. What dispute exists has centered not on the principle that rent is dependent upon possession, but rather upon the question of what
landlord activity constitutes substantial performance of the oblireserve rent in the form of a share of crops. See 2 R. POWELL, supra note 2,
230[1], at 296. In that sense, rent literally did issue out of the land.
Professor Weinberg says that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this
feudal or medieval conception of rent coexisted with the contractual or promissory explanation, and was superseded by the latter conception in the eighteenth
century. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 36. One interesting question raised by
the existence and coexistence of these two quite distinct explanations of the tenant's obligation to pay rent is whether the two analyses produce the same results. It appears that, in some cases, the two analyses will lead to the same
conclusion. In the typical case in which the landlord physically expels the tenant
from the leased premises, the tenant's rent obligation is excused both on the
dependency explanation offered in Dyett, and on the ground that rent issues
from the land: When the estate is terminated by repossession, the obligation
that issues from it likewise terminates. See Humbach, supra note 12, at 1231;
Weinberg, supra note 6, at 36. In other cases, however, the two analyses appear
to diverge. Thus, if the landlord deprives the tenant of access to an entitlement
connected with the lease, such as a right of way to reach the leased premises, the
obligation to pay rent could not be excused on feudal rent grounds, since rent
issued from the demised premises and not from appurtenant rights. See Siegel,
supra note 6, at 683; Weinberg, supra note 6, at 79. American courts, however,
have excused the tenant in such cases on constructive eviction grounds. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Osborne, 35 Barb. 523, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861). Since this particular
use of the doctrine of constructive eviction is indicative of the courts' use of the
doctrine to import contract reasoning into lease cases, we return to it later. See
infra note 119.
73. For a discussion of Deakin, see supra notes 23-29 and accompanying
text.
74. The landlord's obligation to secure the tenant's undisturbed possession
includes both an obligation to refrain from evicting the tenant from possession
after the term has begun, and an obligation to deliver possession at the outset of
the term. Failure to perform allows the tenant to rescind if he so elects. See
Adrain v. Rabinowitz, 116 N.J.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (1936) (lessor has duty to put
lessee in actual possession of premises); Sloan v. Hart, 150 N.C. 269, 63 S.E.
1037 (1909) (landlord impliedly covenants to deliver possession to tenant); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.37 (lessor's implied covenant to
deliver possession); id. § 3.46 (implied covenant of power to demise); id. § 3.49
(interference by lessor). Because the tenant is allowed to rescind, her or his rent
obligation is dependent on the landlord's performance of the promise to deliver
possession. For a discussion and analysis of the doctrine of dependency as applied to leases, see supra note 20. Although the concept of "possession" can
exert a restrictive influence on the determination of the landlord's substantial
performance in the delivery as well as in the eviction context, see infra note 113,
we limit out textual analysis to eviction in order not to prolong unduly the
discussion.
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gation to protect possession. All agree that actual eviction by the
landlord-" invasion of the tenant's right to physical possession of
the property" 75 -justifies the tenant's termination of the lease.
The landlord is thus in material breach if he engages in positive
acts of physical interference with the tenant's possession. A more
problematic concept, however, is constructive eviction, the claim
at issue in Stewart. 76 Originally, courts took the position that only
an actual eviction excused the tenant's nonperformance of the
covenant to pay rent.7 7 Then, in the nineteenth century, English
and American courts adopted the rule that a plea of "construc78
tive" eviction could be raised as a defense to a suit for rent.
This was done on the sensible ground that the landlord could
make the tenant's life miserable by interference as bad as, but falling short of, an actual eviction. 79 In so doing, the courts, as one
judge prophetically said, "introduce[d] a new and very extensive
chapter in the law of landlord and tenant." 80 In our discussion
below, we hope to show that this chapter of the law, with its genesis in property concepts, differs from, although it is related to, the
contract chapter on material breach. Specifically, we hope to
show that the doctrine of constructive eviction, because it derived
from the property doctrine of eviction from possession, is more
restrictive than the doctrine of material breach of contract, so that
on identical facts a landlord might be held not to have committed
a constructive eviction when, in contract terms, he almost certainly would be regarded as having committed a material breach.
75. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.49, at 275.
76. For a discussion of Stewart, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying
text.
77. See Lewis, ConstructiveEviction, 25 LAw. & BANKER 12, (1932) ("The early
common law did not recognize constructive eviction, an actual eviction being necessary to relieve the tenant from liability for rent." (emphasis in original)). See
also Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727, 739-40 (N.Y. 1826) (Colden,J., dissenting);
McGovern, supra note 6, at 666-67; Weinberg, supra note 6, at 67-69.
78. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, §§ 3.50-3.51; Weinberg, supra note 6, at 66-82.
79. See East Haven Assocs. v. Gurian, 64 Misc. 2d 276, 279, 313 N.Y.S.2d
927, 930 (Civ. Ct. 1970). The East Haven court stated:
The doctrine of constructive eviction was developed by analogy to actual eviction on the basis of a very simple and obvious proposition. If a
tenant is effectively forced out of leased premises as a result of misconduct by a landlord that substantially impairs enjoyment of the leased
premises, the same legal consequences should follow as though the
[tenant] . . . were physically evicted.

Id.
80. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727, 739 (N.Y. 1826) (Colden, J., dissenting). See also Weinberg, supra note 6, at 69-82 (discussing American expansion of
doctrine of constructive eviction in nineteenth century).
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"Possession" and Material Breach: The Scope of the Covenant of
Quiet Enjoyment

Because the tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent
upon the landlord's maintenance of the tenant's possession, even
when the lease is silent on the question, 8' it cannot be said that
lease covenants are independent in the strict and proper sense of
that term. 8 2 The tenant is excused if the landlord does not substantially perform his obligation to protect the tenant's quiet enjoyment of possession. The question is: What conduct by the
landlord, short of physical interference with the tenant's access to
the leased premises, constitutes material breach of that covenant?
Specifically, the issue in Stewart is whether breach of a specific
lease covenant alone can constitute a material breach of the lease
in the terms that property law imposes for resolving that question-that is, whether it can constitute a "constructive" eviction.
We suggest that under a property analysis, there are several ways
in which it could be argued that breach of such a covenant does
not constitute material breach. What makes Stewart a representative and noteworthy case is that it can be read as addressing or
raising all of the possible arguments.
One possibility is to say that the landlord's breach of a particular lease covenant does not discharge the tenant because the
only substantial performance required under the lease is performance of the covenant of quiet enjoyment itself. The covenant of
quiet enjoyment has a minimum content apart from any question
of its incorporation of other specific lease covenants, 83 such as a
covenant to repair, in that under the doctrine of actual eviction,
the tenant is protected from the landlord's acts of physical interference with his possession. 8 4 Once "constructive" eviction is
recognized, some expansion of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
to cover landlord interferences beyond those of an actual ouster
81. For a discussion of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, see supra notes 7074 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the dependency of lease covenants, see supra note

20.
83. See C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 905 (1974)
("[T]he covenant [of quiet enjoyment] is often said to impose no affirmative
duties on the landlord whatsoever. This can easily lead one to conclude that the
covenant has no substantive content. Such a conclusion would clearly be in error, for the covenant does require that the landlord refrain from certain conduct
directed toward the lessee.").
84. For a discussion of the doctrine of actual eviction, see supra text accompanying note 75.
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from possession is inevitable. If, however, the covenant of quiet
enjoyment is patterned after the parent eviction doctrine, and is
limited to landlord interferences of the same type exhibited in
cases of actual physical eviction, then only affirmative interferences with the tenant's possession would constitute a "constructive" eviction. 8 5 Thus, the relevant interference with possession
would have to be by the landlord's affirmative conduct- 8 6acts as
opposed to failures to act. Moreover, these acts might have to be
accompanied by a specific intent to dispossess the tenant.8 7 The
landlord's mere failure to act-to perform specific additional
lease covenants like the covenant to waterproof in Stewart-would
on this reading allow the tenant a damages remedy alone.8 8
85. An actual eviction consists of both a physical entry (a trespass) by the
landlord and an ouster (dispossession) of the tenant. See Weinberg, supra note 6,
at 67. This double requirement explains the oft-repeated statement in actual
eviction cases that a mere trespass does not constitute an eviction. Id. at 76-77 &
n.224. In an early English case, Lord Mansfield laid the groundwork for the plea
of "constructive" eviction by suggesting that the landlord's trespass, accompanied by such significant interference with the tenant's enjoyment of the premises
that the tenant abandoned possession, might be tantamount to an eviction. The
tenant lost the case, however, because he failed to properly plead eviction. Hunt
v. Cope, 1 Cowp. 242, 98 Eng. Rep. 1065 (K.B. 1775). See also Weinberg, supra
note 6, at 68-69. The concept of constructive eviction thus had its origin in, and
could have been limited to, situations in which the landlord's conduct satisfied
the entry but not the ouster element of actual eviction. As such, the doctrine
would have been only a limited expansion of the doctrine of actual eviction.
However, when constructive eviction appeared in American law in Dyett v. Pendleton, the court extended the fiction of "constructive" interference to include the
landlord's entry as well as ouster of the tenant, thus creating a broader concept
of constructive eviction than had been suggested in Hunt v. Cope. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 737 (N.Y. 1826). Despite this expansion, we find that the parent
doctrine of actual eviction has exerted a restricting influence on the determination of the relevant landlord activity that can amount to a "constructive" eviction
of the tenant. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. The development of
"constructive" eviction doctrine thus historically has been influenced by its origin, and perhaps continues to be. See infra note 116.
86. See Lloyd, The Disturbed Tenant-A Phase of Constructive Eviction, 79 U. PA.
L. REV. 707, 718 (1931) ("Logically an eviction by the landlord is an affirmative
act and the use of the term should be confined to acts of commission involving
an intentional and wrongful interruption of the possession or a permanent and
substantial interference with the beneficial use.") (footnote omitted); Rapacz,
Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1 DE PAUL L. REV.
69, 79 (1951) ("In theory, eviction ought to involve some act of the lessor. It
has often been asserted that it is properly an affirmative act on the lessor's part;
an act of commission rather than just an act of omission.") (footnote omitted).
87. See M. McDOUGAL & D. HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION,
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 369-70 (1948) (noting that "amusing decisions"
result from insistence on specific intent, and that more recent cases reduce the
"intent hazard" in constructive eviction law by holding that the landlord intends
the natural and probable consequences of his acts).
293, 296 (1865) (landlord's breach of
88. See, e.g., Wright v. Lattin, 38 Ill.
covenant to repair is not an eviction; the tenant's "possession remains undis-
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Under this approach, the "vital" provision in the lease upon
which the tenant's rent obligation depends is the landlord's (negative) obligation, expressed in his covenant of quiet enjoyment, to
refrain from acts having the characteristics of an actual eviction.
Thus, affirmative obligations that the landlord might undertake in
the lease are not "vital," but rather "collateral," because their
breach does not involve the paradigmatic conduct originally recognized by the law of actual eviction.8 9 Stewart might well be exturbed, the breach of covenant only hindering the more commodious enjoyment
of the term, whilst in case of an eviction, the term is gone, or the property so
situated that it ceases to be useful for the purpose for which the term was obtained"); Leavitt v. Fletcher, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 119, 121 (1865) (tenant's covenant to pay rent is "independent" of landlord's covenant to repair); Etheridge v.
Osborn, 12 Wend. 529, 532-33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (landlord's failure to perform lease covenants is not an eviction). See also 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 145 (B. Jones 3d ed. 1939) (landlord's failure to perform separate
covenants should not constitute eviction); Note, Landlord and Tenant: What Constitutes Eviction, 16 ILL. L. REV. 535, 535 (1922) (noting that Gibbons v. Hoefeld,
299 Ill. 455, 132 N.E. 425 (1921), "seems to be the only instance in which the
Supreme Court [of Illinois] has held on the facts that an omission of duty on the
part of the landlord as distinguished from an affirmative wrongful act will constitute constructive eviction").
The courts' refusal to consider the landlord's breach of specific lease covenants in determining whether the tenant has received substantial performance
puts tenants at an extreme disadvantage for at least three reasons. First, by hypothesis, the tenant cannot vacate and terminate the lease for such breaches; if
the tenant has vacated under a misapprehension of his or her right to claim an
eviction resulting from the landlord's breach, the tenant faces double exposure:
the original rent liability continues, in addition to whatever new rental liability
the tenant may have assumed. Second, if the tenant remains in possession and
stops paying rent in response to the landlord's breach, he or she faces dispossesArnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915) (landlord's
sion. See, e.g.,
breach of covenant to repair cannot be asserted in summary dispossession proceeding). Finally, even if the landlord sues the tenant for rent rather than for
possession, the tenant may be unable to resolve the dispute with the landlord in
one proceeding; the landlord's breach under local procedural rules may not be
susceptible to set-off, counterclaim, or recoupment. See Weinberg, supra note 6,
at 33 n. 15. Sensitivity to the difficulty of the tenant's position may have been the
motivating factor behind the decision of some courts to allow breach of at least
some specific lease covenants to amount to an eviction. See infra notes 91-103
and accompanying text.
89. It would be possible to categorize all specific promises by the landlord,
including the covenant of quiet enjoyment, as immaterial, on the theory that the
landlord's execution of the lease or delivery of possession constitutes substantial
erformance. See, e.g., In re Edgewood Park Junior College, 123 Conn. 74, 778, 192 A. 561, 562-63 (1937) ("[S]ince the execution of the lease by the lessor
may be said to constitute performance on his part, the lease for that reason may
be considered a unilateral agreement. . . . A lease, therefore, considered as a
contract, is a unilateral agreement with no dependency of performance."); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 290 comment a (1932) ("Partly . . . because the
grantor of a lease or other conveyance has performed the major part of his side
of the transaction and any covenants are subsidiary, there are no general rules
excusing performance of a covenant by one party because of breach of covenant
by the other."); 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 686, at 240 (footnote omitted)
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plained in this way, inasmuch as the court emphasized that it was
"unable to find in the record any evidence that shows that the
landlord ... did anything with the intention of depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of the premises." 90 In short, the Stewart
court found nothing in the landlord's mere failure to act that
looked like the kind of conduct typical of an actual eviction.
While this analysis might explain the result in Stewart, it does
not explain other constructive eviction cases considered below.
In any event, it would not make our point as broadly as we wish to
make it. We contend that the property concepts of "possession"
and "eviction" also exert a constricting influence on the determination of material breach in those cases in which the courts allow
breach of a separate covenant to operate as a constructive eviction. Such cases exist; indeed, the venerable American Law of Property speculates that "[p]erhaps the most significant cases on
constructive eviction are those involving breach of an express
covenant or a statutory duty to repair or to furnish heat or services." 9 1 Here, the point to be made is that the parent property
concepts of "possession" and "eviction," if they do not restrict
the relevant landlord breaches to acts as opposed to failures to
act, might nonetheless restrict the kinds of relevant failures to act
that can count as constructive evictions. There are defaults and
("Upon the execution of the lease, the landlord has conveyed and the tenant has
received a property interest in the land. In making this conveyance, the landlord
has rendered the most important of the performances that the parties contemplate in connection with the lease. Subsequent breaches of covenant by him,
therefore, do not operate as a total failure of consideration.").
The difficulty with this view is that the tenant's obligation to pay rent is
dependent upon the landlord's performance of the post-delivery obligation to
protect the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises, although admittedly property law generally discusses the landlord's post-delivery obligations under the
rubric of eviction, either actual and constructive, rather than substantial performance and material breach. However, since eviction is a form of dependency
reasoning, it seems preferable to say that the landlord has not substantially performed her or his obligations under the lease unless the landlord both delivers
possession and refrains from interfering with the tenant's possession after delivery. See 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 686, at 241 (tenant's continued enjoyment of possession is a condition of duty to pay rent; eviction "goes to the
essence and operates as a discharge" of the tenant's duty). If the landlord's
breach of a specific lease covenant does not excuse the tenant, the reason properly should be that the landlord is deemed to have substantially performed his
post-delivery obligations according to the standard applied by property law to
those obligations. The landlord should not be viewed as having substantially
performed merely by executing the lease. See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
90. 86 N.J.L. at 650, 92 A. at 393 (emphasis added). For a discussion of
Stewart, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
91. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 351, at 281.
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there are defaults. Not every breach of an express lease covenant
creates a situation that is comparable to actual eviction. "Possession," which the covenant of quiet enjoyment protects,9 2 is a spatial concept, just as "eviction" is a physical interference with
possession. 9 3 For purposes of determining "constructive" eviction, the covenant could be read to incorporate the landlord's express additional covenants only to the extent that performance of
those additional covenants is necessary to protect the actual livability or physical availability of the premises.9 4 Stated differently,
if, as in Stewart, the premises remain available for some beneficial
use, despite the landlord's interference, the interference does not
constitute a constructive eviction.
Two considerations support our claim that the property concept of "eviction from possession" can inhibit a court's determination of substantial performance and material breach when the
95
landlord's failure to perform specific lease covenants is at issue.
92. For a discussion of the doctrine of quiet enjoyment, see supra note 71
and accompanying text.
93. For a discussion of actual eviction, see supra note 85.
94. See, e.g., Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 668, 148 S.W. 196, 198
(1912) ("To constitute an eviction by construction of law, the wrongful conduct
of the landlord must be sufficient, through affirmative act or omission of duty, to
render the premises untenantable for the purpose for which the tenant leased
them or at least seriously interfere with their permanent use."). A. CASNER & W.
LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 366 (2d ed. 1969) ("The only case in
which a landlord's default will permit a tenant to quit is where the default makes
the premises uninhabitable-which is called a 'constructive eviction,' and is
treated the same as the case where the landlord sends his men around and
throws the tenant out."). See also Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co.,
25 Cal. 2d 664, 669, 155 P.2d 24, 27 (1944) (lease covenants are independent
unless dependency is "expressed or necessarily implied"). The view of constructive eviction that we are considering in the text makes the Kulawitz point
concrete. The tenant's obligation to pay rent would be dependent by necessary
implication upon the landlord's performance of covenants that are indispensable to the habitability of the premises.
95. In the course of his perceptive discussion of the nineteenth century development of the doctrine of constructive eviction by American courts, Professor
Weinberg takes a view different from ours on the limiting effect of the parent
doctrine of actual eviction. He apparently sees the analogy to actual eviction as
producing only two limiting requirements: first, the requirement that in cases of
third party interference with the tenant's possession the interference be attributable to the landlord; and second, the requirement in all cases that the tenant
abandon the premises in order to claim relief from the obligation to pay rent.
See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 75-77. As developed in the text, we see the parent
concept of eviction as also limiting the very scope of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, that is, as limiting the kinds of landlord activity that might be said to constitute a "constructive" eviction. Thus, in our view, the requirement of
affirmative landlord misconduct, or the requirement that relevant landlord defaults must seriously impede the tenant's actual access to the premises, are best
explainable on the ground that unless those requirements appear in the case,
the landlord's interference will bear little resemblance to an actual eviction.
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First, as the American Law of Property excerpt notes, the typical
cases in which the courts have found a constructive eviction upon
the landlord's breach of an express lease promise are those in
which the promise is indispensable to possession because its substantial breach is likely to interfere with the tenant's use of the
premises for any purpose. 9 6 Examples include promises to repair,
to provide heat or electricity, or to provide some other essential
service. Breach of such promises places the tenant in much the
position he would be in were the landlord to enter and expel him
physically: The premises are in essence unavailable to the tenant
for any beneficial use. 9 7 Second, it is revealing that the leading
cases involving covenants whose breach does not interfere with
possession in fact (however much it may interfere with the tenant's contractual expectations) avoid property reasoning altogether. These cases generally elect an explicit contractual view to
justify the tenant's discharge from the rent obligation.9" Deakin is
Some cases have made the point expressly. See, e.g., Wright v. Lattin, 38 Ill. 293,
296 (1865) ("There seems to be no analogy between an eviction, or an act of the
landlord which amounts to an eviction, and the breach of a covenant of the landlord to repair the premises.").
96. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97. For a discussion of constructive eviction cases, see supra note 94. See
also Lewis & Co. v. Chisolm, 68 Ga. 40, 47 (1881) (landlord's failure to repair
does not excuse the tenant's rent obligation "unless the premises become untenantable for want of repairs where the landlord was under covenant to repair"); Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Vt. 109, 118 (1876) (rejecting view that to
constitute an eviction, the landlord "must do some positive overt act, and not
merely neglect to do some act that he was duty bound to perform," and holding
that "any act or default of the lessor that renders the tenement such as endangers the life or health of the occupants, may be treated by the lessee as an eviction, and give him the right to abandon the premises, and terminate his
obligation to pay rent").
98. See, e.g., Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d
411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942); University Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 265 11. 257,
106 N.E. 790 (1914); Hiatt Inv. Co. v. Buehler, 255 Mo. App. 151, 16 S.W.2d
219 (1929). But see Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664,
155 P.2d 24 (1944) (landlord's failure to perform noncompetition covenant
treated as constructive eviction). In Kulawitz, the tenant was in breach of his
obligation to pay rent when the landlord's breach occurred, and the case is now
understood to stand for the proposition that the constructive eviction defense
"is available to a lessee who was himself in default in the payment of rent at the
time when the lessor's breach occurred." BASIC PROPERTY LAw, supra note 14, at
495. It is doubtful whether a holding for the tenant could have been justified on
dependency principles. See Note, The California Lease-Contractor Conveyance?, 4
STAN. L. REV. 244, 252 (1952). The Kulawitz court thus may have elected the
eviction route to avoid the contract obstacle to granting relief to the tenant. In
any event, what is important for present purposes is that the court's treatment of
the noncompetition covenant in eviction terms appears aberrational. See BASIC
PROPERTY LAw, supra note 14, at 495 ("In fact where the lessor's breach produces economic rather than physical injuries, as in Kulawitz, it seems peculiarly
inappropriate to speak in terms of eviction."). In addition, the decision has been
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representative.9 9 Unquestionably, the noncompetition promise at
issue was vitally important to the commercial tenant. As another
case noted, "the only reasonable explanation of the presence in
the lease of the grant of exclusive rights is that ... [the] covenant

was bargained for" by the tenant "as a necessary part" of the
commercial transaction.' 0 0 In contractual terms, the landlord's
noncompetition promise is a vital part of the agreed exchange,
and it is perfectly appropriate to treat breach as a failure of the
condition of performance implied in the lease.' 0 ' But Deakin, as
we noted, is explicit in grounding its result in contractual reasoning.' 0 2 In contrast, if the property doctrine of constructive eviction provides the only recourse for the tenant, it is questionable
that a tenant aggrieved by his landlord's breach of a noncompetition covenant could prevail: "Where the lessor's breach produces
economic rather than physical injuries ...

it seems peculiarly in-

appropriate to speak in terms of eviction."'

03

It is inappropriate,

subjected to criticism. See Note, supra, at 251-56. For a discussion of constructive eviction doctrine in noncompetition covenant cases, when the lease also restricts the tenant's use of the premises, see infra note 103.
99. For a discussion of Deakin, see supra notes 23-29 and accompanying
text.
100. Carter v. Adler, 138 Cal. App. 2d 63, 72, 291 P.2d 111, 116 (1956).
See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 420, 132
P.2d 457, 462 (1942) ("The exclusive right to conduct a drug store in the building was vital to [the tenant's] successful operation of its business .. ");RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 7.2 & comment b (1977) (landlord's
noncompetition covenant is material covenant, giving tenant full remedies upon
breach). See generally 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.42.
101. For a discussion of implied conditions in leases, see supra notes 14-17
and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of Deakin, see supra notes 23-29 and accompanying
text.
103. BASIC PROPERTY LAW, supra note 14, at 495. Of course, if the rent were
substantial and the tenant had reasonably expected to produce high income
from the bargained-for special use of the property, interference with that reasonable expectation could be viewed as the functional equivalent of eviction.
However, property law traditionally has taken a more limited and mechanistic
view of the eviction concept. The focus of traditional property reasoning has
been on an abstract notion of the tenant's right to use the property. To illustrate, a lease provision may, in addition to barring the landlord from leasing to
competitors of the tenant, restrict the tenant to the use protected by the noncompetition covenant. The presence of such a restriction aids the determination
that the landlord's noncompetition promise is material. See Medico-Dental Bldg.
Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 419, 132 P.2d 457, 462 (1942) ("The
lessee was limited by the terms of the lease to maintaining a drug store, a restriction emphasizing the import of the lessor's duty in negotiating future demises of
other portions of the building."). See also University Club of Chicago v. Deakin,
265 Il1. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914) (restriction on tenant's use mentioned in facts,
but not further adverted to in opinion). The absence of such a restriction would
appear to be fatal to a claim of constructive eviction, because, as suggested in
the text accompanying this note, the tenant would suffer purely economic injury,
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however, not because the tenant has suffered no harm, but because he has not suffered the kind of harm that the conveyance
view of the lease, with its emphasis on "possession" as the essence of the bargain, allows property law to take seriously.
We have noted two possible restrictions on the scope of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, both flowing from the covenant's
historical mission of protecting the tenant's "possession," which
in turn is the central entitlement of the tenant under the conveyance view of the lease. First, the covenant might be read to require that the landlord's "substantial interference" with the
tenant's possession be by affirmative misconduct rather than by
mere failure to perform. Under that view, all express covenants
in the lease, other than the covenant of quiet enjoyment itself, are
classified as subsidiary or collateral; breach of any of them leaves
the tenant with only an action for damages. Second, the covenant
of quiet enjoyment might be read to incorporate express lease
duties to the extent that failure to perform such duties renders
the premises physically uninhabitable. Under this second view,
express covenants that secure or enhance the physical condition
of the premises will be vital; those that only secure economic or
other nonphysical benefits will be collateral. Under either interpretation, "substantial interference" with the tenant's possesbut no physical restriction on his use of the premises as a result of the landlord's
breach. If, however, the lease did restrict the tenant's use, the tenant could
make a good case-indeed, the only case, see supra note 98-for regarding the
landlord's breach of promise as an eviction. The landlord's breach would
render unavailing the one and only use the lease allows the tenant. In that situation the landlord's breach thus could be regarded as tantamount to a physical
exclusion of the tenant. This may explain why the leading noncompetition covenant cases, discussed supra at note 98, adopt contract rather than property reasoning in order to allow the tenant to rescind, regardless of whether the tenant's
use of the premises is restricted.
In any event, the fact that some noncompetition covenant cases are decided
on constructive eviction grounds does not alter the point made in the text.
There will be some covenants which, no matter how material in a contract sense,
will have no bearing on the tenant's physical enjoyment of the premises, under
any circumstances. Breach of such covenants, under the view of material breach
now being considered, thus could not amount to an eviction of the tenant. See,
e.g., Exchange Sec. Co. v. Rossini, 44 Cal. App. 583, 186 P. 828 (1919) (landlord's covenant to give the tenant an option to purchase the property was "in its
nature" independent of tenant's covenant to pay rent). Cf Brown v. Young, 364
A.2d 1171 (D.C. 1976) (landlord's breach of covenant giving tenant right of first
refusal in case of sale could not be asserted in landlord's suit for possession);
Ringwood Assocs. v.Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 379 A.2d 508
(Law Div. 1977) (suggesting that tenant's duty to pay rent could be regarded as
dependent on landlord's performance of his obligation not to unreasonably
withhold consent to assignment on contract principles but not property principles) aft'd, 166 N.J. Super. 36, 398 A.2d 1315 (App. Div. 1979).
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sion-the test of constructive eviction' 04 -is a more demanding
standard than the contract test of material breach, since it requires an interference which deprives the tenant of use of the
premises. The contract test simply asks whether the tenant has
lost the bargain he expected. In these terms, all constructive evictions will be material breaches, but not all material breaches will
be constructive evictions. Since possession is a predicate to any
use at all, it would have to follow that a "substantial interference"
with possession would deprive the tenant of a significant part of
what he contracted for, and thus be a material breach. But the
relationship does not hold the other way. It is quite possible for
the landlord to breach an essential term of the contract (viewing
the matter without the fetters of "possession"), and yet for the
tenant still to have the possibility of beneficial enjoyment of the
leased premises (viewing the matter in property terms). It may
not be the beneficial enjoyment the tenant contemplated and contracted for in entering the lease, but viewing the transaction in
property terms makes that question irrelevant. The conveyance
view defines the tenant's bargain as the acquisition and retention
of a "possessory" interest in land, and it is quite consistent with
that view to say that the tenant still has his bargain, thus defined,
even though the landlord has breached a term that on the particu10 5
lar facts the tenant regarded as essential.
The distinction we have suggested can be illustrated by reconsidering Stewart. There, the court noted that the "cellar was
necessary for the conduct of the business of the [tenant].' 0 6 A
more explicit acknowledgement of the materiality of the landlord's promise in the contract could not be found. The record
showed that "the premises were fitted for and used as a Childs
restaurant,"' 0 7 and the conclusion seems inescapable that the
tenant contracted for use of the cellar.' 0 8 But while the water104. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 2, 225[3] at 273.
105. The requirement of interference with "possession" in order for a constructive eviction to result, and not merely interference with the expected bargain, bears an obvious affinity to the requirement in cases of frustration of
purpose that the frustration be total or nearly total. See infra notes 162-72 and
accompanying text.
106. 86 N.J.L. at 650, 92 A. at 392-93. For a further discussion of Stewart,
see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
107. 86 N.J.L. at 650, 92 A. at 393.
108. It is possible to argue that the result in Stewart would not necessarily
be different even under modern contract principles. If the tenant's need for a
waterproof basement to run its coffee-making apparatus were regarded as unusual, and if the landlord did not know of that need, it could be argued that the
parties did not intend for the landlord's performance of the waterproofing cove-
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proof cellar was necessary to the business, the business was not
necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the premises. Since the
lease did not limit the tenant's use of the premises to this particular type of business, 10 9 it is quite possible that the tenant could
have used the premises for some other business, or some other
purpose, not requiring a waterproof cellar. 0 The fact that both
parties knew and contemplated that the tenant would operate the
particular business that he did"' is relevant if we are concerned
with determining materiality in situational terms. We suggest,
however, that it is precisely the function of the conveyance view of
a lease to determine material breach without such concerns.
Rather, it determines material breach in conclusive, a priori
terms.' 2 The tenant's bargain, as embodied in the property docnant to be a condition of the tenant's obligation to pay rent. See Grinnel Bros. v.
Asiuliewicz, 241 Mich. 186, 188, 216 N.W. 388, 388-89 (1927) ("There goes
with every rental of premises the right of beneficial enjoyment by the tenant for
the purpose for which the premises are rented, at least to the extent disclosed to
the lessor at the making of the lease."). Cf 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1356,
at 472 (the lessor may be unaware of the lessee's intention to use the premises
for a particular purpose, "and the usefulness of the premises for that specific
purpose may have played no part in determining the amount of the rent. When
such is the case, the risk of frustration ... is left ... on the lessee.").
The argument makes two critical assumptions: (1) that the Stewart landlord
did not in fact know, or could not be chargeable with knowing, of the tenant's
needs for the waterproof cellar; and (2) in any event, that inferential rather than
express evidence of intent to make performances independent of one another is
sufficient. Both assumptions are questionable. The landlord's promise in Stewart was not boilerplate. Rather, it was couched in specific and unequivocal language, suggesting that the landlord knew or should have known that a dry
basement was vital to the tenant. Specifically, the provision read: "the basement shall be waterproof, and not less than seven feet high. And he does hereby
guarantee that he will at all times during the said lease keep the said cellar waterproof at his own expense." 86 N.J.L. at 649, 92 A. at 393 (emphasis added). See
O'Byrne v. Henley, 161 Ala. 620, 626-27, 50 So. 83, 85 (1909) ("the use to
which the lessee put the premises seems to have been known to the landlord,
and no objection was made by him; hence we think that the business he is shown
to have carried on was the business which the lease contemplated."). In any
event, promises in modern contract law appear to be mutually dependent "unless a contrary intention is clearly manifested." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 267 & comment a (1932). The landlord's argument traced above is founded
upon inferences from silence rather than upon a clear manifestation of intent
that the promises be independent.
109. See supra note 103.
110. See Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201, 206 (1870). In Royce, the
landlord encroached on leased premises and erected a building that blocked off
light and air to the leased premises. Id. at 206. As a result, "two of the rooms
... previously used as a kitchen and bedroom, were made entirely unfit for those
purposes, and by reason of that unfitness were abandoned. The bill of exceptions does not show that the [landlord] contended that the rooms could have
been used for any other purpose after the erection of the new building." Id.
111. See supra note 108.
112. The determination of substantial performance in contract law is in-
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trines of eviction and "constructive" eviction, is rent for possession. The tenant in Stewart continued to have the benefit of that
bargain, despite the landlord's failure to waterproof the cellar,
and even though the tenant no longer had the bargain he
3
expected. 1
But the Stewart holding is not the last word on the covenant
of quiet enjoyment. It is possible to regard protection of the tenant's "possessory" expectations as one function of the covenant
but not its sole function. Since "enjoyment" is a concept capable
of expansive meaning, it is possible to read the covenant without
its "possession" gloss. Under this view, the covenant protects the
bargain for which the tenant actually contracted, as revealed by
the facts and circumstances, and not just the bargain attributed to
him by property law. Indeed, the tenant in Stewart urged just such
an expansion of the covenant of quiet enjoyment on the court,
arguing that
the failure of the landlord to do what is lawfully required
of him either by the terms of the lease or otherwise,
which renders the demised premises unfit for the purpose for which they are leased, or which seriously interferes with the beneficial enjoyment thereof
constitutes an eviction by construction of law, and releases the tenant .... 114

We know, of course, that the Stewart court rejected the tenant's
argument. But courts in other jurisdictions, as well as commentatensely fact oriented. See 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 704, at 318 (substantial
performance "is always a question of fact, a matter of degree, a question that
must be determined relatively to all the other complex factors that exist in every
instance") (footnote omitted).
113. In suggesting that the concept of "possession" restricts the determination of substantial performance and material breach, we have limited ourselves
to cases of constructive eviction where, as in Stewart, the restriction operates to
the landlord's benefit. However, the concept of "possession" also can operate
in other areas to distort the determination of substantial performance and material breach to the landlord's disadvantage. See, e.g., Smith v. McEnany, 170 Mass.
26, 48 N.E. 781 (1897) (tenant excused from rent obligation when the landlord
built a wall that encroached one or two feet on the side of the leased lot; landlord argued that the question of excuse should depend on whether the wall
made the premises "uninhabitable for the purpose for which they were hired,
materially changing the character and beneficial enjoyment thereof'); Dieffenbach v. McIntyre, 208 Okla. 163, 165, 254 P.2d 346, 348 (1952) (tenant who
leased multi-unit premises for a beauty parlor allowed to rescind when landlord
failed to deliver a part of the premises not used for the tenant's business; landlord argued "that the breach was only a partial breach since it did not interfere
with the operation of the beauty parlor").
114. 82 N.J.L. at 539, 92 A. at 393.
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tors, have stated a similarly broad view of constructive eviction.' 15
In fact, Stewart appears to have been repudiated by at least one
later case in its jurisdiction. 116
Because of this broad, bargain-protecting reading of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, it is not possible to argue, and we do
not contend, that property principles necessarily produce different
results from contract principles in the determination of substantial performance and material breach.' 17 We do contend, how115. See, e.g., Radinsky v. Weaver, 170 Colo. 169, 174, 460 P.2d 218, 220
(1969) (any disturbance "which renders the premises unfit for occupancy for the
purposes for which they were leased, or which deprives the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises . . .amounts to a constructive eviction") (citations omitted); Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196,
201, 172 N.E. 35, 38 (1930) ("Any act of the landlord which renders the lease
unavailing to the tenant or deprives him of the beneficial enjoyment of the
premises constitutes a constructive eviction."). See generally AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.51, at 282 ("liberally applied," constructive eviction
produces results "not different" from the contract rule of dependency); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 6.1 (1977) (landlord's interference with "a
permissible use of the leased property by tenant" justifies termination); 6 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 20, at 589 n.5 (difference between constructive eviction
and dependency "is of no great moment" so long as tenant vacates when deprived of the beneficial use of the premises).
116. See, e.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 457, 251 A.2d 268,
274 (1969) ("Any act or omission of the landlord.., which renders the premises
substantially unsuitable for the purpose for which they are leased, or which seriously interferes with the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, is a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment and constitutes a constructive eviction.").
117. However, despite broad statements of the scope, or potential scope, of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, see supra note 115, we hesitate to say that modern courts enforce the covenant as a bargain-protecting device, totally free of its
"possession" gloss. We draw this conclusion from a consideration of companion developments under the supposedly more progressive law relating to the
warranty of habitability. There, modern courts, ostensibly applying the current
view that a lease should be treated like any other contract, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text, nevertheless have restricted the scope of the warranty of
habitability to a minimum-expectations standard. Thus, while the abatement
remedy constitutes a significant advance over the remedies traditionally available for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the remedy is not available
for the landlord's failure to provide promised amenities, nor presumably for his
or her failure to perform any material promise unrelated to the condition of the
premises. See infra Part III-A.
Moreover, in one important area of constructive eviction law, the covenant
of quiet enjoyment continues to receive a narrow construction that belies the
broad statements of its scope, and reflects, we think, the origins of the doctrine
in the law of actual eviction. In cases in which the tenant claims a breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment because of the disturbing conduct of neighboring
tenants, the majority view apparently continues to be that the landlord is not
responsible for such conduct, and thus is not in breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, unless he or she participates in or encourages the conduct. The
landlord's mere failure to act-for example, by refusing to enforce a covenant in
the lease with the disturbing tenants-does not constitute a constructive eviction. See, e.g., Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich. 497, 165 N.W. 716 (1917); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 1,§ 3.53;

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
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ever, that the possibility of different results is present, that this
possibility results from the concept of a lease as the conveyance of
a possessory interest in land, and that the possibility has been realized in some decisions, as a comparison of Stewart and Deakin
amply reveals.
3.

Revisionists and Traditionalists

If our analysis is correct, both the revisionists and the traditionalists have expressed important insights on the property-contract theme, though neither has presented a fully accurate picture.
The revisionist position, represented by Professor Siegel, argues
that the independence of lease covenants in landlord-tenant law is
a function of the contract concept of dependency, and constitutes
a "vigorous" application of the doctrine of substantial performance." 8 While the focus on substantial performance and its op§ 6.1 & reporter's note 3, at 232 (1977) (adopting view that landlord is responsible for "conduct of tenants which he could legally control," but indicating that
"the weight of authority is contra"). See generally Humbach, Landlord Control of
Tenant Behavior. An Instance of Private Environmental Legislation, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 223 (1976); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 849 (1980). The view that the landlord is
only responsible for conduct that he connives in or encourages is a modern instance of the requirement that to constitute a constructive eviction, the landlord
must engage in affirmative misconduct. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying
text.
118. Professor Humbach takes issue with Professor Siegel's equation of the
lease doctrine of independency with the contract doctrine of substantial performance. He suggests that if the equation were correct, substantial performance should produce "independency," while material breach would excuse the
tenant and reflect dependency. He points out, however, that the latter half of
that proposition does not hold in two situations. First, "many landlord failures
to provide services are certainly of sufficient magnitude to constitute a failure of
substantial performance in the nature of a material breach," and yet courts do
not always excuse tenants for such breaches. Humbach, supra note 12, at 1275
n.273. Second, even if a material breach is found, with the result that the tenant's duty to pay rent should be dependent, "the duty would still be subject to
recreation" when the tenant affirms, and thus would still be an independent
duty. Id. at 1279 n.283. He concludes that "the so-called independence of covenants in leases most emphatically cannot be regarded as simply a result of the
doctrine of substantial performance, as has been alleged" by Professor Siegel.
Id. at 1279 n.287.
Professor Humbach's first point, far from denying a connection between
"independency" and substantial performance, suggests to us exactly what the
connection is. Landlord-tenant law will excuse the tenant when the landlord
does not substantially perform, but it will not always define substantial performance in exactly the same way that contract law does; specifically, it might exclude
service obligations from the definition of substantial performance. See supra
notes 83-90 and accompanying text. While Professor Humbach is aware that
property and contract reasoning may produce different versions of substantial
performance, he does not emphasize the difference and thus misses an opportunity to show an instance in which ordinary contract law and property law do
produce divergent results. See Humbach, supra note 12, at 1281 n.295.
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posite, material breach, is instructive and correct, Siegel's total
assimilation of property law into contract law is extreme and unpersuasive because it distorts the reality of the results produced
in cases like Stewart." t9 In that assimilation, however, Professor
Professor Humbach's second point, that covenants are still "independent"
when the tenant affirms, notwithstanding the landlord's material breach, is correct. That does not deny a connection between substantial performance and
independency doctrine so much as indicate that the connection does not exhaust
all the relevant things to be said about the tenant's obligation to pay rent. As we
have noted, see supra note 20, we think it is important to separate three questions
that frequently get merged and confused under the "independency" rubric:
(1) the question of whether conditions to a promisor's duty always must be express; (2) the question of what kinds of performance satisfy constructive conditions when they are recognized; and (3) the question of the impact of the
tenant's election to affirm, notwithstanding a substantial failure of performance,
on his or her obligation to pay rent. We prefer to avoid the independency label
in discussing the latter two questions, while Professor Humbach does not. See
Humbach, supra note 12, at 1274 n.269.
119. Professor Siegel separates his discussion of independency from his
consideration of constructive eviction. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 663-70 (discussing independency), 679-85 (discussing constructive eviction). This separation is troublesome because it obscures the essential point that while
constructive eviction is a significant property substitute for the doctrine of dependency of covenants, it is nevertheless a substitute, having important differences from the contract doctrine. We have dealt in detail with Professor Siegel's
discussion of independency doctrine. See supra notes 38-69 and accompanying
text. A word is in order concerning his views on constructive eviction.
In discussing constructive eviction, Professor Siegel argues that cases in
which the landlord breaches a specific duty imposed by the lease or by statute,
such as a duty to repair, see supra note 91 and accompanying text, constitute the
only area of overlap between property and contract doctrine. In cases in which
the landlord affirmatively interferes with the tenant's possession, see supra notes
83-90 and accompanying text, he regards constructive eviction law as sui generis,
based neither on contractual concepts nor on the property law of actual eviction;
rather, he contends, it represents an expression of feudal rent analysis. See
Siegel, supra note 6, at 679-87. See also supra note 72 (discussion of feudal rent
analysis). To argue, however, that cases of affirmative landlord interference with
the tenant's possession are not based upon contractual analysis is to overlook
that the duty to refrain from such interferences is imposed contractually by the
covenant of quiet enjoyment. The tenant's obligation to pay rent is dependent
upon the landlord's performance of his covenant of quiet enjoyment, and a
breach of the covenant can occur quite apart from the landlord's failure to perform any separate specific covenants in the lease. While the factual parallels
between constructive eviction by such affirmative misconduct and a typical
breach of contract case may not be close, the underlying theory of constructive
eviction in such cases is contractual, as Dyett v. Pendleton indicates. See supra note
72 and accompanying text.
The argument that the affirmative interference cases are not based on property reasoning is that "from its outset, constructive eviction necessitated redefining eviction." Siegel, supra note 6, at 682 (footnote omitted). Given that the
doctrine under consideration is "constructive" eviction, one would expect that
some redefinition of the basic doctrine is necessarily involved. See A. CASNER &
W. LEACH, supra note 94, at 53-54 (discussing " 'constructive' this and that, and
other fictions"). The relevant question is the nature of the redefinition. If we
are correct, the problem with constructive eviction law over much of its history is
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Siegel can claim distinguished company. Professor Corbin, after
noting that the tenant's continued possession of the premises is a
condition of the duty to pay rent, and that an actual eviction discharges the tenant, observed that
[the] rule as to the effect of eviction gave the courts an
opportunity to infiltrate the law of contracts into the law
of landlord and tenant ....

The word 'constructive' [in

''constructive eviction"] shows that it is not the law of
property that the court is applying, but the law of mutual
dependency in contracts; it is believed that the time has
come to recognize this fact openly and to apply the flexible rules of contract law in determining whether a
breach by either party is so material as to discharge the
other from further duty. The question of 'materiality'
varies with the circumstances; and decisions may seem to
lack harmony.' 20
While we fully agree with Professor Corbin on the desirability of applying a flexible contract approach to the determination
of material breach in lease cases, we differ in our perception of
the obstacles to that goal. Professor Corbin, like Professor Siegel
after him, apparently sees the law of constructive eviction as simply a covert application of the contract doctrine of dependency.
He thus is led to attribute the "lack of harmony" of cases like
not that it disregarded the parent concept of eviction, but rather that it adhered
too closely to it. As we have suggested, it is precisely the close adherence to the
law of actual eviction that causes the law of constructive eviction to diverge from
contract analysis. See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, in arguing that constructive eviction law is an example of feudal rent analysis, see supra note 72, rather than contractual or property analysis,
Professor Siegel notes that the feudal rent analysis is selectively applied. "Applying the feudal theory no suspension of rent occurs upon the deprivation of
appurtenant rights because the rent does not issue from them but from the demised premises alone." Siegel, supra note 6, at 683 (footnote omitted). However, because landlord-tenant cases do allow an eviction claim for interference
with appurtenant rights, one might reconsider the argument that such cases do
not reveal contractual analysis at work. In contract terms, the landlord would be
in breach if he substantially interfered with an important right of the tenant
under the lease. That seems to be precisely the way that courts recognizing an
eviction for landlord interferences with an appurtenant right proceed. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Osborne, 35 Barb. 523, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (landlord's interference with an easement of access "was a material interference with the beneficial
use . . . of the [leased] premises"). To be sure, the doctrine of constructive
eviction is not a full-blown example of contract reasoning for the reasons we
have suggested. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text. But it does not
follow that the doctrine is not based on contract reasoning at all, or that it is not
an important advance over feudal rent analysis.
120. 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 686, at 242-43.
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Stewart and Deakin to the inherent difficulty of applying the loose
standard of "materiality" to divergent facts, the dissonance being
compounded by the fact that property decisions do not acknowledge what the courts are doing. Professor Corbin's criticism is
thus an application of Professor Llewellyn's "famous Realist dictum"' 12 1 that "[c]overt tools are never reliable tools."' 12 2
With respect, however, we suggest that property cases like
Stewart are not simply doing the same thing as contract cases without saying so. They are doing something different. We think that
the differences that exist between property and contract analyses
are methodological. The problem is not (or not merely) the elastic, and hence unpredictable, test of substantial performance that
property and contract both apply; the problem is rather that the
test is applied in different ways. In property law, when the landlord makes a specific promise in the lease, the significance of that
promise is not assessed factually but rather conceptually; it is assessed through the lens of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and
the "possession" that the covenant protects. The court thus does
not ask whether performance of the promise is vital to the bargain
that the tenant in fact struck. Instead, the court asks whether performance of the promise is vital to the bargain that property law
regards him as having struck: the maintenance of the tenant's
"possessory" interest in the premises. The advantage of rejecting
this quiet enjoyment and possession analysis, as Deakin does in its
straightforward evaluation of the lease as a bilateral contract, is
that it allows the determination of substantial performance to be
made on the strength of the facts of the case, rather than by way
of deductions from a concept.
By these remarks we do not mean to suggest that difficult and
controversial judgments about materiality do not exist in contract
law. Like all teachers, we have our favorite contract cases in
which courts have deemed material promises that the facts might
suggest are immaterial, and immaterial those that the facts might
suggest are vital.' 23 In contract cases, however, it seems fair to
121. Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. LJ. 407, 408 (1979).
.122. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing
0. PRAUSNITZ, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental
Law (1937)). Llewellyn points out that the law has developed "a whole series of
semi-covert techniques" to avoid throwing out a contract clause on the basis of
public policy. Id. at 702.
123. See e.g., Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188 (1885); Walker & Co. v.
Harrison, 347 Mich. 630, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957). In Norrington, a seller contracted to sell 5,000 tons of iron to the buyer, shipment to be "at the rate of
about one thousand (1,000) tons per month, beginning February, 1880, but
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attribute the divergent results, as Professor Corbin suggests, to
the multitude of fact patterns in which the question arises. In
property law, by contrast, the controversial judgments about materiality result from the hegemony of the concept of
"'possession."
The traditionalists, for their part, will have to relinquish the
claim that lease covenants are independent in the proper sense of
that term, and will have to concede the revisionist point that the
concepts of substantial performance and material breach,
grounded in the law of constructive conditions, operate in landlord-tenant law. Given this, traditionalists will have to argue that
the differences between property and contract lie in the application of shared concepts. The most astute of the traditionalists
have, in fact, suggested the essential point that property law,
while it recognizes dependency through the doctrine of constructive eviction and related doctrines, 124 defines substantial performance in a unique way. In the course of a provocative seminal
article, Professors Quinn and Phillips argue that the landlord's
failure to perform a specific contractual obligation, such as the
obligation to furnish heat or electricity, could discharge the tenant's rent obligation "in the limited situation where the failure to
provide services was so severe that it shocked the court's conscience.''125 Professors Quinn and Phillips thus echo the earlier
whole contract to be shipped before August 1st, 1880." 115 U.S. at 189. The
quoted language could have been read as requiring substantial shipments in
each of the first five months, with the sixth month available to make up any
shortfall. The Court, however, treated the language literally, and held that delivery of "about" 1,000 tons in the first five months was a condition of the
buyer's obligation to perform. Id. at 204-05. The Court excused the buyer,
notwithstanding that the seller had shipped the entire contract tonnage within
the six months. Id. at 205. Thus, what could have been regarded as a minor
breach without violence to either the contract language or common sense was
regarded as a material breach. In Walker, the lessor of a sign promised to maintain and service the sign. 347 Mich. at 631, 81 N.W.2d at 353. Notwithstanding
repeated requests by the sign tenant, the landlord did not perform the requested
service until the tenant had repudiated the contract. Id. at 636, 81 N.W.2d at
356. Apparently determining that prompt servicing was not a condition of the
tenant's performance, the court held that there was no valid ground for the tenant's repudiation, and that the tenant himself was therefore in breach, entitling
the sign owner to judgment on the contract. Id. Here a breach which arguably
should have been regarded as material, was treated as immaterial. Thus, the
possibility of a shifting standard of breach, moving between stringency and relaxation, is not unknown to contract law. "Obviously there is some softening
effect, or 'play,' in the process of deriving a condition from a promise." E.
FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, supra note 18, at 698. And just as contract law can be
restrictive, property law can be expansive. See supra Part IV-B.
124. See supra note 113.
125. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 2, at 236; see J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO,
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argument of Professor Schoshinski's widely-acclaimed article on
tenant remedies, that the defense of eviction "is in effect a plea of
complete failure of the consideration for which the rent was paid,"
while under the contract doctrine of dependency, "any substantial
failure of the landlord to meet his obligations would defeat his
action for rent, as well as entitle a tenant to rescind the lease and
12 6
abandon the premises."'
We have simply attempted to spell out, and to put into more
concrete terms, what we perceive to be the essential insight of
these writers. Underlying the notion that eviction constitutes a
"complete failure" of consideration, or consists of conduct that
"shocks the conscience," is the point that property analysis imposes a more demanding standard of material breach than does
contract law. We prefer to make that point explicit, and to focus
on the various classes of landlord activity that might constitute an
eviction from the restrictive perspective of property law: acts as
opposed to failures to act, or failures to act that interfere with the
tenant's expectation of possession as opposed to his expectation
of benefits in addition to possession. 12 7 The central point is that
with modification and extension, the traditionalist insistence on a
fundamental difference between property and contract analyses
of material breach remains sound, despite variations in the articulation of the difference among traditionalists, and (especially) despite the revisionist attempt to collapse the distinctions. 12 8
supra note 19, § 11-29, at 434 (constructive eviction operates in "extreme"

cases); S. PLAGER, NEW

APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY

5 (1970) (con-

structive eviction operates in "egregious" cases).
126. Schoshinski, supra note 2, at 534 (discussing the defense of failure of
consideration).
127. See supra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
128. In the course of his informative discussion of dependency doctrine,
Professor McGovern makes the following observation:
It is often said that covenants in leases were independent because a
lease [is] regarded as a conveyance of property rather than as a contract. Rarely has a proposition about legal history been so often asserted with so little evidence to support it. If medieval lawyers
regarded a lease as a conveyance rather than a contract, they never said
so ....

It is hard to see any connection between the dependency of
promises and the conveyance of property rights between parties to a
contract.
McGovern, supra note 6, at 679 (footnotes omitted).
As we read his discussion, Professor McGovern makes two points, both of
which we find troublesome. First, he makes the conceptual argument that property reasoning generally does not have an impact on the question of the dependency or independency of covenants. Indeed, he finds "only one situation" in
which the conveyance concept affects the issue of dependency: "Under the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, after the property in the goods had passed to the
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FAILURE OF "PRESUPPOSED CONDITIONS" IN LANDLORD-

TENANT LAW: DESTRUCTION OF THE LEASED PREMISES

When a promisor's ability or willingness to perform a conbuyer he could not reject them if they were defective." Id. at 680 (footnote
omitted). The basis for this exception "seems to be that when 'the property
passes by the sale, the vendee having thus benefitted by the partial execution of
the contract, and become the proprietor of the thing sold, cannot treat the failure of the warranty as a condition broken.' " Id. (quoting Behn v. Burness, 3 B.
& S. 751, 755, 122 Eng. Rep. 281, 283 (Ex. Ch. 1863)). In short, the buyer's
obligation to pay becomes "independent" after delivery by the seller. Thus,
under the English Sale of Goods Act, it seems the seller's vital promise is the
promise to deliver the goods, while any promise or warranty that the seller may
have made concerning the quality of the goods is collateral or minor. Since the
seller has performed the promise upon which the buyer's obligation to pay depends, the buyer must pay. In the terminology that we prefer, the seller under
the Sale of Goods Act has substantially performed his obligation by delivery, and
any breach of warranty is an immaterial breach. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
We suggest, however, that Professor McGovern's recognition of the role of
property reasoning on the dependency question in this "one situation" undercuts his point that "[it is hard to see any connection between the dependency of
promises and the conveyance of property rights." McGovern, supra note 6, at
679. Although we think that there is more to conveyance reasoning, see infra Part
IV-A, one component of the conveyance view of a lease regards the lease transaction as akin to the sale of the premises for the term, with rent as the purchase
price. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809) (lessor entitled to rent even
after building burned down). Under this view, the landlord has performed substantially upon delivery, and any subsequent breaches are immaterial. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 290 & comment a (1932). In other words, the
conveyance view of the lease puts the tenant after delivery in the same position
as the buyer after delivery under the English Sale of Goods Act. In both cases,
the tenant's obligation to pay rent is "independent," i.e., unconditional, because
the condition to its performance, delivery by the landlord, has been satisfied.
Thus, the "one situation" in which Professor McGovern sees a connection between conveyance reasoning and the dependency doctrine is precisely the landlord-tenant situation as conceived by conveyance reasoning.
Second, in addition to seeing only the supposedly limited conceptual connection between conveyance reasoning and the dependency question noted
above, Professor McGovern makes an historical or evidentiary point. He suggests that if medieval lawyers saw any conceptual connection between the independency of lease covenants and conveyance reasoning, they failed to state it.
McGovern, supra note 6, at 679. Since we are not legal historians, and have
neither the familiarity nor the facility with ancient sources that Professor McGovern does, we quarrel with this point with diffidence. Nevertheless, it seems
to us that Professor McGovern's own use of his data renders his point irrelevant.
The primary argument of his insightful article is that the law reveals no simple
developmental movement from the view that promises are independent to the
view that they are dependent, with Lord Mansfield's decision in Kingston v. Preston being the important turning point. See id., supra note 6, at 676. He supports
his argument by noting earlier cases from various fields of law in which courts in
effect-though not in terms-regarded promises as dependent. In discussing medieval lease cases, for example, he says that it was "settled" law no later than the
end of the fourteenth century that the landlord's eviction of the tenant from
possession excused the tenant's duty to pay rent. The tenant's rent obligation in
his view was thus effectively dependent on the landlord's maintenance of the

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/1

46

Chase and Taylor: Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and Contract

1985]

LANDLORD AND TENANT

617

tractual undertaking is impaired by an unforeseen supervening
event, the question arises whether the promisor must neverthe29
less perform, or at least pay damages if he fails to perform.
The building on leased premises, for example, might be destroyed without the fault of either the landlord or tenant. The
question would thus arise whether the tenant is nonetheless obligated to pay rent despite this unforeseen interference with the
use and enjoyment of the premises.
A general rule of contract law, expressed in the maxim pacta
sunt servanda, is that agreements must be enforced as written.
Under this view, "when a contractual promise is made, the promisor must perform or pay damages for his failure to perform no
matter how burdensome performance becomes as a result of unforeseen circumstances."' 3 0 An exception to the rule, however, is
recognized in cases in which the supervening event renders performance impossible or totally frustrates the venture of which the
promised performance was a part.' 3 ' In such cases, the contract
is either terminated and the promisor excused, or the contract is
32
modified to reflect the changed circumstances.'
The doctrinal basis for recognition of the excuse from performance in cases of impossibility and frustration is the law of
implied or constructive conditions.' 3 3 "The parties are said to
have contemplated the continued existence of a state of facts,"
tenant's actual possession of the premises. Id. at 666. He then notes that "other
breaches" by the landlord did not justify the tenant's termination of the lease.
Thus, in the fifteenth century, the courts rejected the view that the landlord's
failure to repair allowed the tenant the right to terminate the lease, and he notes
that constructive eviction did not become settled law until the nineteenth century. Id. at 666-67. It seems to us that the explanation for the differing results in
the actual eviction and failure-to-repair situations might lie precisely in conveyance reasoning as we have explained it. In the former case, the landlord has
materially breached, while in the latter the landlord has substantially performed
because he or she has not interfered with the tenant's "possession" or actual
access to the leased premises, which is the tenant's central entitlement under a
property view of the lease. The fact that courts at that time did not state the
matter in terms of material breach and substantial performance, see supra note
72, does not deter Professor McGovern from making a forceful, and we think
persuasive, case that the courts in effect were applying dependency analysis. At
the same time, the fact that the courts did not explicitly say that there is a connection between conveyance reasoning and dependency doctrine does not prevent us from contending that there is such a connection.
129. See Rosett, supra note 19, at 1087.
130. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 13-1, at 477.
131. See id. at 476-77; Rosett, supra note 19, at 1093, 1094-95. See generally 6
A. CORBIN, supra note 14, §§ 1353-1361.
132. See Rosett, supra note 19, at 1095.
133. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1331.
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and there is thus a "condition precedent to the promisor's duty
that the facts contemplated continue to exist."' 13 4 Phrased in the
language of the Uniform Commercial Code, the lease example
presents the question of whether the continued existence of
buildings on the leased premises is a "basic assumption" of the
parties, and hence a "presupposed condition" of the tenant's obligation to pay rent. 3 5 Thus stated, the question of the tenant's
continued liability after destruction of the premises bears an obvious affinity to the question, canvassed in Part I, of the tenant's
continued rent liability after breach of promise by the landlord.
In fact, the dependency and destruction cases present two aspects
36
of the same question. The type of condition may be different,
but the issue in both cases is whether the court will impose a constructive condition to ameliorate the lease omission and whether
conveyance reasoning has any impact on that issue. Our cOnclusion here, as in the dependency discussion, is that there are important similarities between property and contract reasoning, but
that these similarities should not be allowed to obscure vital
differences.
A.

"Possession" and Presupposed Conditions

Despite inconsistency and confusion in judicial statements
and commentary, 3 7 the tenant's relevant claim in cases of the destruction of the premises is frustration of purpose, not impossibility of performance. Destruction of the premises does not render
it impossible for the tenant to perform the obligation to pay
rent.' 3 8 Rather, the tenant's claim is that he or she had a particular object or purpose in contracting for the use of the leased
134. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 13-1, at 477.
135. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977). Some recent cases reflect a doctrinal shift,
from the view that implied conditions are rooted in the parties' expectations, to
the view that they are based on considerations of fairness and justice. See, e.g.,
Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
This shift is part of a larger shift away from manipulation of intent as the basis
for contract decisions toward a more forthright balancing of the interests at
stake. However, much of the reasoning in contemporary excuse cases still employs traditional methodology, as the text accompanying notes 134 & 135
reveals. Consequently, we focus on that methodology in our discussion.
136. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, §§ 13-1, 13-10 at 477, 495
(distinguishing between a constructive condition that substantial performance
be rendered, and a constructive condition that an assumed state of facts continued to exist, as bases for excusing a promisor from a duty to perform).
137. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1322.
138. Id. § 1353, at 458. See Warshawsky v. American Automotive Prods.
Co., 12 Ill.
App. 2d 178, 188, 138 N.E.2d 816, 820 (1956).
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premises; that the continued availability of the premises for this
use is a condition of the obligation to pay rent; and that the rent
obligation is discharged when unforeseen fortuitous events destroy the premises and hence the possibility of the particular
39

use. 1

Traditional landlord-tenant doctrine rejects the tenant's
claim for relief from the rent obligation when the premises are
destroyed. Typically it declares that "a tenant is not relieved
from paying rent by the destruction of a building on leased premises, although the building may be the principal subject matter of
the lease.' 40 While that statement indicates an unambiguous result, it masks a variety of justifications for the result. At least
three separate explanations appear in the decisions, each differing in its assessment of the fact that buildings on the leased premises "may be the principal subject matter of the lease."
Traditionalists have tended to merge the explanations. This is
unfortunate since the explanations are conceptually discrete and
since merging them obscures the contractual roots of all three explanations. Revisionists, for their part, have failed to explore all
of the explanations, and their selectivity has blinded them to important differences between property and contract reasoning.
1. Property as Contract: Three Explanationsfor the Destruction Result
Courts occasionally assert that they will not relieve a tenant
from "an express contract to pay rent upon the ground that the
premises have been destroyed by fire . . . unless there is an express stipulation to that effect."' 4 ' The requirement of such an
express condition dates to the early English case of Paradine v.
139. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1353, at 457-58. For a further discussion of Professor Corbin's view of the frustration argument in lease cases, see
infra note 220. As we hope to show in the ensuing discussion, conveyance reasoning presents various obstacles to the successful assertion of the frustration
argument stated in the text. See infra notes 141-76 and accompanying text.
140. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.103, at 396. Because
the common law rule is modified by statute in many jurisdictions, or by a lease
provision in particular cases, it might well not apply to a majority of modern
leasing transactions. Since our concern is with the reasoning underlying the
common law rule, we disregard such statutory and contractual modifications.
Where the rule has not been modified, some courts have indicated a willingness
to follow it even today. See Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 738 (1980). See generally Henszey & Pugh, Tenant's Liabilityfor Rent on Destruction of the LeaseholdPremises, 7 REAL
EST. L.J. 187 (1979) (discussion of common law rule, exceptions, and statutory
modifications); Note, Destruction of Building on Leasehold, 32 OR. L. REV. 336
(1953) (same).
141. White v. Molyneaux, 2 Ga. 124, 126 (1847).
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Jane,14 2 in which a tenant defended a suit for rent on the ground
that the leased premises had become completely unavailable to
him, as they had been overrun by an alien army. The court rejected the defense. The tenant was bound to make good on his
express promise to pay rent "notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by
his contract."' 4 3 In this simple and straightforward analysis, the
tenant lacks the benefit of a constructive condition for the simple
reason that constructive conditions are not recognized. If use of
buildings on the leased premises or use of the land itself is in fact
"the principle subject matter of the lease,"' 14 4 and hence a condition of the tenant's obligation to pay, it is incumbent on the tenant to bargain accordingly. Thus, conditions not stated in the
14 5
lease do not exist.
Because this first explanation fails to excuse a tenant who has
not protected himself in the contract, it is distinguishable from
the second approach. The second approach does not insist upon
express contractual conditions; rather it determines the tenant's
liability for rent in accordance with legal rules allocating risk of
14 6
loss in sales transactions. In the leading case of Fowler v. Bott,
tenants who had leased premises for use as a mill site defended an
action for rent on the ground that the destruction of the mill
building relieved them of their obligation to pay. The court,
framing the question as "whether, after a destruction by fire of
14 7
the buildings demised, the lessors ... can recover their rent,"'
held for the landlord. In addressing the "supposed hardship" of
its rule of continued rent liability, the court eschewed the robust
freedom-of-contract rationale of Paradine. Rather, the court reasoned that the lease "is a sale of the demised premises for the
term.... The rent is in effect the price, or purchase money ....
and their [the premises'] destruction, or any depreciation of their
value, happening without the fault of the lessor, is no abatement
of his price, but entirely the loss of the purchaser."'' 48
Because Fowler requires an express stipulation to upset the
risk of loss allocation made by sales law, it is easy to confuse this
142. Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1648). See generally 6 A.
note 14, § 1322, at 328-31 (discussion of Paradine).
143. Aleyn at 26, 82 Eng. Rep. at 897.
144. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
145. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1324, at 335.
146. 6 Mass. 63 (1809).
147. Id. at 67.
148. Id.
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explanation with Paradine's express condition rationale. The difference is that under Paradine, the absence of an express contractual escape from rent liability is always fatal, whereas under the
sales analogy, it is only fatal when sales law operates to impose
the risk of loss upon the tenant. Though there are few cases on
point, it appears that the sales rationale would excuse the tenant
from the rent obligation, whereas the Paradine rationale would
not, if the premises were destroyed between execution of the
lease and the start of the term, notwithstanding the absence of an
express stipulation.14 9 This result could be explained by saying
50
that risk of loss does not pass to the purchaser until delivery.1
The facts in Fowler, however, are representative of the far more
common case, in which destruction of the premises occurs after
the term has begun. In this situation the delivery test is satisfied,
and the tenant, as purchaser, bears the risk of loss. The result,
again, is not affected by the fact that a "building may be the principal subject matter of the lease,"'' l because risk of loss as to the
building has passed, according to applicable rules, to the purchaser-tenant.
This second explanation, while widespread in the cases, is
not universal. A third approach was articulated in the leading
English case of Baker v. Holtpzaffell, 15 2 where the landlord sued for
rent accruing after a fire destroyed buildings on the leased premises. Apparently, use of the buildings was central to the tenant's
purposes in acquiring the leasehold. After the fire the premises
were described as in "a ruinous state and not inhabited" by the
tenant.15 3 Nevertheless the landlord recovered. Importantly,
however, the court did not mention the sales analogy which figured as centrally in Fowler. Instead, the court found that the tenant remained bound because "[t]he land was still in existence" to
support the rent obligation. 1 54 A leading treatise convincingly
149. See Wood v. Hubbell, 10 N.Y. 479, 486-88 (1853) (alternate holding;
court also reformed the lease, finding that parties had agreed to insert a covenant excusing the tenant in case of destruction of the premises and had failed to
include it by mistake). But see Anderson v. Ferguson, 17 Wash. 262, 277, 135
P.2d 302, 308 (1943) (dictum; tenant is bound if premises are destroyed subsequent to the "making" of the lease). Cf 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 667, at
194-95 (in contracts for the sale of land, risk of loss resulting from destruction of
buildings or land in the interval between contract of sale and conveyance of
deed is on purchaser).
150. See U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (1977).
151. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
152. 4 Taunt. 45, 13 Rev. Rep. 556 (1811).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 46, 13 Rev. Rep. at 557. Accord, Paxson & Comfort Co.v. Potter,
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suggests that Baker illustrates the "well settled rule of the common law that where lands are the subject of a demise and the
buildings or improvements thereon are accidentally destroyed
....
this destruction ... does not discharge the covenant to pay
rent . . . . "55 The reason is that "the subject of the lease is the
land and not the buildings thereon.... As the land remained to
the tenant after the erections were destroyed ....
his liability for
56
rent was still assumed to continue."'
As thus elaborated by the commentary, the Baker reasoning is
different in important ways both from the sales analogy advanced
in Fowler and from Paradine'sexpress condition rationale. Under
the sales analogy, once risk of loss passes to the tenant it becomes
irrelevant that the "subject matter of the contract" is destroyed
since the tenant, as purchaser, bears the burden of the fortuitous
destruction of the subject matter of the transaction. In contrast,
under Baker, destruction of the "subject matter" of the lease
transaction is a central consideration and the determination of the
lease's "subject matter" becomes crucial.' 5 7 Thus, the tenant
30 Pa. Super. 615, 616 (1906); Post v. Brown, 142 Tenn. 304, 306-07, 218 S.W.
823, 824 (1920); Anderson v. Ferguson, 135 P.2d 302, 308 (Wash. 1943).
155. 2 H. UNDERHILL, supra note 35, § 528.
156. Id. But see infra note 177 (citing cases for the minority viewpoint that
tenant is excused upon destruction of buildings, even though land remains to
support the rent obligation).
We do not mean to suggest that Baker, an 1811 case, overtly employs the
vocabulary of frustration of purpose. That concept apparently does not appear
explicitly in English law until the early 1900s. See Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740
(1903) (frustration of purpose excuses promisor). See also Taylor v. Caldwell,
122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863) (impossibility of performance excuses promisor).
Indeed, the "subject matter" explanation of Baker appears to be based on the
property conception that rent issues out of the land, and that since the tenant
still has the land after destruction of buildings, he continues to owe rent. See
supra note 71. We do suggest, however, that the "subject matter" explanation of
Baker is the property equivalent of the contract doctrine of frustration of purpose,
just as the doctrine of constructive eviction is the property equivalent of the
contract doctrine of material breach. See supra Part I. Viewed in frustration of
purpose terms, Baker holds that the tenant is not excused upon destruction of
buildings because the essential element of the transaction remains, and hence
there is no total, or even substantial, loss of bargain. See infra note 166 and
accompanying text. Here, as on the independency question, property law does
allow the tenant to be excused. See infra note 160 (tenant excused when land is
unavailable). However, the criteria used by property law are, on the whole,
more stringent than those employed in the alternative contract doctrine.
157. To be sure, the two explanations can produce the same result. When
buildings on the leased premises are destroyed, the tenant remains liable for the
rent on either theory, because risk of loss of that destruction has been allocated
to him (at least after delivery) under the sale of goods rationale, or because he
still has the central use (of the land) contracted for, and hence has suffered no
relevant interference with his bargain, under the Baker rationale.
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might escape continued rent liability, even after delivery of possession, if it can be said that the purpose for which the tenant let
the premises no longer can be achieved. Nevertheless, destruction of buildings on the premises, even though the buildings in
fact "may be the principal subject matter of the lease," 1 58 ordinarily does not thwart the purpose of the lease because property law
conceives the purpose to be use of the land, unless the parties
specify otherwise.' 59 But inaccessibility of the land itself would
thwart the purpose of the lease and thus should excuse the tenant, as the commentary and the few relevant cases suggest.1 60
And because such inaccessibility would excuse the tenant even
without an express condition in the contract, the Baker explanation also differs from that in Paradine,'6 1 since in Paradinethe ten-

ant was held liable even though he was, in fact, excluded from the
entire leasehold, including the land.
Since the Baker reasoning explains the tenant's excuse in
cases where the land itself becomes unavailable, while Fowler and
Paradine do not, it has the advantage of making the destruction

cases internally consistent. In addition, the Baker analysis has the
advantage of revealing consistencies between the destruction
cases and related lease decisions. Although the common law denied that destruction of buildings excused the tenant's rent obli-

gation, it also generally held that a lease for a use subsequently

made illegal or severely restricted by government regulation did
excuse the tenant. 16 2 These illegality cases are based on an appli158. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
160. See Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707, 712 (1882) ("The common
law regards ... a lease [for a term] as the grant of an estate for years, which the
lessee takes a title in, and is bound to pay the stipulated rent for, notwithstanding any injury by flood, fire, or external violence, at least unless the injury is such
a destruction of the land as to amount to an eviction."); Waite v. O'Neil, 76 F.
408, 416 (6th Cir. 1896) ("If the land remained to the tenant after the buildings
were destroyed, and he had a right to occupy and use it, his liability for rent,
without abatement, was held to continue.... But the very foundation upon
which the old rule was rested is removed if the subject-matter of the demise is
destroyed."); Chamberlain v. Godfdrey's Adm'r, 50 Ala. 530, 534 (1874)
("When the land ... ceases to exist, the rent . . .of necessity must cease.");
Bunting v. Orendorf, 152 Miss. 327, 331-32, 120 So. 182, 183 (1929) ("[t]here is
no allegation that the land ... rented was destroyed."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY § 5.4 reporter's note 4, at 201 (1977) ("The basis of the old rule
was that the tenant could terminate on destruction of the subject matter of a
lease, but the land was the subject matter of a lease unless otherwise specified,
and unless the land itself was destroyed, the tenant could not bring himself
within this rule.").
161. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
162. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Supra note 1, §§ 3.44, 3.104. See also
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cation of the doctine of frustration of purpose: "In effect, the
courts imply a condition that the specified use continue to be lawful."' 1 63 Like the cases in which the land itself becomes inaccessible, the illegality cases are inconsistent with the Fowler and
Paradine rationales. Under Fowler's sales reasoning, the tenant
would bear the risk of changes in the law respecting use of the
purchased object. 1 64 Under Paradine'sreasoning the tenant bears
all risks not expressly contracted away.' 65 The illegality cases,
however, are not inconsistent with Baker's "subject matter" explanation of the destruction cases, inasmuch as the frustration doctrine that the illegality cases apply is simply a version of that same
doctrine as applied to destruction cases. Frustration doctrine requires that the "object" of the contract be totally or almost totally
frustrated. 66 While it is possible to say that the bargain is not
frustrated so long as the premises remain available for any use
after the supervening illegality occurs, the cases generally hold
otherwise. They hold that if the "principal use" of the lease is
frustrated by the supervening law, there is sufficient total or near
total loss to excuse the tenant.16 7 Before finding that the "principal use" has been frustrated, however, the cases require an express restrictive convenant limiting the tenant to the very use
16 8
made illegal or prohibited by subsequent law or regulation.
Where there is no restrictive covenant, the conclusion that there
is not sufficient frustration to excuse the tenant's rent obligation
is justified on the ground that the tenant's allowed uses are various, and frustration of one of those uses, even if it is the tenant's
O'Byrne v. Henley, 161 Ala. 620, 50 So. 83 (1909) (analogizing illegality rules to
destruction rules). It is perhaps more correct to say that American common law
applies what is essentially frustration of purpose reasoning in both the destruction and supervening illegality cases. In England, apparently, the courts refuse
to apply the principle of supervening illegality to leases. See infra note 232 and
accompanying text.
163. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.44, at 265. See also
supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (constructive condition as basis of
frustration argument).
164. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.44, at 266.
165. See Imbeschied v. Lerner, 241 Mass. 199, 201, 135 N.E. 219, 220
(1922) (tenant of lease for "liquor business only" not excused by federal prohibition law "in the absence of any provision in the lease that the rent should be
abated ... in the event of such business becoming illegal"). For a discussion of
Paradinev. Jane, see supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
166. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 13-10, at 495-96.
167. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.44, at 265-66.
168. See id. § 3.44, at 265-66; id. § 3.104, at 400-01; 6 A. CORBIN, supra note
14, § 1356, at 473; infra note 169.
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principal use, leaves the tenant free to pursue other uses. 1 69
The requirement of a restrictive use covenant in the illegality
cases, however, appears to be nothing more than an expression of
the reasoning that underlies Baker's "subject matter" view of the
destruction cases. In the destruction cases, the law reasons that
loss of buildings does not frustrate the tenant's principal use of
the premises, because that use is presumed to involve the soil, not
70
the buildings, unless the lease expressly provides otherwise.
Similarly, in the illegality cases, loss of one use does not frustrate
the tenant's purpose under the lease because the law assumes that
other uses remain available, unless the lease specifically provides
that only one use is allowed. The restrictive covenant requirement in the illegality cases functions to make the loss incurred by
the tenant tantamount to loss of the land in the destruction
cases-any beneficial use becomes impossible. 7' To say that the
tenant is excused when land but not buildings is destroyed, then,
is simply to apply consistently the principle that operates in the
illegality cases. The principle in both cases is that the tenant can
be excused when his main purpose in entering the transaction is
frustrated, but property law in both cases imposes a stringent requirement on the determination that the main purpose has been
72
frustrated.
There are thus three separate explanations for the destruction cases, and they contain important differences. The differences, however, should not obscure important similarities. The
most important similarity for purposes of the property-contract
theme is that all three of the explanations are forms of contract
reasoning. The insistence upon an express condition to relieve a
promisor from an obligation is a remnant in landlord-tenant law
of the once general rule of contract law. That this insistence re169. See Note, Landlord and Tenant, Liabilityfor Rent Not Excused Under Doctrine
of Commercial Frustration, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 156, 157 ("The doctrine [of frustration] will apply to leases only if the use of the premises is restricted by the terms
of the lease to a particular purpose, and the supervening event prevents that use.
If, however, the terms of the lease contain no reference to the use to be made of
the premises, or if such references as it contains is merely permissive, the lease is
not terminated by any fortuitous event. This is true irrespective of the fact that
the premises were to be used for one particular purpose and no other.") (footnotes omitted).
170. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
171. The parallel in the constructive eviction context is the view that the
landlord's interference must render the premises uninhabitable. See supra notes
83-113 & infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
172. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 13-10, at 495-96.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

55

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1

626

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 571

flects the law of "an earlier, sterner age"'' 73 should not obscure
the fact that it reflects the contract law of that age, and is not an
idiosyncracy of lease cases. Likewise, the sales analogy relied on
in Fowler simply compares the lease contract for purposes of risk
of loss to a standard contract for the sale of goods. While the
express condition rationale is dated, 174 the risk of loss principle
that becomes relevant by virtue of the sales analogy is standard in
contract law and applicable even today.' 75 Finally, Baker's "subject matter" rationale is, as we suggested, in essence an application to leases of the contract doctrine of frustration of purpose,
based on a theory of conditions. In property terms, the "object"
of the lease contract is use of the land. The continued availability
of the land is thus a "basic assumption" of the parties. The tenant is excused when the land is no longer available because continued existence of the land is a "presupposed" condition of his
176
obligation to pay rent.
2.

Property vs. Contract: The American "Exception "for MultipleOccupancy Premises

The Baker rule's unvarying assumption that land is the essence of the lease transaction is essentially useless to the modern
tenant. In response to this perceived deficiency, a small but vocal
minority of American cases simply have rejected that assumption. 17 7 However, a more significant development in American
law is the creation of a purported "exception" to the Baker rule.
Under this "exception," the tenant is excused from the obligation
to pay rent when the lease "is of rooms in a building or of a building without land," and the building is destroyed. 178 The "excep173. Rosett, supra note 19, at 1094.
174. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1324, at 335-36; § 1339, at 395;
§ 1356, at 471.
175. See U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (1977) (risk of loss generally on purchaser after
delivery').
176. See supra notes 133-35 & 152-61 and accompanying text.
177. See Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674 (1881); Wattles v. South Omaha
Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897); Albert M. Greenfield & Co. v.
Kolea, 475 Pa. 351, 356, 380 A.2d 758, 760 (1976) ("In this case, . . . if we
applied the general rule and ignored the realities of the situation, we would bind
the [tenant] to paying rent for barren ground when both parties to the lease
contemplated that the building would be used for the commercial enterprise of
repair and sale of used motor vehicles."); Cogan v. Parker, 2 S.C. 255, 275
(1879) ("If parties contract with reference to the occupation of a dwelling house,
the destruction of that dwelling house is clearly the destruction of that which
they had in view, and was the basis and consideration of their contract.").
178. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.103, at 397. Because
the American "exception" really functions as a repudiation of the Baker rule in
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tion" is justified on the theory that "as distinguished from cases
where the lessee still has the land, here there is a complete destruction of the subject matter of the lease." 7 9 The excuse in this
"exception," like the excuse for the tenant where the land is inaccessible, is inconsistent with the express condition and sales rationales. Commentators who have said that it is a repudiation of
those explanations and not a true exception to them are quite
right. 1 80 Under Paradine'sexpress condition rationale, the question of whether the lease is a building or a land lease is simply
irrelevant; in all cases the contracting party seeking an excuse
from his obligation to perform must have negotiated a specific
casualty exception to his obligation in the contract.' 8 ' Likewise,
the American "exception" is inconsistent with the sale of goods
rationale. Regardless of whether the tenant receives rooms or
land at the outset of the lease, the fact is that the tenant receives
them at that point, so that any ensuing loss is a post-delivery loss,
with the risk.on the tenant. Since the sales construct focuses on
the tenant's acquisition of possession of the thing-whether
buildings or land-rather than on the particular uses that the tenant might have contemplated for the thing, the American "exception" is "illogical" in sales terms, as Professor Lesar has forcefully
8 2
contended.
an important sense, see infra notes 185-97 and accompanying text, we are reluctant to discuss it without the quotation marks.
179. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.103, at 397-98.
180. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498, 502 (1863) ("In a case where a
lessee binds himself, by express covenant, to pay the rent during the term, and
there is no exception in the lease of casualties by fire, notwithstanding the house
should be burnt down by accident, he is bound to pay, for the simple reason that
he has bound himself by an express covenant to do so.") (Wright,J., dissenting).
Linn v. Ross & Co., 10 Ohio 412 (1841) (tenant who leased portion of building
and expressly covenanted to pay rent, held liable for rent after destruction of
building). The majority in Graves did not disagree with the Paradinereasoning of
the dissent; it simply adopted an alternative theory that rendered that reasoning
irrelevant. For further discussion of Graves, see infra note 215. For a discussion
of Paradine,see supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
182. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.103, at 398 ("logically, this exception is inconsistent with the theory of the destruction rule, and it
is not made in England") (footnote omitted); Lesar, supra note 2, at 1284 n.32
(1960) ("The reasoning [of the American "exception"] is that, as distinguished
from cases where the lessee still has the land, here there is a complete destruction of the subject matter of the lease. But the burden of the ... common law
rule, is that the lessee has purchased an estate and is not contracting for the use
of something. The distinction is not made in England."). Putting the question
of England aside temporarily, see infra note 190, we think that Professor Lesar
more appropriately might have said that the burden of one strand of the common law rule, the lease-as-sale conception, is that the tenant is a purchaser. See
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A closer question is presented with respect to the Baker "subject matter" rationale1 83 to which the American position consciously purports to be an "exception." However, we think that
even here the so-called "exception" is ultimately a repudiation, in
an important sense, of the very explanation of which it is supposedly a part. To be sure, from one perspective, the American "exception" is consistent with the basic proposition stated in Baker,
because it simply draws the line that defines Baker's outer limits.
Thus, if land is the essence of the bargain under the Baker rationale, the tenant should be excused whenever land is not an essential part of the bargain. In the ordinary case of rental of a suite of
rooms in a multiple-story building, the sole basis on which the
parties contract is use of the space demarcated by the various cubicles in the building, rather than use of the land on which the
building is situated. 84 Destruction of the building prevents the
tenant from using the bargained-for space, and hence from consummating the bargain. Under this approach, it would be entirely
consistent with the rule announced in Baker to relieve the tenant
from the obligation to pay rent in that situation. But while the
American "exception," at least in the situation noted, appears
consistent with the Baker rule, we wonder whether the rule is altogether consistent with the "exception." The American cases
seem to apply the "exception" in all cases in which the tenant
185
leases a portion of a building rather than an entire building.
Application of the "exception" in cases of multiple-story buildsupra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. In contrast, the subject-matter rationale of the Baker case appears to us to treat the lease as a contract "for the use
of something" rather than as a sale. But Baker also defines the "something" as
the use of land rather than buildings on the land, so that destruction of buildings
does not cause any frustration of the tenant's purpose in entering into the lease.
In treating the lease as a contract for use rather than as a sale, the American
"exception" runs counter to the sales rationale strand of the destruction rule, as
Professor Lesar rightly notes. We think, however, that the American "exception" also runs counter to the Baker analysis that it purports to apply, because
instead of invoking the property notion that the lease is an estate "in land" as a
means of ascribing a purpose to the transaction, it searches the transaction itself
for clues about the purpose of the lease. For a discussion of Baker, see supra
notes 152-56 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the impact of
conveyance reasoning on the frustration argument, see infra notes 220 & 232.
183. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
184. See Javins v, First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ("In the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the lease is
that it gives him a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment
on the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet
below".).
185. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.103, at 397-98 (no
distinction drawn between types of multiple-occupancy situations).
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ings is sensible, as we have just noted. However, when the tenant
leases half of a single-story building and the building is destroyed, it is still possible to define a discrete land space that remains "available" for the tenant's exclusive use, in a way that is
quite literally impossible in the case of destruction of a multiplestory building. In spite of this conceptual flaw, the American "exception" applies in this situation as well. 18 6 Likewise, the American "exception" is applicable, according to the authorities, when
the tenant leases a "building without land,"' 8 7 which means, we
take it, a building having no appreciable apron of usable land.
Here again, however, destruction of buildings still would leave
the tenant with exclusive access to the land on which the building
rested. Since we believe the basic Baker rule is troublesome, we
do not contend that it should be applied in these latter situations.
We argue only that it could be applied, and that the failure of
American courts to apply the rule in these situations is evidence
not only of a dissatisfaction with the rule but of an actual repudiation of it.
The repudiation of the Baker rule manifests itself more obviously in the reasons the courts give for the "exception" than in
the results reached. In the American "exception" cases, the
courts say that the subject matter of the lease is the use of buildings rather than of land. 188 They then apply the Baker rule relieving the tenant on the ground that the subject matter of the
contract is destroyed. 8 9 But in the "exception" cases the mode
of determining the subject matter of the transaction is critically
different from the Baker approach. The courts apparently let the
rental facts speak for themselves; they determine from the circumstances of the letting that the parties must have intended for
186. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89, 90 (1869) (tenant who leased
west half of building excused from rent obligation after fire; lease "was of a
portion of the building or superstructure, and not of the land upon which the
same rested; hence a destruction of the house, the subject-matter of the lease,
... terminated the lease and the relation of landlord and tenant").
187. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.103, at 397.
188. See Womack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103, 104 (1867) ("This exception
...is founded upon the idea that in such cases it is not the intention of the lease
to grant any interest in the land, save for the single purpose of the enjoyment of
the apartment, and that when that enjoyment becomes impossible, by reason of
the destruction of the building, there remains nothing upon which the demise
can operate."); Albert M. Greenfield & Co. v. Kolea, 475 Pa. 351, 354, 380 A.2d
758, 759 (1976) (the exception recognizes "that in a landlord-tenant relationship with respect to an apartment, the parties have bargainedfor a part of a building and not the land beneath" (emphasis in original)).
189. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
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the buildings to be a vital part of the transaction, and that their
continued existence is a condition of the tenant's obligation to
pay rent.' 90 Unlike the Fowler sales analogy cases, these "exception" cases regard the purpose for which the tenant receives delivery of the leased premises as the essence of the contract. In
addition, unlike the Baker "subject matter" cases, the courts in
these cases inquire into the tenant's purpose in entering the lease
by looking at the facts and circumstances of the transaction,
rather than merely ascribing a purpose to the tenant and putting
on the tenant the burden of expressly stating any contrary purpose in the lease.
All of this is quite proper. Indeed, it seems inevitable from a
contract perspective.' 9 1 One is hard-pressed to contend that a
tenant in any of the cases covered by the American "exception"
has the slightest interest in the land on which the building is situated. The point is, however, that if the reasoning of the "exception" were taken seriously, the Baker rule itself would virtually
cease to exist. In many of the cases in which the Baker rule of
continued rent liability is applied, it is just as difficult as it is in the
American "exception" cases to believe that the tenant had any
real interest in the soil as opposed to the buildings on the premises. In Baker itself, for example, the continued existence of the
leasehold buildings was vital to the achievement of the tenant's
190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. Some commentators argue
that the American "exception" is "illogical" and draw support for that conclusion from the rejection of the exception in England. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. However, the English case Izon v. Gorton, cited as authority for
the rejection of the exception, presents peculiar facts. See Izon v. Gorton, 5
Bing. (N.C.) 502, 132 Eng. Rep. 1193 (C.P. 1839). In Izon, the tenant rented
upper floors of a warehouse. The fire that provoked the lawsuit gutted the
building, but apparently left the structure, including means of access to the upper floors, intact; as the court noted, "the space enclosed by the four walls [of
the tenant's rooms], still continued as marked out by them." 5 Bing. (N.C.) at
507, 132 Eng. Rep. at 1195. The tenant in Izon thus still had his particular space
available after the fire, just as in the usual Baker situation the tenant still has his
or her land available after destruction of buildings. Izon, in short, is not really a
destruction case, and thus is not authority for the English rejection of the American "exception". The Izon court could have conceded the "exception" and still
ruled against the tenant, since there had been no effective destruction of the
tenant's rooms. Izon is rather more akin to cases of supervening illegality, in
which the thing leased continues to exist, but subsequent events impair its beneficial use to the tenant. As to those kinds of lease cases, the English courts apparently have consistently refused to apply frustration-of-purpose doctrine. See
infra notes 232 and accompanying text.
191. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1356, at 470 (courts in American
"exception" cases treat the transaction "as a contract for use and occupation
rather than a conveyance").
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bargain. 192 Nevertheless, the court refused to excuse the tenant,
ascribing to him a purpose to use the soil, not the buildings. 19 3
Tying the present discussion to our earlier discussion of independency, we suggest that there is a direct parallel between, on
the one hand, the common law destruction rule and the doctrine
of independency of lease covenants revealed in Stewart v. Childs
Co., 1 9 4 and on the other hand the American "exception" to the
destruction rule and University Club v. Deakin.195 In both the destruction and independency contexts, conveyance reasoningwhich defines the tenant's bargain as a contract for a possessory
interest in land-operates to suppress transactional facts that do
not fit that model.' 9 6 However, in the American "exception" for
192. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
193. See id. See also Mayer v. Morehead, 106 Ga. 434, 436, 32 S.E. 349, 350
(1899) (tenant of gin mill not excused upon destruction of gin house on premises, even though "[a]ccording to the evidence offered by the [tenant], the gin
house constituted a very substantial part of the rented premises, and was of
much benefit to [them]"); Bussman v., Ganster, 72 Pa. 285, 291 (1872) (tenant
who contracted for use of building as storeroom held liable for rent after destruction; the dissent argued that "the true purpose of the contract" was occupancy of the building, not the land).
It should not be assumed, and we do not contend, that frustration analysis
always will relieve a tenant from the obligation to pay rent upon destruction of
the leased premises. If in a particular transaction it appears that the land is in
fact the essence of the bargain, the tenant should not be excused upon destruction of buildings on the premises. Cases exist in which the courts have, quite
properly, refused to excuse the tenant in such circumstances. See, e.g., Bradley v.
McCabe, 438 P.2d 468 (Okla. 1967). The point is that in deciding whether to
excuse the tenant, the court should employ usual contractual processes of determining intent. These processes include looking to the particular transaction for
clues about the actual or presumed intent of the parties respecting the destruction situation (for instance, the presence of insurance on the premises, payable
to the landlord), or assessing the transaction in the light of general policies concerning the parties' relative ability to bear the loss, the impact of destruction
doctrine on leasing practices, and the like. In short, the court should determine
whether there is a particular transactional or a general social basis for inferring
or constructing a condition to relieve the tenant and decide accordingly. It
should not determine, abstractly, that the tenant remains bound because the
landlord has "sold" the premises to him, or because the tenant has contracted
for use of the land rather than buildings on the land.
194. For a discussion of Stewart, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying
text. See also O'Byrne v. Henley, 161 Ala. 620, 50 So. 83 (1909) (comparing
illegality and destruction rules to constructive eviction).
195. For a discussion of Deakin, see supra notes 23-29 and accompanying
text.
196. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. Again, of course, our statement in the text about the debilitating effects of conveyance reasoning refers to
conveyance reasoning as it is generally understood and employed by the courts.
See supra note 12. There is no inherent reason why the concept of "possession"
could not be employed to protect the expectations of the tenant, as revealed by
the facts and circumstances of the particular transaction before the court. Indeed, the minority cases on destruction, see supra note 177, and the American
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multi-unit premises and in Deakin, the courts reject the constricting effects of conveyance reasoning. Instead they inquire into the
bargain actually struck by the parties as revealed by the facts and
circumstances of the individual case, 19 7 and they excuse the tenant through the device of a constructive condition when that bargain is not forthcoming.
However, one should not be led to overestimate the importance of the American multiple-unit destruction cases. For one
thing, the severe hardship that the destruction rule visits on the
tenant provides a strong equitable impetus to find an "exception"
to mitigate the hardship. For another, whatever their numerical
ratio to all destruction cases, the multiple-occupancy destruction
cases are probably far less numerous than cases in which landlords breach specific lease covenants. Thus, while an essentially
contractual approach flourishes in these "exceptional" destruction cases, it probably occupies a relatively small domain in landlord-tenant law.
B.

Revisionists and Traditionalists

We suggest that the conclusion reached in our consideration
of the independency doctrine holds for the destruction cases as
well. There are inescapable similarities between property and
contract reasoning because, on inspection, "property" reasoning
turns out to be essentially some form of contract reasoning. Yet,
important differences remain because the contract ideas underlying conveyance reasoning are limited (as in the sales analogy), or
at least are put to limited use (as in Baker's "subject matter"
approach).
Revisionists have argued, however, that the destruction
cases, like the independency decisions, reveal no important differ"exception" for multiple-occupancy lease transactions, see supra notes 178-91
and accompanying text, appear to employ just such a transactionally oriented
concept of possession. For a further discussion of the use of property concepts
to achieve reform, see infra Part IV-B.
197. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. The minority common
law cases, see supra note 177, also employ a transactional method of determining
whether the tenant's purpose in entering the lease has been frustrated by destruction of buildings on the leased premises. See, e.g., Albert M. Greenfield &
Co. v. Kole, 475 Pa. 351, 356, 380 A.2d 758, 760 (1976) ("It is no longer reasonable to assume that in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary the lessee
should bear the risk of loss in the event of the total destruction of the building.
Where the parties do not expressly provide for such a catastrophe, the court
should analyze the facts and the lease agreement as any other contract would be
analyzed."). For a further discussion of the impact of conveyance reasoning on
the frustration argument, see infra notes 220 & 232.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/1

62

Chase and Taylor: Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and Contract

1985]

LANDLORD AND TENANT

633

ences between property and contract analyses. The most vigorous statement of the revisionist position again has been made by
Professor Siegel. Far from seeing significant differences between
property and contract analyses in the destruction cases, Professor
Siegel highlights the destruction cases as an "exemplar"' 9 8 of his
thesis that lease law is "grounded in contract doctrine" and indeed has a "dominant contract basis."' 9 9 Specifically, he asserts
that "the decisions establishing the rule [of continued rent liability upon destruction of the premises] ... are not grounded in real
property law. They are contract decisions," 20 0 inasmuch as they
are based on a "three hundred year old view of a lease as a contract" 20 ' of sale of the premises for the term. "The sale of goods
is the paradigm, the core analogy, of modern landlord-tenant
law," 20 2 and the analogy anchors the destruction cases solidly in
contract: "The primary economic function of contract, in the
premodern era, was to transfer title to personal property. Contract meant sale of goods." 20 3 Thus, "[i]t is obvious that modern
commercial contract analysis," and not real property analysis, "is
the basis of the rule of a tenant's continued rent liability after de20 4
struction [of the leased premises] by fire."
There is certainly no ambiguity here. On the basis of a review of "all cases," 20 5 Professor Siegel denies that there is any
difference between property and contract reasoning because, he
argues, the destruction cases are in fact expressions of contract
reasoning. What is one to make of his thesis? First, and least
important, we think it is necessary to point out that "all cases" do
not support his claim that the sale of goods analogy is the articulated ratio decidendi of the destruction case. As we discussed
above, there are cases that rely on express condition reasoning, 20 6 others that employ "subject matter" reasoning, 20 7 and still
others that merge some20 8 or all 20 9 of the three explanations.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Siegel, supra note 6, at 651.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 657 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 658.
Id. at 652.
See, e.g., Buerger v. Boyd, 25 Ark. 441, 443 (1869).
See, e.g., Baker v. Holpzaffell, 4 Taunt. 45, 13 Rev. Rep. 556 (1811).

208. See, e.g., Gibson v. Perry, 29 Mo. 245 (1860) (express condition and
sale of goods rationales merged).
209. See, e.g., White v. Molyneaux, 2 Ga. 124 (1847).
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However, since the express condition and "subject matter" explanations as well as the sales analogy can be understood in contract
terms, 21 0 this objection simply questions the selectivity of Professor Siegel's focus. It does not repudiate, indeed it broadens and
strengthens, his basic point of a connection between property and
contract analyses.
However, a second, and more basic, objection takes issue
with Professor Siegel's complete assimilation of property and
contract reasoning. Professor Siegel rather triumphantly identifies the reasoning in the destruction cases as contractual, only to
invest "contract" with the meaning ordinarily ascribed to "conveyance," that is, transfer of title. 21 ' When the destruction rule is
based on that narrow contract analogy, differences between property and contract reasoning of course disappear; contract law,
even today, puts the risk of loss on the purchaser of delivered
goods. 21 2 Nor should this identity of result be surprising. A sale
of goods can be regarded as a "conveyance," just as a conveyance
of a lease interest can be regarded as a "sale."
Professor Siegel's complete assimilation of contract and
property reasoning on that basis betrays both a logical and an historical error. His logical error may be exposed by the following
syllogism, which underlies his argument: Contract, over much of
its history, has performed a sale of goods (i.e., transfer of title)
function; the destruction cases identify a lease as a sale of the
premises for a term; therefore, the destruction cases have a
"dominant contract basis" and in fact exemplify the "unity of
modern leasing and contract law." In making that claim, however,
Professor Siegel has confused a part with the whole. It is true that
there is an analogy between sale of goods and conveyance reasoning; but it cannot follow that the analogy totally or even substantially equates contract and property doctrine unless we supply the
intermediate premise that contract doctrine itself is essentially exhausted by the sale of goods (i.e., transfer of title) analogy.
Although that intermediate premise is on its face difficult to accept, Professor Siegel seems to assert it. His "confirmation" that
the tenant's continued rent liability is grounded in contract law is
210. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
211. See Humbach, supra note 12, at 1215 n.1 1 ("Professor Siegel implicitly
recognizes that leases are conveyances by analogizing leases to contracts for the
sale of goods .... Such analogies, however, miss the point of the argument that
leases should be treated as contracts: the point is that leases should be treated
as contracts instead of as conveyances, not as contracts of conveyance.").
212. See U.C.C. § 2-509(3).
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"the fact that such liability is in harmony with applicable contract
principles in each era of contract doctrine." 21 3 The tenant's continued rent liability after destruction of the premises is not "in
harmony with applicable contract doctrine," however, except on
the assumption that the only "applicable" contract doctrine is the
sale of goods analogy. But that, of course, is to assume that which
Professor Siegel should be busy trying to establish.
We believe that Professor Siegel's logical error springs from
an error in his "historical" analysis. His historical approach proceeds by identifying some early cases on destruction, isolating the
transfer of title reasoning in those cases, and comparing the result
with extant sale of goods principles. 21 4 From this perspective, his
historical analysis validates his "unity" thesis, since the liability of
a purchaser after delivery of goods has been constant in sales law.
But a preferable historical approach would have dug more deeply
and widely into the lease cases. Moreover, it would have gone
beyond the lease cases. By doing either, Professor Siegel could
have elaborated two contract arguments in favor of the tenant's
relief from rent liability. He then could have seen that there is a
difference between those contract principles and the limited contract (sale of goods) principle he has identified, and thus a differ2 15
ence between property and contract reasoning.
213. Siegel, supra note 6, at 656.
214. Id. at 657-59.
215. In his discussion of the destruction cases, Professor Siegel in fact
maintains two theses. He argues not only that the common law destruction rule
is thoroughly contractual, but also that the American "exception" for multipleoccupancy premises is noncontractual, and is based instead on property reasoning. See id. at 658-62. While we have devoted our textual discussion to the first
of these theses, we have difficulty with the second as well.
In Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498 (1863), the leading case presenting the
question of the tenant's continued rent liability after destruction of multipleoccupancy premises, the court affirmed a lower court judgment that the tenant's
rent liability did not survive destruction of the building. The dissenters, as Professor Siegel notes, "spoke contract":
In a case where a lessee binds himself, by express covenant, to pay the
rent during the term, and there is no exception in the lease of casualties
by fire notwithstanding the house should be burnt down by accident, he
is bound to pay, for the simple reason that he has bound himself by an
express covenant to do so.
26 N.Y. at 504 (Wright, J., dissenting). Against this contractual reasoning, the
majority, according to Professor Siegel, offered the following "absurd" and
"anachronistic," Siegel, supra note 6 at 662, conveyance reasoning:
A distinction is taken between an overflow of the land by the sea, and
fresh water, because, though the land be covered with fresh water, the
right of taking the fish is vested exclusively in the lessee, and in that
case the rent will not be apportioned. In the latter case the tenant has a
beneficial enjoyment, to some extent, of the demised premises, but in
the former he has none, and if the use be entirely destroyed and lost, it
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One way to avoid the common law rule concerning destruction is to start with the sales analogy that figures so prominently
in the cases discussed by Professor Siegel, and then to modify it.
While risk of loss even on today's contract principles is clearly on
the purchaser after delivery of the goods, that principle defeats
the tenant only on the assumption that delivery is complete at the
beginning of the lease. In other words, the tenant loses only if
is reasonable that the rent should be abated, because the title to the
rent is founded on the presumption that the tenant can enjoy the demised premises during the term ....
The effect of the destruction of
the building, in such a case, is analogous to the effect of the destruction
of demised premises by the encroachment of the sea ....
26 N.Y. at 500. While the aquatic analogy is quaint, we do not agree that it is
"absurd" and "anachronistic." The quoted language, on balance, can be understood as a straightforward example of frustration of purpose analysis. The tenant owes rent if after the supervening event he or she continues to have "a
beneficial enjoyment... of the demised premises," and does not if he or she has
no such enjoyment. In the case of salt water overflow, the loss of enjoyment is
total, whereas in case of fresh water overflow it is only partial, and hence not
legally cognizable. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (frustration must
be total or nearly total). Thus, both the dissent and the majority in Graves
"speak contract." They differ only in that the dissent speaks the old express
condition language of Paradine v. Jane, discussed supra at notes 142-45 and accompanying text, while tne majority in essence speaks the more modern constructive condition language of frustration of purpose doctrine, discussed supra
at notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
Professor Siegel's search for a pure property approach to the multiple-occupancy cases is productive only with respect to one set of cases. When the landlord sued a recalcitrant tenant for possession of multiple-occupancy premises
after destruction of the building rather than, as in Graves, for rent, the courts had
to abandon contract theory. This is because on sale of goods principles the tenant would continue to own, and thus be entitled to possess, whatever remained
of the leasehold premises. On frustration of purpose principles, it would be
anomalous to allow the landlord to assert the tenant's frustrated purpose as the
basis for terminating the contract when the tenant himself is not doing so. Consequently, the decisions granting the landlord the right to repossess the premises after destruction do indeed talk property rather than contract. See, e.g.,
Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477, 478 (1832) (lease of rooms in a building analogized to grant of an easement or license to take minerals from the soil; "[b]y
such grants, the land does not pass"). While the later American "exception"
cases involving the landlord's claim for rent seized the underlying factual insight
of cases like Winton-that land is not the tenant's main interest under the lease in
multiple-occupancy leasing transactions-they generally stated that insight in
vocabulary which is understandable in frustration of purpose terms, see supra
notes 178-97 and accompanying text, rather than the Winton language of grants
and reservations. Thus it seems incorrect to claim that Winton "founded a collateral line of precedent which was used in the multiple-occupancy liability for rent
cases that followed," Siegel, supra at 659-60, if by that claim one means to say, as
Professor Siegel apparently does, see id. at 662, that cases like Graves adopted
both the factual insight and the doctrine apparatus of Winton. In any event, since
the liability-for-rent destruction cases, and not the ejectment destruction cases,
are the central focus in any discussion of the property-contract theme, as Professor Siegel recognizes, see id. at 659, the fact that Winton expresses pure property
reasoning is somewhat beside the point.
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one assumes that the appropriate sales analogy is the single-transaction, rather than the installment, sale of goods. The vast majority of the landlord-tenant cases proceeding on the sales analogy
accept the "single-shot" delivery model as the appropriate
one. 2 16 But a few cases disagree. Occasionally courts have said
that a lease is "a running rather than a completed contract," "an
agreement for a continuous interchange of values between landlord and tenant, rather than a purchase single and completed of a
term or estate in lands." 2 1 7 Under this installment sale analogy,
the tenant would not bear the risk of loss, and hence would not be
obligated for outstanding installments of the purchase price, as to
undelivered future segments of possession. 2 18 The installment
sale analogy is, of course, contractual, so that courts adopting it
are invoking contract reasoning. The important point, however,
is that the existence of the alternative installment sales analogy
shows that there remains a tension between the general run of
destruction cases, which do not employ that particular analogy,
and at least some forms of contract reasoning.
A second argument for relieving the tenant from liability eschews the entire sale of goods analogy in favor of an explicit frustration approach. This approach focuses on the purpose of the
lease, and asks whether enough of the purpose remains after destruction of the premises to justify continuing the tenant's obligation to pay rent. Under this view, the lease is not essentially the
sale of a thing, that is, a transfer of absolute dominion over an
object, which becomes complete for purposes of ownership and
risk of loss upon delivery. 2 19 Rather, the lease is viewed as a contract for certain uses of the leased space, 220 uses that can be es216. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 64 (1809); Gibson v. Perry, 29 Mo. 245
(1860).
217. Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674, 687 (1881); accord, Wattles v. South
Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 267, 69 N.W. 785, 790 (1897).
218. See U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (1977).
219. See Note, DisengagingSales Law from the Sale Construct: A Proposalto Extend
the Scope of Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARV. L. REV. 470, 470 (1982) (under the sale
of goods paradigm, "transfer of ownership in a physical thing is complete and is
the sole concern of the parties to the contract").
220. Under the sale analogy, the tenant-purchaser is deemed to have only
one important purpose in entering the transaction: receipt of the thing sold. See
6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1356, at 472. With that analogy, the only way to
protect the tenant in cases of destruction is to argue that the tenant has not yet
received the thing; that is, that the sale is in installments, and that the tenant is
not responsible for the price of future installments that cannot be delivered because of destruction. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. By contrast, when the lease is viewed as a contract for the use of the leased space, it
becomes possible to argue that the tenant has both "immediate" and "indirect
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tablished by extrinsic evidence if they are not specified in the
lease. 22 ' When the tenant's purpose in entering the contract no
longer can be fulfilled, either because the uses for which the
premises were let are no longer lawful or practicable (as in the
illegality cases) or because the buildings in which the uses were to
occur are no longer in existence (as in the destruction cases) the
tenant can be excused.
This frustration approach appears in lease cases, as well as in
general contract cases. The "subject matter" destruction cases
and the illegality cases in essence announce this frustration docor ultimate" purposes. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1353, at 457. Professor
Corbin has captured this dual purpose idea in the following succinct statement:
[A] lessee promises to pay rent in order to induce the lessor to convey a
limited estate in the land-the leasehold interest. He desires to be
owner of this leasehold ...in order to enjoy the physical use and occupation and to realize the profits therefrom by operating it as a farm, a
dwelling place, a movie theater, or a liquor saloon. The conveyance is
made; and the lessee is in possession and owner of the leasehold interest. He has attained his immediate object. Yet he may be wholly
ousted from possession by an invading army; the dwelling house may
be burned down; a city ordinance may forbid the use of inflammable
films; the legislature may prohibit the sale of liquor. In these cases, the
ultimate purpose of the lessee is frustrated. It is what he now regards
as his chief purpose; without it, he would not have promised to pay rent
or, at least, so much rent.
Id. This dual purpose conception appears to undergird both the American "exception" cases to the destruction rule, see supra notes 177-96 and accompanying
text, and the minority common law cases, which hold that the tenant is excused
upon destruction of buildings on the leased premises, see supra note 177 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the basis of the American "exception" and the minority common law view, see infra note 232.
The sale of goods analogy historically has harmed the tenant in the destruction context. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (tenant as purchaser
bears risk of loss of destroyed premises). It has also harmed the tenant historically in the warranty of habitability context, although whether it should have is
debatable. See Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 115-16, 23 N.E. 126, 127 (1880)
(no warranty of habitability in lease because "[t]he maxim caveat emptor applied
to the transfer of all property, real, personal, and mixed, and the purchaser generally takes the risk of its quality and condition unless he protects himself by an
express agreement on the subject") (citation omitted). But see, e.g., L. VOLD,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES § 89, 435-37 (2d ed. 1959) (citing cases preceding and roughly contemporaneous with Franklinv. Brown that recognize warranty
of merchantability in sale of goods). In any event, the sale of goods analogy only
recently has been used to the tenant's advantage. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (warranty of habitability implied in
residential leasings on analogy to warranty of merchantability in sales law). Perhaps in the future it might be used to even better advantage. See Chase, supra
note 11, at 221-25 (use of U.C.C. § 2-717 as model for fair withholding procedure in habitability cases). We do not at this writing attempt to choose between
the sale of goods analogy and the contract-for-use-and-occupation approaches
to conceptualizing the lease transaction, nor even to suggest that a choice is
necessary.
221. See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
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trine. The problem is that, under the influence of property reasoning, they define the tenant's purpose in entering the lease so
narrowly that the principle rarely gets applied in favor of the tenant.2 22 There are a few destruction cases, however, that reject the
common law rule even when the land remains to support the rent
obligation. 22 3 Furthermore, the American "exception" to the destruction rule applies what is essentially frustration doctrine un2 24
impeded by its conveyance underpinnings.
Moreover, once the destruction cases are conceived in frustration of purpose terms, general contract decisions involving occupancy transactions other than leases become relevant. In the
landmark case of Krell v. Henry, 22 5 the owner brought suit on the
defendant's formally unconditional promise to pay for the use of
rooms. The defendant, who had taken the rooms to view the
royal coronation, successfully asserted the frustration defense,
based on the cancellation of the coronation after the agreement
had been struck. The court took great pains to classify the trans22 6
action as "a license to use rooms for a particular purpose,"
rather than as a lease of the rooms. A license, of course, is an
agreement to use the premises for a particular purpose, 2 27 as opposed to an agreement looking solely to the transfer of possession. The vital difference is that the licensee analysis focuses on
the purpose for which the premises are hired, 22 8 whereas in the
lease analysis the mere acquisition of the premises is deemed central to the bargain. By classifying the occupancy agreement as a
license, the Krell court opened up the possibility of viewing the
transaction according to a standard contract approach that accounts for the unexpressed expectations of the parties, as gleaned
222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra notes 152-72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-97 and accompanying text.
2 K.B. 740 (1903).

226. Id. at 750.
227. An easement, which is like a license except on the question of revocability, is "an interest in land in the possession of another" which "entitles the
owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in which the
interest exists." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450(a) (1936). Thus, the determi-

nation that the transaction does create a right of "limited use or enjoyment" is
an essential element in classifying the transaction as an easement or license.
Transactions which fail to clearly specify a limited use invite litigation over
whether a limited interest or some more substantial interest was intended. See,
e.g., Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 177 N.W.2d 786
(1970); Northwest Realty Co. v. Jacobs, 141 N.W.2d 141 (S.D. 1978).
228. See supra notes 146-51 & 227 and accompanying text.
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from the circumstances of the transaction. 229 Thus, the court excused the defendant from the obligation to pay for the rooms because, even though the contract was silent on the point, the
circumstances indicated that the occurrence of the coronation
"was regarded by both contracting parties as the foundation of
the contract." 2 30 Had the Krell court been burdened with the conveyance reasoning entailed in a lease classification, its result
would have been much more difficult to reach. Krell is a case involving not the destruction of the premises, but rather the thwarting of the purpose for which the premises were taken; its
analogue in standard lease cases is the situation in which the purpose for which the lease is made subsequently becomes illegal.
As we noted in discussing those cases, conveyance reasoning can
present a double barrier to resolution in favor of the tenant. In
its sale of goods guise, conveyance reasoning might insist that the
risk of cancellation of the coronation be on the purchaser. 23 1 In
its "subject matter" variation, conveyance reasoning would presume that the tenant's purpose in entering the transaction was
satisfied merely by having the use of the premises unless the lease
expressly provided-as it did not in Krell-that use for the specific
purpose of viewing the coronation was central.23 2
229. See 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 14, § 686, at 243 ("A contract between a
lodger and his landlord for the mere hiring of a room is quite different from a
formal lease creating in the tenant an estate in the land. Lodging contracts are
not conveyances, and the usual contract rules with respect to conditions will be
applied.").
230. Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740, 750 (1903).
231. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text. See also Note, Government
Orders and Regulations Affecting Tenant's Liability for Rent-Application of Doctrine of
Frustrationto Leases, 32 MINN. L. REV. 837, 838 (1948) ("English courts, not hesitating to apply the doctrine of frustration to excuse performance under contracts, have steadfastly refused to follow Krell v. Henry in regard to leases")
(footnote omitted).
What unifies Krell with the minority common law approach to destruction,
see supra note 177 and accompanying text, and with the American "exception"
cases, see supra notes 178-97 and accompanying text, is the conclusion that an
occupant of premises hired for a particular purpose should be excused from
payment when unforeseen supervening events prevent attainment of that purpose. Krell gets at the vital question of the purpose of the transaction through
the device of classification and regards the arrangement as a license rather than
a lease. This approach is also illustrated by some American cases. See, e.g., Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 187 Mass. 402, 73 N.E. 523 (1905) (occupant of icehouses
destroyed by fire is excused if he had license to use them, but bound if he leased
them). However, as the minority common law cases and the American "exception" cases indicate, classification of the transaction as a lease does not necessarily prevent a court from focusing on the parties' purposes in entering the
transaction. What is necessary under the lease classification is that the court
reject the inhibiting elements of conveyance reasoning. Under the view that the
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Whether the installment sale or the frustration theories are
implicated, the point is the same with respect to the revisionist
thesis: during the nineteenth and early twentieth century heyday
of the common law destruction rule, alternative conceptions of
the lease transaction existed; those conceptions, like the ones underlying the common law rule itself, are contractual, but they are
based on contractual ideas or approaches that open up the possibility of a result different from that of the common law rule.
Here, as with the independency question, property reasoning and
contract reasoning can be related but not assimilated. Important
tensions exist between property and contract reasoning, or as we
prefer, between different forms of contract reasoning, unscathed
by the revisionist thesis.
III.

THE CURRENT NEED FOR CONTRACT ANALYSIS

The dependency and destruction questions discussed above
are facets of the law of constructive conditions. We asserted that
conveyance reasoning can impede the free imposition of constructive conditions to effectuate the parties' expectations or to
achieve ajust result in disputed cases. We now move to the other
constituent of implied or constructive terms-promises rather
than conditions. 2 3 3 As a starting point, we will assume that the
modern residential tenant has two central concerns, the quality
and continuity of possession. 234 The tenant expects livable premlease is a sale, the tenant's purpose is deemed to be the mere receipt of the thing
sold, so that the further question of the purpose for which the tenant bought the
thing becomes irrelevant. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. Under the
view illustrated by Baker v. Holtpzaffell, the tenant is regarded as having a purpose
to use the premises in a particular way, but then conveyance reasoning deems
that the tenant's post-delivery purpose is satisfied by having the land available,
unless the lease contract specifically provides that use of buildings is the main
inducement to the lease. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. Both
the minority common law cases and the American "exception" cases reject the
approach of ascribing a purpose to the tenant, and inquire, rather, into the tenant's actual purpose. They differ only in the extent of their rejection of the common law destruction rule. The minority cases reject the rule for all leases, while
the American "exception" cases reject it only in the situation of leases of a portion of a building.
233. See Patterson, ConstructiveConditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
904 (1942) ("Contracts are.., made up of promises, which give rights to promisee and impose duties on promisors, and conditions, which qualify or negate
these rights and duties.") (footnotes omitted); Rosett, supra note 19, at 1088.
234. See, e.g.,Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D. C.
Cir. 1970) ("When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter'
today, they seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which
includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.") (footnote omitted); Kludze, The Termination of
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ises and security against abrupt termination of occupancy of the
premises. In the past, the law often disappointed both of those
expectations. The common law refused to imply a warranty that
the premises were fit for occupancy at the outset of the lease, or a
promise to repair during the tenancy. 2 35 Furthermore, it imposed
no requirement of cause for the termination of indefinite tenan2 36
cies or for the refusal to renew term tenancies.
Modern landlord-tenant law generally does imply a warranty
of habitability in residential leases. 23 7 We shall attempt to show,
however, that the warranty, despite its vaunted origins in contract, has not progressed beyond a modest, minimum expectations standard. As to the expectation of "durational security," 238
landlord-tenant law lags behind at least one related contract field,
franchises, which has recognized some limitations on the right to
terminate. 23 9 We shall attempt to show that the failure of contract ideas to flower, as to the warranty of habitability, or to even
take root, as to good cause termination, is the result of landlordtenant law's continued reliance on conveyance reasoning, or, at
240
the very least, of its "estate frame of mind."
A.

"Habitable" Premises: The Scope of the Warranty of Habitability
and the Remedy of Abatement

Until the early 1970s, landlord-tenant law generally did not
recognize an implied term guaranteeing any particular level of
quality in residential leases. 24 1 Thus, unless the landlord expressly contracted to make repairs, the burden of making repairs
fell on the tenant. In the 1970s, courts, starting from the premise
that leases of urban dwellings "should be interpreted and conLeases, 7 REV. GHANA L. 10, 10 (1975) ("Any person who takes a lease of premises must be interested in the circumstances in which the landlord can terminate
his lease or secure his ejectment from the premises.").
235. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.45, at 267-69.
236. See id., §§ 3.23, 3.28, 3.85, 3.88, 3.90.
237. See Fusco, Collins & Birnbaum, Damagesfor Breach of the Implied Warranty
of Habitability in Illinois-A Realistic Approach, 55 CHI.-]KENT L. REV. 337, 344
(1979) (thirty-eight states and District of Columbia have adopted implied warranty of habitability).
238. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, § 2.16, at 60.
239. For a discussion of franchise cases, see infra Part III-B.
240. Weinberg, supra note 6, at 31 n.9.
241. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. Various exceptions to the
common law rule existed, the chief one being that the landlord was held to have
impliedly warranted the fitness of furnished premises leased for a temporary
purpose. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.45, at 267-69.
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strued like any other contract," 242 began to recognize an implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases. 243 To effectuate this
newly created right, the courts afforded the tenant what was at the
242. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See also Sommer v. Kridel,
74 NJ. 446, 454, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977) ("distinction between a lease for
ordinary residential purposes and an ordinary contract can no longer be considered viable").
243. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. Courts frequently base the
existence or creation of the implied warranty upon the expectations of the parties as revealed by the lease contract. See, e.g.,Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079 (because
lease specified a certain period of occupancy of premises as shelter, tenant can
reasonably expect habitable premises during that period); Marini v. Ireland, 56
N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 533-34 (1970) (lease for "apartment" to be used as
"dwelling" implies fitness for that purpose). Unquestionably, however, the
courts also rely on considerations of public policy as a basis for constructing the
warranty. See, e.g.,Javins, 428 F.2d at 1076-77 (public policy reflected in housing
code requires recognition of warranty of habitability); Marini, 56 NJ. at 144, 265
A.2d at 534 (warranty was based on considerations of fairness and justice). In
addition, courts occasionally find an express term as a basis for the warranty of
habitability. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 NJ. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 21
(1973) (landlord's promise that he would make premises "livable" and would
repair them treated as express warranty of habitability); Marini, 56 N.J. at 144,
265 A.2d at 533-34 (description of premises as "apartment" and specification of
use such as "dwelling" could constitute express warranty of habitability).
The distinction between implied in fact, implied in law, and express warranties might be important on two questions. First, the ability to disclaim the warranty could vary depending on the basis of its creation: express warranties, see
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1977), and warranties implied in law, seeJavins, 428 F.2d at
1081-82, would not be subject to disclaimability, while implied in fact warranties, which are based on the parties' intentions, could be negated by a clear statement of intention. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3) (1977). It should be noted,
however, thatJavins, which employs both an implied in fact and an implied in law
basis for creation of the warranty, rejects the possibility that the implied in fact
warranty can be disclaimed. See 428 F.2d at 1080 n.49. Such a notion of nondisclaimability can be explained in terms of unconscionability; the landlord's attempt to disclaim the warranty of habitability, like the seller's attempt to disclaim
liability for personal injuries resulting from defective consumer goods, is unconscionable. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (basic unconscionability provision); id. § 2719(3) ("[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable").
Second, the content of the warranty, which is the question that we address
at length in this article, could depend on the manner of its creation. See infra
notes 249-332 and accompanying text. A court that bases the warranty solely on
public policy might incline toward a minimum definition of the warranty, while a
court that bases the warranty on an express or implied agreement of the parties
might use the language and facts and circumstances of the transaction to define
a broader warranty. Compare Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d
187 (D.C. 1976) (expressly promised air conditioning excluded from scope of
warranty of habitability narrowly defined) with Park Hill Terrace Assocs. v. Glennon, 146 NJ. Super. 271, 369 A.2d 938 (App. Div. 1977) (expressly promised air
conditioning included in broader warranty of habitability). However, this distinction is again at best suggestive. A generally phrased express warranty, such
as that the premises will be "livable" or "habitable," leaves room for a narrow as
well as a broad interpretation of what is intended or included. A public policy
basis for the warranty could accommodate a definition that incorporates the rea-
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time a rather remarkable remedy: The tenant was allowed to remain in possession of the defective premises and withhold
rent. 244 The significance of this remedial development becomes
apparent when it is realized that previously the tenant had no
such rent abatement right even if the landlord had breached an
2 45
express lease term concerning the condition of the premises.
With the advent of this contractual approach to the lease and
its concomitant abatement remedy, landlord-tenant law stood at
an important crossroads, with at least three potential paths of development. First, on the basis of the proposition that leases
should be treated "like any other contract," the courts could have
used a normal, transaction-oriented contractual method of ascertaining the material terms of the lease contract, and extended the
abatement remedy to all material breaches of those terms. Second, the courts could have employed the same contractual
method for determining material terms, but limited the availability of the abatement remedy to material breaches of terms affecting the livability of the premises. Thus, breach of the warranty of
habitability alone would trigger the abatement remedy, but the
scope of the warranty could be defined broadly in accordance
with transactional circumstances and expectations. Third, and
this is the most restrictive path, the courts could have defined the
warranty of habitability in terms of minimal qualities essential to
the bare livability of the premises, and limited the abatement remedy to breaches of such minimal guarantees.
Under each approach, some breaches by the landlord would
sonable expectations of the parties to the transaction if protection of such expectations were deemed an important goal of public policy.
244. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082-83; Cunningham, supra note 20, at
113-26.
245. See, e.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146 P. 423 (1915) (landlord's breach of express covenant to repair is not defense to landlord's suit for
possession based on tenant's nonpayment of rent). Prior to the adoption of the
abatement remedy, however, the tenant, in at least some situations, had a remedy functionally equivalent to it. If the tenant withheld rent in response to his
landlord's breach of a covenant to repair and the landlord sued for rent rather
than for possession, the tenant could counterclaim for damages and the court
would "net out" the two claims, resulting in a form of abatement remedy. See
Chase, supra note 11, at 211-13; Humbach, supra note 12, at 1282. The problem,
of course, is that if the landlord instead decided to sue for possession, the courts
consistently held, as Krigbaum indicates, that the landlord's failure to perform
could not be raised by the tenant as a bar to the landlord's recovery. Although
the topic of summary dispossess actions is outside the scope of this article, we
should note that we remain unconvinced that the doctrine of independency of
covenants was responsible for the tenant's pre-1970s position in such actions, or
that the doctrine of dependency solves the problems that do exist. See Chase,
supra note 11, at 213-25.
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leave the tenant with a damages remedy only, rather than a right
to abate rent. Under the "any material breach" approach, the
tenant would not have a right to abate rent for breaches of immaterial terms in the lease. Under the broad warranty of habitability
approach, the tenant could abate for breaches of terms relating to
the "habitability" of the premises, but not for breaches of lease
terms that do not affect habitability, even though those terms
were regarded by the parties as inducements to consumating the
lease transaction. Finally, under the narrow warranty of habitability approach, the tenant could not abate for the landlord's breach
of terms that, although relating to habitability generally, fall
outside of the narrow definition used to trigger the abatement
remedy; afortiori, then, the tenant could not abate rent for breach
of terms that do not speak to the livability of the premises, even
though those terms were regarded by the parties as inducements
to entry into the lease transaction.
Since it is perhaps difficult to argue that the tenant should
have the right to abate rent for breach of an immaterial term, the
limitation of materiality under the first approach to the abatement
remedy is not particularly severe. Likewise, at first blush at least,
the consequence of adopting either the second (broad warranty of
habitability) or the third (narrow warranty of habitability) approach does not appear to be harsh. In theory, under either of
the latter two approaches, the tenant does not lose a damages
cause of action for breach of terms excluded from the abatement
remedy. Instead, the tenant simply loses the right to abate. As a
practical matter, however, breaches not covered by the abatement
remedy are likely to go unredressed. Excluding the breach from
the abatement remedy means that the tenant must pursue a separate suit while continuing to pay rent to avoid dispossession.
That approach puts the burden of recovery in the first instance on
the tenant. Yet even when the tenant is prepared to go forward
with a separate suit, the amount potentially recoverable in many
instances may not justify the time and expense of the suit. Thus,
in most instances, the only meaningful rights that are afforded the
24 6
tenant are those protected by the abatement remedy.
246. See Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MoD.
242, 245 (1974). Professor Donahue notes:
It does the tenant no good to be told that he has a substantive right to
habitable premises if the only way he can enforce that right is by costly
proceedings in a higher court. The ideal remedy from the tenant's
point of view, granted the substantive right, is a self-help remedy ....
Id. Indeed, the tenant might face a serious dilemma as to claims excluded from
the abatement remedy. If the tenant proceeds by an ordinary action in a court of
L.

REV.
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The most heavily travelled path in determining the tenant's
right to an abatement has been the third path, the restricted warranty of habitability. While many jurisdictions have adopted the
warranty, we shall focus on cases in only two, the District of Columbia and New Jersey. The District is considered in our analysis
because of the force and breadth of the landmark decision in
Javins v. First National Realty Corp,24 7 while in New Jersey a succession of cases provides an interesting study of the incremental process of doctrinal development. 24 8 Beyond that, cases in both
jurisdictions have reached strikingly similar conclusions about the
current limits of the warranty of habitability, conclusions which
are explicable in terms of, if not mandated by, the differences between property and contract reasoning in landlord-tenant cases.
1.

The District of Columbia: From Javins to Winchester

Injavins, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that a warranty of habitability is implied
in leases of urban dwelling units and that breach of the implied
warranty gives the tenant the option of withholding rent pending
judicial determination of the amount of abatement. 24 9 Noting
that this holding "reflects a belief that leases of urban dwelling
units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract,"25 0 Javins developed two contractually oriented methods for
defining the content of the warranty. First, the court asserted that
"the common law itself must recognize the landlord's obligation
to keep his premises in a habitable condition." 2 5 ' Rejecting the
traditional assumption of conveyance reasoning that land is the
essence of the lease contract, the court noted that in modern urban housing transactions, tenants "are interested, not in the land,
general jurisdiction, he or she faces the expense and delay noted by Professor
Donahue. The only alternative that the tenant might realistically pursue without
an attorney is an action in small claims court, but jurisdictional limitations might
be a bar in some states. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-43 (West Supp. 19831984) (only landlord-tenant dispute recognizable in small claims court is one
involving a security deposit).
247. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE

301 (3d ed. 1983) ("one of the most influential

decisions in modern property law"). For a further discussion ofJavins, see infra
notes 249-68 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 270-333 and accompanying text.
249. 428 F.2d at 1072-73, 1082.
250. Id. at 1075.
251. Id. at 1077.
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but solely in 'a house suitable for occupation.' "252 The court
found an appropriate analogy in recent consumer protection
cases. The tenant, as a purchaser of a "package of goods and
services," 2 53 has neither the knowledge, capacity, nor opportunity
to make adequate inspection of the product. Like the purchaser
of an automobile, the tenant must rely on the skill and good faith
of the seller-landlord. 25 4 In addition to this consideration concerning tenants generally, the court noted a particular aspect of
the Javins transaction which supported the expectation of
habitability:
[I]n the present cases there is no allegation that appellants' apartments were in poor condition or in violation
of the housing code at the commencement of the leases.
Since the lessees continue to pay the same rent, they
were entitled to expect that the landlord would continue
to keep the premises in their beginning condition during
2 55
the lease term.
Finally, the court cited the inequality of bargaining power between landlords and tenants in times of housing shortages as an
explanation for the absence of an express term in the contract
mandating habitable housing.2 5 6 In sum, the court employed a
standard contract method in defining the implied warranty of
habitability. It made the expectations of the contracting parties
the touchstone of its inquiry; it refused to limit protectible expectations to those put into express language in the contract; and it
looked to the general and particular circumstances of the transactions to augment the express contract.
In addition to the foregoing analysis,Javins developed a second, narrower methodology for defining the warranty, noting that
"in any event .... the District's housing code requires that a warranty of habitability be implied in the leases of all housing that it
covers." 2 57 Relying on the "well established" principle that "the
252. Id. at 1078 (quoting Ingalls v. Hobss, 156 Mass. 348, 350, 31 N.E. 286
(1892)).
253. Id. at 1074.
254. Id. at 1079.
255. Id. (footnote omitted).
256: Id.
257. Id. at 1080. Javins never clearly commits itself to either the broad or
narrow approaches for giving content to the implied warranty of habitability.
On one hand, the court twice states its specific holding in terms of the narrow
warranty. See id. at 1072-73 ("We ... hold that a warranty of habitability, measured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations ... , is implied by
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law existing at the time and place of the making of the contract is
deemed a part of the contract, as though expressly referred to or
incorporated in it,"258 the court reasoned that "by signing the
lease the landlord has undertaken a continuing obligation to the
tenant to maintain the premises in accordance with all applicable
law." 2 59 Thus, the court suggested that public policy dictated
that the relatively sparse requirements of the housing code be
read into the lease as a minimum statement of the landlord's
2 60
obligations.
Both approaches of the Javins court are contractually oriented. The first rationale, because it is based explicitly on a
search for the actual or presumed intent of the parties with respect to the level of habitability of the premises, focuses on the
operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units covered by those Regulations .... "); id. at 1082 ("We ... hold that the Housing Regulations imply a
warranty of habitability, measured by the standards which they set out, into
leases of all housing that they cover."). See also id. at 1077 ("In the District of
Columbia, the standards of [the warranty of habitability] are set out in the Housing Regulations.") Thus, there is ample textual support for the conclusion of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Winchester Mgmt. Corp. v. Staten,
361 A.2d 187, 189 (D.C. 1976), thatJavins adopted a narrow definition of the
warranty of habitability. For a discussion of Winchester, see infra notes 263-68
and accompanying text.
On the other hand, several considerations suggest thatJavins need not, and
we think should not, be regarded as holding that the housing code is the only
basis for giving content to the warranty in the District of Columbia. First, in
remarks prefatory to its discussion of the source and the content of the implied
warranty, the court noted that "the trend toward treating leases as contracts is
wise and well considered," and immediately thereafter stated that "[o]ur holding in this case reflects a belief that leases of urban dwelling units should be
interpreted and construed like any other contract." 428 F.2d at 1075 (footnote
omitted). The premise that leases should be treated "like any other contract"
would of course allow reference to statutes and ordinances as a method for defining expectations under a contract, but it would not suggest a limitation of such
expectations to statutes or ordinances. Second, the court's extensive discussion
of a transactional basis for inferring and giving content to the warranty of habitability, see supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text, tends to negate the suggestion that the court wanted to limit the warranty to housing code violations.
Finally, the tenant inJavins alleged extensive housing code violations, apparently
as the sole basis for relief. 428 F.2d at 1073. Technically, the court's holding
should have been stated in terms of housing code violations, since those were
the only violations at issue in the case. It does not follow from a holding that
housing code violations constitute a breach of the implied warranty of habitability that such violations constitute the only breach.
258. 428 F.2d at 1081 (quoting Shiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538,
544, 165 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1960)).
259. Id. In its common law discussion, the court pointed to circumstancesthe consumer nature of the transaction, and the characteristics of the leased unit
at the outset of the lease-that furnished evidence of the actual or the presumed
intent of the parties as to the quality of the leased premises. See supra notes 25256 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
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facts and circumstances of the particular case and on the nature of
such transactions generally. The second rationale, in contrast, is
based on considerations of fairness and public policy. It suggests
a threshold below which the parties cannot go in structuring their
bargain, or more appropriately, below which the landlord cannot
go in dictating the conditions of the tenancy. 2 61 It establishes the
minimum expectations to which all tenants are entitled, as opposed to the potentially greater actual or presumed expectations
that might be established by examining the individual lease trans26 2
action through the eyes of an ordinary reasonable tenant.
While many tenant complaints will be based on living conditions that violate housing codes, and thus satisfy even the narrower basis of the Javins decision, the court's reliance upon two
distinct analytical foundations for the implied warranty portended
trouble. What would be the position of a tenant who could point
to a transactionally based expectation of suitable housing concerning a condition not enumerated in a housing code? Winchester
Management Corp. v. Staten 26 3 presented that question. Tenants
whose leases expressly provided for air conditioning withheld
rent during summer months when their premises were both without hot water and air conditioning. In the landlord's suit for possession, the trial court granted abatements for both defects,
finding that the absence of a continuous supply of hot water violated the housing code, and that the failure of air conditioning
was a material breach of an express term of the contract. 2 64 On
appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed in
part, rejecting the abatement remedy for the failure of air conditioning. In a careful opinion, the court recognized that the rejected abatement claim could have been upheld on either of two
theories. The court moved to forestall both. First, one could reason that even though the warranty of habitability is the sole theoretical basis for the tenant's abatement, the warranty can be
defined broadly to encompass any condition relating to the livability of the premises. The scope of the warranty would depend on
the particular bargain struck between the contracting parties as to
the condition of the premises. Under this view, all relevant facts
and circumstances of the transaction would be available as indicia
261. See Williams, Languageand the Law (pt. 4), 61 L.Q. REV. 384, 401 (1945)
(discussing actual intent, presumed intent and public policy bases for judicial
implication of terms in contracts).
262. See Humbach, supra note 12, at 1267.
263. 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976).
264. Id. at 188.
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of the parties' expectations. Thus, an express promise for a particular service such as air conditioning, if found to be an inducement to the tenant's entry into the bargain, would necessarily be
an element of such a transactionally defined "habitability." Readers of our earlier discussion will recognize this view of the scope
of the warranty of habitability as the one developed by Javins in
accordance with its assertion that "the common law itself must
recognize the landlord's obligation to keep his premises in a hab2 65
itable condition."
Alternatively, but still adhering to the rule that only breaches
of the warranty of habitability trigger the abatement remedy, one
could define the warranty more narrowly, as being coextensive
with the housing code. However, limiting the warranty of habitability to housing code violations would not prevent a tenant's
claim to abatement for the absence of air conditioning if one rejected the premise that the implied warranty of habitability is the
sole justification for an abatement. Instead, one could allow
abatements for any material breach of contract, notwithstanding
that the breached promise is not part of the warranty of habitabil2 66
ity, no matter how habitability is defined.
Since, on the facts of Winchester, either the broad definition of
the implied warranty of habitability or the recognition of an
abatement right tied to any material breach of the lease contract
would have supported the tenants' claim, the potential differences
between the two approaches are not dramatized by that case. It is
important to note, however, that the Winchester court addressed
and responded to both arguments. The court concluded both
"that the tenant may be relieved of his full contractual rental obligation only when the landlord breaches his implied warranty of
habitability," 26 7 and also "that the landlord's duties under such a
warranty are discharged when he has [substantially] complied
with the applicable standards set forth in the Housing Regula265. 428 F.2d at 1077. See text accompanying note 251.
266. The statement injavins that a lease should be treated "like any other
contract," 428 F.2d at 1075, would suggest not only a broad definition of the
warranty of habitability, see supra note 243, but also the possibility of allowing the
abatement remedy for any material breach of contract. This also seems to be the
approach adopted by the Winchester trial court as to the air conditioning claim.
361 A.2d at 190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 7.1, at 247 (1977)
(tenant may abate for landlord's breach of promise that deprives tenant "of a
significant inducement to the making of the lease").
267. 361 A.2d at 189.
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tions." 268 Thus, the court rejected the two broadest definitions of
the tenant's right to an abatement-the broad warranty of habitability approach and the "any material breach" approach. In their
stead, the court adopted the narrowest possible approach, limiting the scope of the implied warranty of habitability to conditions
covered in the housing code and limiting the abatement remedy
to those narrowly defined violations of the implied warranty of
habitability.
2.

New Jersey: From Marini to Berzito

By a more circuitous route, NewJersey decisions have arrived
at a result similar to Winchester. In Marini v. Ireland,26 9 the New
2 70
Jersey Supreme Court, building on a dictum in an earlier case,
held that "the landlord should, in residential letting, be held to an
implied covenant against latent defects, which is another manner
of saying, habitability and livability fitness." 2 7 1 In Marini, the tenant had repaired and deducted the cost of repairs from the
rent. 27 2 In upholding this action, the court sanctioned a more restricted remedy than the withholding and abatement allowed by
Javins, but it followed Javins in announcing both a broad and a
narrow basis for giving content to the implied warranty of habitability. Having identified the implied warranty as one of "habitability and livability fitness," the court expanded on that key
phrase. 2 73 The court noted that the implied warranty is a promise
by the landlord that at the inception of the lease there are no defects in "facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential
268. Id. The court also noted that substantial, as opposed to exact, compliance is sufficient to satisfy the landlord's duty. Id. at 193.
269. 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
270. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
In Reste Realty, a commercial tenant of a basement unit vacated the premises
after the landlord's repeated failure to repair the grade of an adjacent driveway,
which caused flooding of the tenant's unit. The thrust of the opinion is that the
landlord's failure to repair constituted a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and a constructive eviction of the tenant, justifying the tenant's termination of the lease. The court also indicated, however, that it regarded the
landlord's failure to repair as the breach of an implied warranty against latent
defects, see id. at 453-55, 251 A.2d at 272-74, and that the landlord's breach
might justify either a "repair and deduct" or an abatement remedy. See id. at 462
n.l, 251 A.2d at 277 n.l. As the New Jersey Supreme Court later noted, Reste
Realty "is probably more important for what the opinion said and for what it
forecast than for what it held." Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 465, 308 A.2d
17, 20 (1973).
271. 56 N.J. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
272. Id. at 134-35, 265 A.2d at 528.
273. Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
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purposes" due to faulty construction or deterioration. 2 74 Moreover, the implied warranty is a promise "that these facilities will
remain in usable condition during the entire term of the
lease." 2 75 The scope of the warranty is thus that "vital" facilities
are and will remain operable. In determining how a "vital" facility might be defined, however, the court vacillated between two
methods. First, taking a partially transactional approach, the
court suggested that the "nature of vital facilities . . . is limited
and governed by the type of property rented and the amount of
rent reserved." 2 76 It said that the landlord's obligation is to make
"reasonable repairs" and that the failure to do so would allow the
tenant to offset against rent due "the cost of such repairs as are
reasonable in the light of the value of the leasehold." 2 7 7 The
court's second approach suggested a more restrictive method for
giving content to the warranty of habitability. Thus the court
noted that it is "eminently fair and just" to charge a landlord with
the duty of warranting that the premises are habitable. 2 78 The
use of considerations of fairness and justice to give content to the
warranty rather than the use of the facts and circumstances of a
particular lease transaction is suggestive of the minimum expectations approach employed by theJavins court in its use of the housing code to give content to the warranty.
Tying Marini to our earlier consideration of Javins, we would
274. Id.

275. Id.
276. Id. at 144-545, 265 A.2d at 534.
277. Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535. A full transactional perspective might, of
course, consider facts and circumstances other than the type of rental property
and the amount of rent. In using those two factors as "limiting" considerations,
the court proceeded cautiously on the rights side even as it did in sanctioning a
more restrictive remedy than didJavins. See supra note 276 and accompanying
text. An inclination to be cautious when treading new ground, however, is understandable. What seems most important on balance is that the court recognized the transactional method of giving content to the implied warranty and
not that it failed to embrace the most expansive application of that method.
Although the tenant in Marini apparently only requested the repair and deduct remedy that the court in fact adopted, the court's discussion of remedies is
nevertheless restrictive. In contrast to Reste Realty, which suggested the propriety of an abatement remedy, the Marini court held that the tenant had "only" the
alternatives of repairing and deducting, or vacating the premises under a claim
of constructive eviction. 56 N.J. at 147, 265 A.2d at 535. Cases subsequent to
Marini, however, do establish the abatement remedy suggested in Reste Realty.
See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
278. 56 N.J. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534. See Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: External Defect of Suburban Townhouse Entitles Tenant to Rent Abatement, 7
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 617, 619 (1976) ("Marini . . . left unanswered the question
whether the covenant of habitability was based on public policy alone or on the
intentions of the parties.") (footnote omitted).
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say that nothing in Marini suggests that the court sanctioned the
broadest possible defensive claim for tenants in eviction proceedings-the claim that any material breach of contract justifies relief
from the rent obligation. While that suggestion was not rejected,
neither was it alluded to, as inJavins;the Marini opinion considers
only the defense arising out of the landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability. With respect to that warranty, however,
Marini is ambiguous. While Marini adopts the implied warranty
rationale as its ratio decidendi, the court, as we noted, discusses
both the transactionally defined and the minimum expectations
formulations, without committing itself to either. The court's discussion of the warranty of habitability problem thus prompts, but
does not resolve, the same basic question generated by Javins:
What happens when a tenant has a legitimate expectation, based
on the lease contract read in the light of attendant facts and circumstances, that his premises will be "habitable" according to a
particular standard, but the particular service or facility which the
tenant reasonably expects to receive is not within the scope of a
narrowly defined "vital" facility?
Immediately after Marini, a trial court in Academy Spires, Inc. v.
Brown,2 79 embraced the narrower implications of Marini's discussion of the implied warranty of habitability. Reciting a monotony
of miserable living conditions that the tenant had endured, the
court stated that some of them "clearly go to bare living requirements," 280 and that the landlord's failure to supply such bare necessities was a breach of the implied covenant of habitability,
justifying an abatement remedy. 2 8 1 The court noted, however,
that other conditions "go to what may be called 'amenities.' "282
"Living with lack of painting, water leaks and defective venetian
blinds may be unpleasant, [and] aesthetically unsatisfying, but [it]
does not come within the category of uninhabitability. Such
283
things will not be considered in diminution of the rent."
While Brown might be faulted for adopting the closed, categorical approach to the definition of the implied warranty of habitability, in contrast to the open-ended, transaction-oriented
alternative also suggested in Marini, the decision at least may be
commended for taking a stand, and also for attempting to flesh
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex County Ct. 1970).
Id. at 482, 268 A.2d at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 482-83, 268 A.2d at 559.
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out, through the suggestive "bare living requirements and amenities" language and the recitation of examples, the notion of "vital" facilities established in Marini. A subsequent supreme court
decision, Berzito v. Gambino,28 4 stands in contrast. There the court
held "that the covenant on the part of a tenant to pay rent, and
the covenant-whether express or implied-on the part of a landlord to maintain the demised premises in a habitable condition
are for all purposes mutually dependent." 28 5 That holding is important chiefly for its statement of remedy. While the facts of the
case did not squarely present the question, the court apparently
wanted to broaden Marini and to allow the abatement remedy of
Brown for breaches of the warranty of habitability. 2 86 However,
on the crucial question of the scope of the warranty of habitability, on which the abatement remedy hinged, the Berzito decision
offered little elucidation.
The court began with the proposition that "[n]ot every defect
or inconvenience will be deemed to constitute a breach of the
covenant of habitability. The condition complained of must be
such as truly to render the premises uninhabitable in the eyes of a
reasonable person." 28 7 But "reasonable" could mean reasonable
as defined narrowly by the court, or as defined broadly by the
parties to the transaction. Instead of choosing a clear approach,
the court simply paraphrased an eight-factor list of considera28 8
tions-it cannot be called a "test"-from an earlier Iowa case.
284. 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
285. Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21. For a discussion of the potential significance of the distinction between express and implied warranties, see supra note
243.
286. 63 N.J. at 471 n. 1, 308 A.2d at 22 n. 1 (citing Brown as adopting a "similar approach" to the question of remedies). See also Millbridge Apts. v. Linden,
151 N.J. Super. 168, 173, 376 A.2d 611, 614 (Camden County Ct. 1977) ("Berzito
... established the principle that if there is a breach of habitability, the tenant is
entitled to an abatement in the amount of rent due.").
287. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22.
288. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1973). The eight factors
enumerated in Berzito are as follows:
1. Has there been a violation of any applicable housing code or building or sanitary regulations?
2. Is the nature of the deficiency or defect such as to affect a vital
facility?
3. What is its potential or actual effect upon safety and sanitation?
4. For what length of time has it persisted?
5. What is the age of the structure?
6. What is the amount of the rent?
.7. Can the tenant be said to have waived the defect or be estopped to
complain?
8. Was the tenant in any way responsible for the defective condition?
63 N.J. at 470, 308 A.2d at 22.
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The list is less than useful, however, because it includes a diffusion of considerations, some going to the question of the scope of
the warranty, and some looking to the question of whether the
landlord can negate the tenant's assertion of the warranty,
whatever its scope, by way of the claims of waiver, estoppel, or
unclean hands. Moreover, and this is the more basic concern for
present purposes, even the factors which do relate to the issue of
the scope of the warranty relate in different ways. Two of the factors are variations of the categorical minimum expectations approach: the existence of a housing code violation, redolent of
Javin's alternative theory; 28 9 and the effect of the condition on
safety and sanitation, a consideration which would seem to suggest a narrow standard for the determination of habitability. Two
other considerations, the age of the structure and the amount of
the rent, are relevant only if one defines the scope of the warranty
in transactional terms. A tenant would have fewer legitimate expectations of quality in older and less costly housing units, and
greater legitimate expectations of quality in newer, more expensive, units. Indeed, these factors were suggested in Marini290 and
have been used as relevant indicia of intent in a few cases. 29 1 Nowhere in the Berzito opinion, however, does the court endeavor to
guide lower courts in applying these imprecise and potentially inconsistent criteria. While lower courts faithfully continue to recite the eight factors, 29 2 no decision of which we are aware has
been able to reason effectively from them. This is no wonder,
since the considerations, to the extent that they are meaningful at
all, point in no clear direction.
3.

Property and Contract Analyses in Habitability Law:
Glennon and Dietz

Limiting the scope of the implied warranty of habitability to
housing code violations, as in Winchester,2 9 3 and to the landlord's
failure to provide "bare living requirements," as in Brown, 294 are
289. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338
A.2d 21 (Law Div. 1975). For a further discussion of Dietz, see infra notes 305-33
and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., Milibridge Apts. v. Linden, 151 N.J. Super. 168, 376 A.2d 611
(Camden County Ct. 1977); Park Hill Terrace v. Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271,
369 A.2d 938 (App. Div. 1977)(per curiam); Timber Ridge Town House v.
Dietz, 133 NJ. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (Law Div. 1975).
293. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
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but variations on a single method for determining the scope of
the warranty. The method can be stated in terms of expectations,
but only in terms of minimum expectations that every tenant is
entitled to have, not expectations that would emerge from a perusal of the particular lease transaction before the court. The conflict between the minimum expectations and the transactional
expectations methods of determining the scope of the implied
warranty of habitability is often unapparent because the condition
of the premises frequently violates even minimally defined expectations. When the conflict does emerge, Winchester and Brown represent one response: the limitation of claims for abatement to
conditions that violate a relatively fixed and predetermined standard, and relegation of the tenant to a damages remedy for violations that fall outside the scope of this narrowly defined warranty.
In fact, since housing codes usually cover the sort of conditions
that one would describe as "bare living requirements," 29 5 the
Winchester and Brown approaches may well amount to much the
2 96
same thing in practice.
There are contrary decisions. Two New Jersey Superior
Court cases are particularly noteworthy, both for a more generous contract method of analysis that offers broader relief for tenants, and for the contradictions that have arisen when courts have
attempted to employ that method.
In Park Hill Terrace Associates v. Glennon,2 97 the issue, as in
Winchester, was whether the landlord's failure to provide expressly
promised air conditioning constituted a breach of the warranty of
habitability. The landlord, understandably in light of New Jersey
law, argued that air conditioning was an amenity. The court apparently rejected that view, holding that there was "sufficient
credible evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the airconditioning failure for the stated days affected the habitability of
the involved premises." 2 98 However, no further basis for the decision appears in the report. The court did not say that it regarded
the landlord's promise to provide air conditioning as a relevant
295. See, e.g., Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 328,
391 N.E.2d 1288, 1294, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 316 (1979)(warranty of habitability,
though not limited to housing code provisions, is limited to conditions constituting "[t]hreat to . . . health and safety").
296. See Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 191 (D.C.
1975) ("With no explicit direction from the housing code making cool air in the
summer vital to the use of these (or any) apartments, we would be exceeding the
proper limits of our authority to read in such a provision.").
297. 146 N.J. Super. 271, 369 A.2d 938 (App. Div. 1977)(per curiam).
298. Id. at 277, 369 A.2d at 941-42.
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consideration in defining the scope of the implied warranty. In
fact, the court seemed to dismiss the landlord's express promise
with the true but hardly dispositive observation, that "[t]here are
many instances of breaches of the leasing agreement which would
not affect habitability and thus would not be relevant in a dispossess action although they might very well be a proper basis for a
separate cause of action for breach of contract." 299 Nevertheless,
the court still could have articulated a persuasive implied warranty basis by noting that air conditioning in fact existed at the
outset of the lease, and that it figured into the determination of
the tenant's rent obligation. Those facts would justify an expectation by the tenant-as the court inJavins argued3 0 0 -that the service would continue to exist, in its original form, throughout the
tenancy. By focusing on the fact that air conditioning was present, rather than on the landlord's promise to provide it, the court
would have avoided, as it obviously wanted to avoid, the suggestion that all express promises count in the determination of the
right to an abatement. The court, however, seemed to reject that
analysis, stating that "[w]e do not deem it controlling that the
leasing contract contemplated the providing of air conditioning
and that the rentals were higher because of it."301 What the court
did do was recite the eight Berzito factors, and follow immediately
with the conclusion, quoted above, that the record supported the
trial court's determination that the air conditioning was part of
30 2
the habitability of the premises.
299. Id. at 276, 369 A.2d at 941.
300. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
301. 146 N.J. Super. at 276, 369 A.2d at 941.
302. Id. Unlike the court in Glennon, the court in Winchester did explain its
restrictive view of the scope of the warranty of habitability: "To hold otherwise
could have the potentially devastating effect of depriving the landlord of the
rental income needed to maintain the premises and correct any defective conditions about which the tenants complain." 361 A.2d at 190. Winchester also defended its equation of habitability with the housing code as an appropriate
judicial deference to legislate action:
Indeed, it was a desire to be consistent with the announced legislative policy of requiring habitable living space which led the courts to
imply a warranty of habitability into the modern lease. Thus, rather
than leaving it to the whim of the tenant and the discretion of the trial
court to determine what does and does not constitute a habitable dwelling for purposes of the landlord's warranty, we defer to the legislative
judgments on the standards of habitability.
Id. at 191 (footnote omitted).
The abatement remedy itself, ironically, may explain in large part the narrow scope that generally has been given the warranty of habitability. A breach of
the warranty of habitability justifies total rent withholding. See, e.g., Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Since such
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Glennon leaves us with a holding in want of a rationale. The
court's apparent fear that not every promise in a lease contract
should be relevant in dispossess cases may be justifiable, but that
fear does not require the court's lapse into methodological silence. The court apparently wanted to disavow, as did the
Winchester court, the "any material breach" approach to determining abatement claims.3 0 3 However, if an abatement is to be allowed, the only remaining possibility is that it is allowed because
the landlord has breached a warranty of habitability, defined
either broadly or narrowly. Since it is difficult to see how air conditioning could be anything other than an amenity under the re30 4
strictive view of the warranty of habitability adopted in Brown,
Glennon would appear to reject Brown, and to stand for the proposition that the abatement remedy is available for breaches of the
warranty of habitability broadly defined. Yet the court did not say
that, and what it did say rather effectively destroyed its basis for a
holding on that ground. Election of either the "any material
breach" or the broad warranty of habitability approach would
have given the orphaned Glennon opinion the rationale that it
lacks, and which is difficult to supply on any other theory. The
court's failure to understand the relevant options is an indication
of the lack of guidance in New Jersey on the question of the scope
of the warranty of habitability.
A parallel case to Glennon arose in Timber Ridge Town House v.
Dietz,3 0 5 which is by far the most interesting theoretical opinion
on habitability in New Jersey. There, the tenant of an expensive
suburban townhouse sought an abatement for the landlord's failure to provide a landscaped patio, a swimming pool, and a playground. The court allowed the abatement for the absence of the
action by the tenant can have a drastic effect on the landlord's cash flow, courts
probably are reluctant to expand the scope of the warranty. On the other hand,
if the tenant's remedy were proportionate withholding, the potential effect on
the landlord would not be as drastic, and much of the reluctance toward an expansive view of the content of the warranty of habitability might disappear. The
central problem with proportionate withholding, that is, the burden placed on
the tenant to calculate his or her damages correctly, is not insurmountable; the
tenant could be protected so long as the calculation was made in good faith. For
what amounts to a sanctioning of proportionate withholding in a sale of goods

context, see U.C.C. § 2-717.
303. For a discussion of the scope of the abatement remedy, see supra notes
241-46 and accompanying text.
304. For a discussion of Brown's "bare living requirements" approach to
habitability, see supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
305. 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (Law Div. 1975), noted in Comment,
supra note 278.
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patio, but denied it for the pool and playground. Unlike Glennon,
Dietz cannot be faulted for its silence. Its internal consistency,
however, is another matter. In Dietz, the rental facility was new,
and the complaining tenants were the first occupants of the unit
in question. The housing complex was the most expensive in the
municipality. The landlord's promotional campaign included the
distribution of brochures that described "on-site recreational facilities including a swimming pool and children's play area . . .
30 6
and individual patio facing a spacious landscaped courtyard."
Construction work by the landlord in the vicinity of the tenant's
unit had destroyed the landscaped courtyard, generated mud and
water which interfered with the tenant's use of his patio, and pre30 7
vented construction of the pool and playground.
In allowing the abatement for the defective patio, the court
followed an impeccable contract approach. Focusing specifically
on "the intention of the parties to this agreement" 30 8 and looking
at all the circumstances surrounding the transaction for evidence
of intent, the court concluded that the "[t]enants had a reasonable expectancy of a decent exterior environment from the sales
promotion, the initial condition of the premises, and the higher
30 9
price of the apartment compared to others in the community."
In another statement perfectly in accord with its announced contractual orientation, the court stressed that legitimate expectations would vary with the circumstances of the letting:
[I]n many multiple-family dwelling units exterior habitability would be a minimal or nonexistent consideration,
especially in a city where the tenant's expectations are
limited to a habitable apartment. In this suburban
"townhouse" setting defendants did have a reasonable
belief that they were renting some adjacent exterior living space, and their reasonable anticipation should not
310
be frustrated.
Since the conclusion that the lease transaction supported the tenant's expectation of a landscaped courtyard rendered immaterial
any determination that the courtyard was an "amenity," the court
correctly noted that the abatement would follow "whether the ex306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

133 N.J. Super. at 579-80, 338 A.2d at 22.
Id. at 580, 338 A.2d at 22-23.
Id. at 584, 338 A.2d at 24.
Id. at 580, 338 A.2d at 23.
Id. at 584, 338 A.2d at 25.
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pectancy be characterized as one of amenity or necessity." 31'
While the court canvassed the Marini, Berzito and Brown decisions,
3 12 it
and made the obligatory recitation of the eight Berzito factors,
sandwiched that portion of the opinion between two substantial
paragraphs, from which we have quoted above, focusing on intent
and expectations as derived from circumstances. Interestingly,
and indicative of the court's broad contractual orientation on the
question of the abatement for the patio, the court characterized
Marini as a decision that relied upon a transactional determination of contractual intent.3 13 Dietz thus seized an opportunity that
the Glennon court missed, holding that the facts and circumstances
of the letting, including the landlord's representations that a particular facility would exist, are important considerations in determining whether the premises are "habitable" in accordance with
the warranty recognized in Marini.
Unfortunately, however, in denying an abatement for the
pool and playground, the Dietz court failed to apply its insight
consistently. The pool and the playground, like the patio, were
specifically mentioned and depicted in the landlord's rental
brochure. The court found as a fact that "these promised facilities were a substantial inducement offered by the landlord to procure the rental agreement." 31 4 No less than with his expectation
of a decent exterior environment, the tenant in Dietz legitimately
could have expected that these additional facilities were a part of
his high rental dollar in this suburban townhouse setting. In
short, the identical circumstantial considerations supporting the
abatement for the defective patio and courtyard mandated an
abatement for the absent pool and playground. In denying the
311. Id. at 580-81, 584, 338 A.2d at 23, 24-25. For a further discussion of
Dietz's "amenity" language, see infra note 321.
312. 133 N.J. Super. at 583, 338 A.2d at 24.
313. Id. at 581, 338 A.2d at 23. While transactional intent analysis dominates the Dietz court's consideration of the patio abatement issue, the court did,
in its application of the eight Berzito factors, describe the patio in terms that
could be viewed as bringing the decision within the minimum expectations view
of Marini's "vital facility" language: "Here, no housing code violation is present, but the work on the retaining wall, causing the unsavory condition, was
required by the borough engineer as a public safety measure .... There is a
possible effect on sanitation and safety." Id. at 583, 338 A.2d at 24. Interestingly, however, the court in the same paragraph used the term "vital facility" in
connection with a factor that is totally oriented towards a transactional determination of intent: "In the context of the promotional effort and type of
townhouse development promised, the court feels a vital facility is affected." Id.
Dietz thus displays the same ambivalence over the definition of "vital facility"
that Marini does. See supra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
314. 133 N.J. Super. at 584, 338 A.2d at 25.
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latter abatement, however, the court expressed a reluctance to go
so far and cited a factual distinction between the allowed and disallowed conditions: while the defective patio was a "very special
and individualized harm" 3 15 to the tenant, the absence of a pool
and playground affected the tenant and other occupants of the
premises indifferently. We respectfully suggest that this factual
distinction is nothing more than that. The absence of individualized harm is certainly a factual distinction between the patio claim
on the one hand and the swimming pool and playground claims
on the other; as such, it can be used to draw the line as to which
defects in the case are abatable and which are not. Yet the court's
rationale for the patio abatement seems to transcend the factual
distinction. There is simply no difference between the patio,
playground, and pool insofar as the tenant's reasonable expectations as to what he would get for his rent money are concerned.
In fact, the tenant's expectations are precisely what the court emphasized in its discussion of the patio abatement question.
The Dietz decision is coherent on any of three theories, none
of which, unfortunately, finally prevailed in the opinion. The decision could have been written in terms of the "bare living requirements and amenities" (or minimum expectations) approach
to habitability stated in Academy Spires v. Brown. 3 16 The construction work which interfered with the landscaped patio likewise deposited mud on the walkways and driveway of the Dietzes'
apartment. Since unobstructed modes of ingress and egress
would necessarily count as "vital" to the livability of the premises,
the abatement for that condition would have been fully justified; a
pool and playground, by contrast, would amount, on any reckoning, to "amenities" at best. The "bare living requirements" test
thus accounts for the result in the case but not the reasoning.
The court did suggest that the pool and playground were not part
of the "living vitality" of the premises, 3 17 but it nowhere indicated
that it was basing its decision on the bare living requirements and
amenities distinction; nor could it do so, since it suggested in its
consideration of the patio problem that even amenities provided
3 18
a basis for abatement.
Alternatively, the opinion could have been written either in
terms of the transactional definition of the implied warranty of
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 585, 338 A.2d at 25.
See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
133 N.J. Super. at 585, 338 A.2d at 25.
See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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habitability, or in terms of an "any material breach" approach to
abatement claims. In discussing the courtyard and patio, the
court in fact vacillated between these two broader versions of the
abatement right. It suggested that the promised landscaped
courtyard and patio were elements of "habitability" transactionally defined,31 9 and abatable under Berzito.3 20 But it also stated
that the courtyard was a "promised amenity," 3' 2 which would
suggest that it was abatable precisely because it was an expressly
or impliedly promised condition which was an important inducement to the tenant. However, since the court specifically found
that the pool and playground were inducements on the same
footing as the courtyard and patio,3 2 2 consistent application of
either the broad implied warranty or the "any material breach"
theory also would have required an abatement for all of those deficiencies. Instead, the court compromised and fell into inconsistency in the process. The court reached a result which conforms
to a theory not articulated, while it articulated theories pointing
to a result not reached. The result reached can be explained only
in terms of the minimum expectations theory. Yet the theories
espoused focus on the actual expectations of the parties as revealed by the transactional realities of the situation. While the
319. 133 N.J. Super. at 580-81, 584, 338 A.2d at 22-23, 24-25.
320. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
321. 133 N.J. Super. at 580-81, 584, 338 A.2d at 23, 24-25 (suggesting that
patio and courtyard could be regarded as an impliedly promised "amenity," but
still abatable because it was a "substantial attribute" of premises and hence a
legitimate part of tenant's expectation). In contrast to the patio and courtyard,
the court referred to the pool and playground as "expressly promised social
amenities." Id. at 585, 338 A.2d at 25. Since the inclusion of the pool and playground in the rental brochure apparently provided the basis for their characterization as "expressly promised" amenities, and since the patio and courtyard
were likewise described in the rental brochure, it would seem that the patio and
courtyard also could be fairly characterized as "expressly" promised amenities.
But the important point is not whether the amenities are characterized as expressly or impliedly promised. Rather, it is that the court, under either characterization, was willing to allow an abatement for a condition that went beyond
the "habitability" of the premises narrowly defined. By emphasizing that the
patio might be regarded as an amenity, the court indicated its view that the warranty of habitability is not limited to "bare living requirements." By emphasizing that the patio was a promised amenity, and a "substantial attribute" of the
package that the tenant legitimately expected to receive, the court suggested
that an abatement might be appropriate for the landlord's failure to perform any
promise constituting a substantial inducement to the tenant's entry into the

lease. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY

§ 7.1 (1977) (tenant entitled to

abatement when deprived of "significant inducement to the making of the
lease").
322. 133 N.J. Super. at 584, 338 A.2d at 25 ("The court finds as a fact that
these promised facilities were a substantial inducement offered by the landlord
to procure the rental agreement.").
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court's policy concern of not going too far with the abatement
remedy may have been real, its resolution of that concern will
perpetuate the doctrinal uncertainty that plagues habitability law
in New Jersey.
In spite of its internal inconsistencies, Dietz remains the most
interesting and innovative case on the warranty of habitability in
New Jersey, or perhaps in any other jurisdiction, and one which is
central to our thesis. The court's explicit use of a broad contractual method as the ratio decidendi for the abatement for the defective courtyard and patio represents a positive and significant
choice. It stands both as a rejection of the formulaic approach to
lease bargains illustrated by Winchester, and as a fidelity to the
premise-so prominent on the rhetorical level in the leading habitability cases-that a lease "should be interpreted and construed
32 3
like any other contract."
However, the court's failure to apply its methodological innovation across the board3 24 reveals that old habits die hard. In
landlord-tenant cases the conveyance frame of mind still dominates the decision making process. The attentive reader of Dietz
cannot help but notice that an important shift occurs in the
court's transition from the patio discussion to its consideration of
the pool and playground claims. Whereas on the former point
the court's method was broadly contractual, on the latter the
opinion lapsed into the minimum expectations approach to habitability: "[W]here the living vitality of the rented facility and its
immediate environs is not specially affected by the failure to perform, the court believes tenants' remedy, individually or in combination with other similarly aggrieved tenants, would be best
handled in a more conventional legal proceeding.- 32 5 In denying
an abatement for the pool and playground, and relegating the
tenant to a separate suit for damages, the court in effect determined that the landlord's breach as to those conditions was
32 6
immaterial.
323. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
324. For a discussion of the court's flimsy but honest reasoning, see supra
notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
325. 133 N.J. Super. at 585, 338 A.2d at 25.
326. Under the prevailing theory, the tenant has a right to withhold rent
upon the landlord's breach, and to retain possession by paying the abated rent
determined by a court in a summary dispossess proceeding. See, e.g., Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970). It would seem to follow that a breach of the magnitude required for
a rescission, i.e., a material breach, would likewise be required for an abatement,
since the justification for the tenant's right to withhold rent initially appears to
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It is not farfetched to suggest a direct parallel between the
pool and playground discussion in Dietz and the Winchester case on
the one hand, and constructive eviction cases like Stewart v. Childs
Co. 3 27 on the other. In Stewart, it will be recalled, the court in
effect conceded the existence of a rescission remedy under the
doctrine of constructive eviction. The court, however, denied the
tenant that remedy based on its narrow definition of what constituted constructive eviction. While a material breach, i.e., substantial interference, would have justified rescission, the court's
opinion, influenced by conveyance reasoning, defined materiality
in such a way as to exclude claims for breaches that did not affect
the entire usefulness of the premises.3 28 Similarly, in Dietz and
Winchester, the opinions recognize the basic right to an abatement.
Given the apparent current theory of abatement, 3 29 these cases
necessarily premise that right on a material breach by the landlord. For there to be such a breach, however, the landlord must
fail to provide housing that meets a mere minimal level of habitability; otherwise a breach by the landlord triggers only the remedy
of suing for money damages and not the remedy of rent
33 0
abatement.
Unlike Stewart, however, Dietz and Winchester cannot claim the
virtue of consistency between method and result. In determining
the conditions under which a tenant could claim rescission for his
landlord's breach, Stewart had available two models. The contract
view analyzed the right and remedy in straightforward contract
terms of material breach and rescission. The conveyance view depended upon the property vocabulary of quiet enjoyment and
constructive eviction from a possessory interest. While University
Club v. Deakin 331 chose the contract method, Stewart clearly and
expressly opted for the conveyance approach, and thus limited
rescission to cases in which the tenant could show the possessory
interference required by the court's conveyance theory. The
Winchester and Dietz courts, however, fail to establish the premise
be that the tenant's performance of the obligation to pay rent is excused by the
landlord's breach on dependency of covenants principles. See id. The cases occasionally suggest as much. See, e.g., Milibridge Apartment v. Linden, 151 N.J.
Super. 168, 171, 376 A.2d 611, 613 (Camden County Ct. 1977) (drawing parallel between standard for constructive eviction and for breach of warranty of
habitability).
327. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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which would render their restrictions of the abatement right sensible. 33 2 We would suggest that Winchester in both result and reasoning, and Dietz in at least result, indicate that landlord-tenant
law has not completely rid itself of the restrictive methodology
generated by the "conveyance" view of the lease bargain. Commitment to that restrictive methodology is unfortunate if the effect is the suppression, as in the old destruction and dependency
cases, of relevant transactional facts suggesting a right to relief
for the tenant. Commitment to the methodology is doubly unfortunate when, in addition to generating unjust results, it flies in the
face of a purported reliance upon the principle that a lease should
333
be treated "like any other contract."
B.

Good Cause Termination as an Implied Term: The Landlord's
Obligation to Deal in Good Faith

Common law doctrine dictates that either party to a periodic
tenancy may, upon proper notice, terminate the arrangement for
any reason or for no reason.3 3 4 The absence of the requirement
of cause to terminate likewise governs tenancies at will3 3 5 and tenancies for a term.3 3 6 The common law, in short, consistently imposes no obligation on the parties to continue existing lease
relationships.
In allowing the landlord to terminate arbitrarily a tenancy at
will or a periodic tenancy, the common law refuses to require the
332. Javins, on balance, seems to have diligently avoided committing the
District of Columbia to the minimum expectations test for defining the scope of
the warranty of habitability. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. Dietz, on
its own terms, and consistently with Marini, opts for a broad, intent-based determination of abatement claims in its discussion of the courtyard and patio issue.
See supra notes 270-78 & 308-13 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
334. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.23, at 222-23. The
only requirement for termination is one of timeliness, not good cause. The terminating party must give the other party seasonable notice, but if that is done,
the absence of a good reason for the giving of notice is irrelevant. Id. On the
other hand, the common law's stringent notice requirements for termination of
a periodic tenancy occasionally forced an additional lease period on an unwilling
party. See, e.g.,
Pack v. Feuchtenberger, 232 Ky. 267, 271-74, 22 S.W.2d 914,
916-17 (1929) (untimely notice to terminate is not effective at next possible
time; error is fatal and requires new notice). However, barring a failure to satisfy notice requirements, either party could cause the lease to end upon the expiration of the period in question. See Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N.Y. 494, 496 (1854)
(yearly periodic tenancy "continues until terminated by a legal notice" and thus
"tenant cannot put an end to the tenancy, or his liability for rent, by withdrawing
from the occupancy of the premises").
335. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 1,§ 3.28, at 229.
336. See id.§ 3.23, at 222.
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landlord to deal in good faith with the tenant. In contract terminology, the law refuses to imply a promise of good faith dealing
as a term in the lease contract. We suggest below that property
considerations are at the root of this refusal. Since there are few
cases addressing the problem directly, our argument will depend
upon two sets of indirectly relevant cases.
First, we shall consider the often discussed situation of leases
expressly terminable at the will of one of the parties only. These
cases do not address the question of why such leases are free from
a requirement of good faith termination; rather they address the
logically prior question of whether a lease terminable at the will
of one party only is a tenancy at will, as opposed to some other
type of tenancy. Regardless of how the courts decide that question, they miss some rather obvious ways of looking at the facts of
leases terminable at one party's option, ways that would appear to
do more justice on the facts and that would be available were it
not for the limitations of property analysis. In our analysis we
discuss the "unilateral-at-will" lease cases to establish the general
point that there are differences between property and contract
analyses of leasehold facts, and that the property analysis limits
the courts' ability or willingness to imply promises.
Second, we briefly consider some recent cases in which
courts have refused to allow franchisors to terminate or fail to
renew a franchisee's business operations. Unlike the unilateralat-will cases, these cases do directly address the question of subjecting the contractual relationship to a good faith requirement,
and they conclude that only good faith terminations are allowed.
These decisions are particularly interesting because they inject a
good faith analysis only after first concluding that the transactions
are not lease transactions. Since they appear to assume that a
good faith rule would be unavailable in a lease transaction, these
decisions provide support for the conclusion we draw in considering unilateral-at-will lease cases: that property analysis inhibits
the ability of courts to imply terms requiring the landlord to deal
in good faith.
1. Property and ContractAnalyses Compared Leases Terminable at the
Will of One Party
In Foley v. Gamester,33 7 the landlord leased premises to the
337. 271 Mass. 55, 170 N.E. 799 (1930), noted in Note, Landlordand TenantTenancy at Will-Foley v. Gamester, 10 B.U.L. REv. 570 (1930) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Foley v. Gamester]. See generally Note, Landlord and Tenant-'"Lease" De-
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tenant "for as many years as desired" 3 3 8 by the tenant, at a specified yearly rental. The tenant immediately entered into possession and erected a gasoline service station. Two years later, the
landlord conveyed the reversion to the plaintiff, who notified the
tenant to vacate. When the tenant refused, the plaintiff instituted
a summary dispossess proceeding, contending, in the court's
words, "that as the lessee could terminate the tenancy at his will,
he was in fact a tenant at will" 3 39 and thus was subject to peremptory termination at the landlord's option. The court held for the
landlord, stating that "where the lessee is not bound for any definite period and is at liberty at any time to terminate the tenancy,
the estate is not a term of certain duration, and as the lessee is not
bound to remain for any definite period, the landlord is not prevented from ending the relation." 340 In classifying the lease as a
tenancy at will, the court relied heavily on Lord Coke's view that
leases expressly at the will of the tenant alone, like leases at the
will of the landlord alone, are tenancies at will, because "every
lease at will must, in law, be at the will of both parties."' 34 ' The
court concluded that "[t]he tenancy had no certain duration as to
the [tenant] and therefore there could be no certain duration as
to the [landlord]. It was in fact a tenancy at will."' 34 2 Notwithstanding the lease provision that the tenant could have the land
"for as many years as desired," the decision deprived the tenant
of his leasehold interest and the ongoing business which he operated on the property.
On the surface, Foley appears to be another example of the
difference between property and contract analyses. While there
are several possible answers as to the intended duration of the
lease, 3 43 it seems unquestionable that, at a minimum, neither
party contemplated that the landlord could terminate the arrangement whenever he wished.3 44 The landlord's promise that
fined-Tenancy at Will, 14 TEX. L. REV. 109 (1936); Note, Landlord and TenantTenancy at Will of the Lessee, 33 W. VA. L.Q 307 (1927) (discussion of related
unilateral-at-will lease decisions) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tenancy at Will].
338. 271 Mass. at 55, 170 N.E. at 799.
339. Id. at 56, 170 N.E. at 799.
340. Id. at 56-57, 170 N.E. at 799.
341. Id. at 57, 170 N.E. at 799-800.
342. Id. at 57, 170 N.E. at 800.
343. See infra notes 352-59 and accompanying text.
344. A construction of the Foley arrangement as creating a yearly periodic
tenancy rather than a tenancy at will would have protected the tenant somewhat,
since the six months' notice required to terminate such a tenancy would have

given the tenant some time to wind down his affairs. 1 AMERICAN
ERTY,

LAW OF PROP-

supra note 1, § 3.23, at 222. However, while better than the tenancy at will
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the tenant could remain "as long as he wished" and the tenant's
conduct in investing in a business on the leased premises indicate
as much. Thus, the classification of the tenancy as a tenancy at
will seems inconsistent with the expectations of the parties as revealed by their words and conduct. In fact, however, Foley conforms to the pattern that we have previously identified as the
essence of the property-contract debate: Below the surface differences, there are important similarities between property and contract analyses, which when explored reveal still further important
divergencies.
We turn first to the similarities between property and contract reasoning that are found in the Foley opinion. The court did
not follow Lord Coke's rule just because it was a rule. Instead,
the court repeatedly emphasized the rationale for the rule: The
landlord was not bound to continue the lease for any longer period than he desired because the tenant was not bound to do
so. 345 Rephrased in contract terms, Lord Coke's rule manifests a
concern with mutuality of obligation. The issue in contract terms
is whether each party has supplied the requisite lawful consideration. The landlord's promise to allow the tenant to remain "as
long as he desires," is a legal detriment and clearly qualifies as a
consideration. The tenant, however, promises only to stay as
long as he chooses, and to pay if he stays. Because performance
is entirely optional with the tenant, his return promise is illusory,
"an expression [which is] cloaked in promissory terms, but which,
upon closer examination, reveals that the promisor has committed himself not at all." 34 6 Since both parties must furnish consideration in a bilateral contract, "the entire arrangement fails if one
of the party's promises are illusory." 3 4 7 From this perspective,
Foley is simply a conveyance law variation on a line of classic contract cases that traditionally have been held to exemplify illusory
and unenforceable agreements-cases in which one party
reserves the right to terminate the agreement at any time without
notice.3 4 8 Consequently, the result in Foley, while harsh, is not at
construction, the periodic tenancy construction still does not address directly
the expectations and fairness considerations that are central under an overt contractual approach to the case. See infra notes 352-59 and accompanying text.
345. 271 Mass. at 57, 170 N.E. at 800.
346. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 4-17, at 159.
347. Id. at 160.
348. The plight of the tenant in Foley was similar to that of the forbearing
creditor in Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N.Y. 392, 39 N.E. 330 (1895). In Strong, the
creditor, in return for the defendant wife's promise to guarantee an overdue
indebtedness of her husband, agreed to forbear enforcement of the debt "until
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all unusual.
Appreciation of the Foley problem as part of the general contract analysis of mutuality of obligation, however, not only explains the harsh result of the case, it also reveals alternative
approaches to the problem. Mutuality doctrine is at best a "puzzle," which has a "core of validity" but which "has clearly been
over-generalized and used as a mistaken premise for decisions defeating justified expectations." 34 9 Illusory promises present one
area of mistaken applications of the mutuality doctrine. As noted
in a prominent contract treatise:
Countless bargains, freely entered into and openly arrived at, have been struck down because of zealous judicial concern that one party's promise appeared illusory.
It mattered not that, ordinarily, it was this party who was
prepared to carry out the bargain without taking advantage of the escape route contained in his promise and
350
the other party who reneged on the agreement.
The point is well illustrated by the result in Foley. The landlord
was allowed to exit the contract along the tenant's escape route,
even though the tenant was willing and ready to perform.
The key to resolution of the mutuality puzzle and to avoiding
the harsh but understandable result illustrated by Foley lies in the
recognition that "the supposed requirement of mutuality of obligation is merely one of mutuality of consideration: each contracting party must supply consideration to the other." 3 5 , As an
exercise in consideration doctrine, the at-will lease problem of Foley can be resolved in several ways, keeping in mind that the task is
to supply a consideration on the tenant's side in exchange for the
landlord's promise to allow the tenant to remain as long as he
desires.
First, it is possible to view the tenant's erection and maintenance of a service station on the leased premises as an implied
such time as I want my money." Id. at 395, 39 N.E. at 331. This "agreement"
was followed by approximately two years of actual forbearance. Thereafter, the
creditor sought to recover against the wife on her promise. Even though the
wife had in effect "bought" the time she was seeking, the court held that the
creditor was not entitled to recover because his promise was illusory and did not
provide consideration for the promise of the wife: "The consideration is to be
tested by the agreement, and not by what was done under it." Id.at 396, 39 N.E.
at 331.
349. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 4-14, at 157.
350. Id. § 4-17, at 160.
351. Id. § 4-14, at 157.
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offer to remain for a reasonable period of time. That promise,
because it is detrimental to the tenant, is meaningful and is consideration, in contrast to his "promise" to stay as long as he
chooses. The landlord's failure to object to the building could
constitute an implied acceptance of the tenant's offer. 3 52 The
case then would be one in which there is a bargain, based on offer
and acceptance inferred from the circumstances of the case. The
question of the "reasonable" duration of the lease would go to
the content rather than the validity of the contract. Both parties
would be bound for some duration, the exact time being a question for judicial determination. Cases upholding leases for the
"duration of the war" as binding agreements, not terminable at
3 53
will, are closely analogous.
Second, it is possible to focus on the tenant's reliance on the
landlord's original, meaningful promise to allow the tenant to remain "for as many years as desired." The tenant's erection of the
gas station constitutes reasonable and foreseeable reliance on
that promise, and provides a substitute for the consideration lacking in the tenant's formal promise to remain only as long as he
desires. 3 54 While this analysis, like the first, focuses on the tenant's conduct in erecting the gas station, it differs in the duration
352. See, e.g., Blaustein v. Burton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 161, 184, 88 Cal. Rptr.
319, 334 (1970) ("The making of an agreement may be inferred by proof of
conduct as well as by proof of the use of words.").
353. See, e.g., Beeson v. LaVasque, 144 Ark. 522, 223 S.W. 355 (1920). For
discussions of the need for certainty in the term of years, see generally Note,
Lease-Definiteness of Term-"Duration of War", 2 ARK. L. REV. 126 (1947); Note,
Landlord and Tenant: Need for Certainty of Duration of Term in Estates for Years, 32
CALIF. L. REV. 199 (1944); Note, Leasesfor the 'Durationof the War', 39 ILL. L. REV.
85 (1944). See also infra note 372 (discussion of "duration of war" lease cases).
But see Stanmeyer v. Davis, 321 Ill. App. 227, 53 N.E.2d 22 (1944) (lease for
duration of war creates tenancy at will).
354. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). Under this section, a promise "which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise." Id. Reasonably foreseeable detrimental
reliance upon a promise provides a basis for the enforcement of the promise,
and is thus a substitute for consideration. In other words, if the doctrine is
found to be applicable to a particular promise, that promise is entitled to the
same degree of legal enforcement, no more and no less, as any other contract
promise. See generally 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 140, at 607-19 (discussing
traditional view of the role of promissory estoppel noted above).
In contrast to the traditional view, the Second Restatement of Contracts adopts a
much more flexible view of the doctrine. Section 90 of the Second Restatement
provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
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of the resulting lease. In the first analysis, the duration of the
lease is for a reasonable period, since nothing else is specified. In
the promissory estoppel analysis, the tenant's reliance is used to
enforce the landlord's original promise, so that the tenant can remain as long as he chooses, a period which may turn out to be
more or less than what a court would decide is a reasonable period. In effect, the promissory estoppel analysis creates a lease
for life, if not longer, 35 5 but one that is terminable earlier if the
tenant so chooses.
Third, it is possible to read the tenant's power to terminate

the arrangement at any time as subject to an implied requirement
of reasonableness. In this analysis, the bargain is construed to
infer a promise on behalf of the tenant either to give notice or to
remain until there is good cause to terminate the lease. Both implied promises constitute consideration, and both have clear analogues in general contract law. 356 An implied obligation of
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted
for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTR-CTS § 90 (1979). This more pliable notion of
promissory estoppel, which of course had not been perceived at the time of Foley, affords a middle ground between full enforcement and nonenforcement of
the agreement. For example, if an agreement like the one in Foley is viewed as
too one-sided to be enforced because of the unlimited discretion afforded the
tenant, the tenant need not be left without a remedy. The landlord's promise
could be subjected to limited enforcement. More specifically, the tenant could
be allowed recovery of his out-of-pocket loss, i.e., the cost of constructing the
service station in Foley, which was an expenditure directly induced by the promise of the landlord. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133
N.W.2d 267 (1965).
355. See Thompson v. Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 119 N.W. 797 (1909) (lease at

will of tenant creates life estate);

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 21 comment a

(1936) (lease at the will of the tenant creates "either an estate for the life of the
transferee or an estate in fee simple determinable depend[ing] upon whether
the required words of inheritance, if any are required for the creation of an estate of inheritance, are present").
356. The use of an implied term to salvage an otherwise unenforceable
promise is not a technique new to contract law. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 19, § 4-20, at 169-71. For example, in Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), the defendant promised the plaintiff
the exclusive right to market her "indorsement" of products. The defendant
attempted to escape liability for her promise to share her profits by claiming that
the plaintiff had promised nothing in return. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the
New York Court of Appeals, rejected the defendant's argument:
It is true that [the plaintiff] does not promise in so many words that he
will use reasonable efforts to place the defendant's indorsements and
market her designs. We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to
be implied. The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism
when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was
fatal. It takes a broader view to-day. A promise may be lacking, and yet
the whole writing may be "instinct with an obligation," imperfectly expressed ....
If that is so, there is a contract.
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reasonable notice to terminate a contract is an interpretive device
recognized in the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 57 while the requirement of good cause as a condition of termination has been
imposed in cases involving franchises terminable at the sole discretion of the franchisor. 35 8 Unlike the first and second analyses,
which depend on the tenant's use of the property subsequent to
the illusory agreement, this third analysis does not require additional conduct by the tenant to cause the illusory promise to become concrete; rather, it finds an implied bargain in the original
3 59
words of the agreement.
Id. at 90-91, 118 N.E. at 214 (citations omitted).
Of course, a case like Foley represents a different, and perhaps more difficult, situation for use of the implied term analysis than the one Wood presents.
In Wood, the agreement was silent as to any obligation on the part of the plaintiff;
in Foley, the agreement stated that the tenant would continue the lease as long as
he chose to do so. Thus in Wood the implied term would only fill a gap in the
agreement, while in Foley the implied term would modify an otherwise unambiguous express term. This difference, however, is not an insurmountable obstacle
to the use of the implied term technique for preservation of the bargain. SeeJ.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 4-17, at 161-62 ("Even where the language of the agreement seems to reserve the right to terminate at any time without notice the more recent cases have sustained the agreement by a process of
interpretation."). For example, in Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945), the plaintiff agreed to supply the United
States Government with the trap rock needed for a construction project. The
agreement provided that "[c]ancellation by the Procurement Division may be
effected at any time." Id. at 643. The court held that the obligation of the
United States was impliedly qualified in the cancellation clause:
[The "acceptance" of the United States] should be interpreted as a reasonable business man would have understood it. Surely it would not
have been understood thus: "We accept your offer and bind you to
your promise to deliver, but we do not promise either to take the rock
or pay the price." The reservation of a power to effect cancellation at
any time meant something different from this. We believe that the reasonable interpretation of the document is as follows: "We accept your
offer to deliver within a reasonable time, and we promise to take the
rock and pay the price unless we give you notice of cancellation within a
reasonable time."
Id. at 644.
357. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (1977). This section provides that "[tiermination of
a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires that
reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable."
Id.
358. For a discussion of good cause termination and franchise cases, see
infra notes 410-26 and accompanying text.
359. Of course, if the lease contains a promise by the tenant in addition to
the illusory promise, there would be no consideration problem, and the lease
would not be relegated to the tenancy at will category. Some cases, however, do
not always reach that result. Compare Newsom v. Meade, 102 W. Va. 489, 135
S.E. 604 (1926) (lease obligating tenant to plant fruit trees and care for the
premises, and allowing him to stay as long as he pleased, created life estate and
not a lease terminable at will), noted in Note, Tenancy at Will, supra note 337 with
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In relation to the property-contract theme, then, Foley is important for what it does and does not do. In effect, Foley applies a
standard contract analysis: For want of mutuality of obligation,
the contract was illusory, and the landlord was bound to no duration of performance because the tenant was not.3 60 What Foley
fails to do is to apply any of the three alternative analyses, discussed above, which would solve the consideration problem generated by the initial classification of the tenant's promise as
illusory. The crucial remaining question is why the court failed to
transcend the illusory promise analysis in a way that would have
given effect to an intended bargain.
We suggest that the answer lies in the inhibiting effect of
property analysis upon the freedom of courts to assess transactional facts in lease cases. From this perspective, Foley supports
the basic theme of our discussion: that there is an important difference between property and contract methodologies in assessing transactional facts. Foley nicely illustrates that difference.
Contract law accords more deference to contracting parties-or
more appropriately, more autonomy to courts in determining
what contracting parties mean when they act ambiguously-than
conveyance law accords to landlord and tenant. While "[i]t is
conceivable that, in a matured system of law, interests in land
could be created without models and with an infinite variety of
legal consequences, somewhat as contracts are formed," 3 6i property law does not work in such a manner. An owner of land "is
not free to fashion segments of ownership in any way that he
pleases." 3 62 Rather, the owner may only divide his ownership
into the kinds of segments that the courts have come to recognize.3 63 Autonomy is limited not only because these "segments"
or estates are limited in number, but also because they are fixed
so that "one legal category having been selected, legal conseSage v. Shaul, 159 Neb. 543, 545, 67 N.W.2d 921, 922 (1955) ("The [tenant's]
version of the oral lease is that if he would go on the place and clean it up, he
could stay as long as he desired. The [landlord's] version is that defendant
could rent it as long as he was satisfactory and [the former landlord] owned the
place. Under either version a tenancy at will was created.").
360. Exceptions to the mutuality rule, however, are so widespread that the
use of the doctrine to abort bargained-for transactions may well be the anomaly
rather than the rule in modern contract law. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra
note 19, § 4-17, at 161-64 (sustaining illusory and optional promises).
361. 1 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 61, at 45 (2d
ed. 1956).
362. BASIC PROPERTY LAw, supra note 14, at 213.

363. Id.
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quences . . . necessarily follow." 36 4
Foley nicely demonstrates the dilemma that arises when ambiguous transactional facts must be forced into the limited legal
molds of conveyance law. It seems unquestionable that the parties in Foley intended to make a binding contract for the use of the
land, and it is almost certain that neither party had contemplated
that the landlord could terminate the agreement at will. Beyond
that, the agreement demands thoughtful interpretation. At one
extreme, the right to remain in possession "for as many years as
desired" could give the tenant a right to lifetime possession, if not
more.3 65 At the other extreme, the quoted language might have
been intended only to negate the landlord's right to terminate at
will. The point, however, is that the quoted language alone is
not, and should not be regarded as, sufficient to determine what
the parties' expectations were at the time of the agreement. 36 6 A
lifetime right to possession may appear to be a reasonable or an
extreme construction depending on the circumstances of the
agreement. The construction would seem extreme if the rental
were low in relation to present and predictable fair rental value,
but reasonable assuming a fair return to the landlord, or some
peculiar transactional facts, such as a close relationship between
the landlord and tenant.3

67

If the lifetime occupancy construction

appears unreasonable under the circumstances, occupancy at the
landlord's will is not the sole alternative. As we have noted, the
Foley arrangement could have been construed to authorize occu3 68
pancy by the tenant for a reasonable period.
364. 1 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 361, § 61, at 46.
365. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
366. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 2-13, at 48-49 (contracts
providing that employment shall be "permanent" are subject to various interpretations: "Terms such as 'permanent employment' have no immutable meaning. When used in different concrete situations by different individuals different
meanings may fairly be attached to the term."); cf. McLean v. United States, 316
F. Supp. 827, 828 (E.D. Va. 1970) (tenant's option to renew "from year to year"
did not create right to perpetual renewals: "There is nothing about the authorized or permitted use of the premises, the term of occupancy, the rental, the
rights granted or language used to suggest the parties intended the lease to continue in perpetuity.").
367. See, e.g., Thompson v. Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 119 N.W. 797 (1909)
(lease at elderly tenant's will creates a life estate and not a tenancy at will).
368. See supra notes 356-59 and accompanying text. In addition, where the
tenant's reliance upon the assumption that the landlord may not terminate at
will is crucial to the case, flexibility in result is attainable under the pliable promissory estoppel doctrine formulated in the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). For the relevant text of § 90, see supra
note 354.
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The conveyance scheme of law, however, prevents adoption
of any of the appealing compromise alternatives from among the
various durational possibilities. The Foley court held that the
lease arrangement was not a term-of-years tenancy because it
lacked the essential characteristic of that estate, a fixed duration.3 69 Having rejected the term of years construction, the court,
from the standpoint of the hierarchical theory of estates, could
only construe the arrangement "up," as a life estate, or "down,"
as a periodic tenancy or tenancy at will. While the latter construc370
tions are not responsive to the parties' apparent expectations,
the life estate alternative may have given the tenant more than he
bargained for. Neither solution provides flexibility. Since it is
difficult to criticize the court for doing too little for the tenant
when the alternative is perhaps to do too much, we do not suggest that the Foley decision was, on its terms, incorrect. 3 7 ' We do
suggest, however, that the dilemma presented by cases like Foley
results from a perceived need to fit fact patterns into rather limited property law categories.372
Three recent cases involving leases allegedly terminable at
the will of one party reveal that courts continue to struggle with
the type of problem presented in Foley. Although all three decisions, unlike Foley, uphold the bargain, conveyance law doctrine
continues to be a factor in each case. In the first decision dis369. 271 Mass. at 57, 170 N.E. at 800.
370. For a discussion of these alternatives, see supra note 344.
371. In suggesting that the fairness of a life estate construction depends on
how well it effectuates the parties' expectations or otherwise produces a just result, we are aware that the Foley court could not have classified the lease as a life
estate because of a local rule prohibiting the creation of life estates without a
seal or a recitation that a life estate was intended. See Note, Foley v. Gamester,
supra note 337, at 572. It seems clear, however, that the court intended its at-will
classification to apply even to transactions that would have been formally sufficient to create a life estate. See id.
372. The common law recognizes only four types of leasehold estates. See 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, §§ 3.13-36. No court, however, is
obliged to follow the common law on this point, as cases upholding leases for
the "duration of the war" illustrate. See supra note 353. The "war" cases could be
understood simply as expanding the concept of certainty that is an essential feature of a term of years. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 19 & comment a
(1936). A lease for the duration of the war is certain to end, although the exact
time cannot be specified. This explanation is troublesome, however, since it obliterates the distinction between a life estate and a term of years, and largely
destroys whatever utility the concept of certainty has as applied to the term of
years. A preferable explanation is simply that the cases recognize the possibility
that valid leases can be created, if the parties so intend, even when their durations do not conform to accepted common law categories. Our point in the text
is that cases operating under the aegis of property concepts frequently do reach
restrictive results, not that they necessarily must. See infra Part IV-B.
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cussed below it is clearly the dominant form of analysis, with the
court simply revising the traditional property approach of Foley.
The second case illustrates how a court can straddle the fence and
employ a mixture of property and contract doctrine to justify its
decision. The third pays lip service to traditional property doctrine and seems to recognize the modern lease as a contract, but
then utilizes a questionable contract analysis.
In Myers v. East Ohio Gas Co. ,37 the lease provided for "a term
of ten years, and so much longer . . . as gas is being produced,
stored, withdrawn or held in storage by the lessee." 3 74 The landlord, seeking to escape the bargain after the ten year period,
sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the lease agreement
created a tenancy at will after the initial ten year term. 37 5 The
landlord argued that a lease for a "primary term, followed by a
grant of uncertain duration that conditioned termination upon
the occurrence of events solely within the control of the 'lessee,'
gives rise to a tenancy at will once the primary term has expired." 37 6 The court upheld a verdict for the tenant, holding,
unlike Foley, that the agreement was not a tenancy at will, and
therefore was not terminable by the landlord even though it was
3 77
terminable at the will of the tenant.
While the Myers court perceived the Foley problem of unilateral termination as a consideration question, it did not decide the
case on that basis, and thus bypassed the shorter road to the result it reached in favor of the tenant.3 7 8 As a consideration case,
Myers is an easier case than Foley. In Foley, the silence of the agreement on the tenant's obligation gave the appearance that the ten3 79
ant was agreeing to lease the property for as long as he wished.
Thus, the only consideration for the landlord's promise to lease
to the tenant was the tenant's illusory promise to do, in effect,
whatever he wanted to in the future. The facts of Myers are dramatically different. In Myers, the tenant agreed to lease the property for a term of at least ten years. This promise, in contract
terms, clearly provided sufficient consideration at the outset of
the agreement to support a return promise by the landlord to
373. 51 Ohio St. 2d 121, 364 N.E.2d 1369 (1977).
374. Id. at 127, 364 N.E.2d at 1374.
375. Id. at 122, 364 N.E.2d at 1371.
376. Id. at 122-23, 364 N.E.2d at 1371.
377. Id. at 127, 364 N.E.2d at 1374.
378. See infra notes 383-90 and accompanying text.
379. For a discussion of the lease agreement in Foley, see supra notes 337-72
and accompanying text.
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lease the property for ten years and as long thereafter as the ten380
ant desired.
In addition, a second avenue for finding consideration sufficient to support the landlord's promise to Myers was readily available. Even as to the period after the initial ten years, the lease in
Myers did not provide, as in Foley, for a duration only so long as
the tenant wanted the property. Instead, the lease called for a
duration so long as the tenant continued to use the premises for
specified oil and gas purposes. 38 ' Contract law, in analogous situations, has recognized an implied promise not to cease operations
except for good faith reasons; 382 the recognition of such a good
faith limitation on the right to terminate solves any problem with
lack of mutuality of obligation. Since the Myers lease did not obligate the tenant to undertake the oil and gas operations, the analogy to the contract cases is not perfect. Nevertheless, it remains
true that whereas in Foley the court would have had to construct a
good faith obligation purely out of its perception of the justice of
the situation, in Myers, the fact that the lease adverted to oil and
gas operations, even though it did not require them, could have
been the basis for an intent-oriented inference of a good faith limitation on the tenant's right to terminate.
Notwithstanding the foregoing contract rationales, the Myers
court employed property-based reasoning that was only slightly
less mechanistic, and certainly more confusing, than that employed by the court in Foley. Myers recognized, but declined to
follow, the widespread adoption of the Foley rule that a lease expressly terminable at the will of only one party is in law terminable at the will of both. 383 Instead, the court held that "those
leases which do not clearly state whether they are terminable at
the will of one or both parties will be presumed, in keeping with
the majority rule, to be terminable at the will of one or both parties." 3 8 4 However, "those leases which clearly and unambiguously terminate at the will of only one party are to be controlled
by their express terms," and are to be regarded as terminable by
380. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 4-22, at 173-74 (one
consideration will support many promises).
381. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 122, 364 N.E.2d at 1371.
382. See, e.g., HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir.
1966) (buyer in requirements contract must exercise good faith in determining
requirements); 407 E. 61st Garage v. Savory Fifth Ave. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275,
244 N.E.2d 37, 296 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1968) (a business will not necessarily shut
down before contract term merely because it is losing money).
383. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 124, 364 N.E.2d at 1372.
384. Id. at 126-27, 364 N.E.2d at 1373.
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that party only.3 8 5 Although the Myers lease did not expressly
state that the tenant could terminate at will, it did tie the duration
of the lease after the initial ten year period to various production
contingencies over which the tenant had sole control. In the
court's view, this provision "clearly granted the [tenant] the right
to terminate at will" once the ten year primary term had expired. 38 6 Moreover, the lease did address the landlord's right to
withdraw, and gave the landlord that right only upon 30 day's notice and only if the lessee defaulted. 38 7 As a result of these provisions, the court concluded that the agreement
is clearly terminable at the will of the lessee only. Therefore, the presumption that a lease at the will of one party
is a lease at the will of both does not apply, a tenancy at
will is not created, and the lease will be enforced accord3
ing to its express terms. 88
The dissenting judge in Myers chided the majority for refusing to adopt or reject the Foley rule, and for assuming a
"mugwumpian stance" in its creation of the "novel" presumption
of mutual termination. 38 9 While much of the dissent's opinion is
not entirely clear, its criticism of the majority's rejection of the
clear Foley rule in favor of a presumption is apt. The Myers court
seems to have replaced the irrational certainty of Foley with an
irrational uncertainty. The majority decision creates a two-tiered
level of analysis for unilateral-at-will leases. In some cases, the
rule that a lease at the will of one party is also a lease at will of the
other party will apply, but as a rebuttable presumption. In other
cases, as in Myers itself, the lease is given effect as written, that is,
as a lease terminable at the will of one party only.
Since the Myers court provides routes for both proving
through and drafting around the presumption, it is clear that little
remains of the Foley rule. Probably few leases that are expressly
terminable at the will of one party only will survive the double
assault and be treated, as in Foley, as leases likewise terminable by
the other party. But while the objective of preventing parties like
the landlord in Myers from escaping an undesirable but freely assumed bargain is commendable, one must wonder whether the
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id. at 126, 364 N.E.2d at 1373.
Id. at 127, 364 N.E.2d at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128, 364 N.E.2d at 1374 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
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Myers court's method of achieving that result is appropriate. In
contrast to the relatively straightforward, but by no means flawless, consideration analysis, 390 Myers creates an uncertain and perhaps ultimately futile variation on the Foley property approach.
The case addresses neither of the important questions prompted
by its mode of analysis: How is one to draft around the presumption, and what circumstantial factors are necessary to rebut the
presumption? The fact that the majority and the dissent disagreed on whether the Myers lease did "clearly and unambiguously" provide for termination at the will of the tenant, and
thereby negate the presumption, indicates that the appropriate
application of that part of the court's test, at least, is far from
clear. The upshot of the court's silence and ambiguity on these
important questions is that the court has the worst of both
worlds-it has achieved neither the certainty of Foley nor the reasoned flexibility of an overt contract approach.
In Thomas v. Goodwin,3 9 ' the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia ultimately employed traditional property doctrine
when faced with what was argued to be a terminability at will
problem. The lease at issue was for a period of fifteen years, but
contained a provision that the lessee could terminate the lease "at
any time by giving Lessor thirty (30) days notice thereof." 392 The
trial court, in granting the landlord's motion for summary judgment, held that a lease that granted a unilateral termination right
to the tenant but failed to create a corresponding termination
right in the landlord was either void, or a month-to-month
39 3
tenancy.
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court recognized
that the Foley rule is based upon the doctrine of mutuality of obligation. 39 4 The court, however, did not dispose of the case under
a consideration rationale. Although the requirement of a specified time for notice of termination is, by itself, a sufficient restriction on a party's future conduct to constitute consideration and to
prevent that party's promise of performance from being viewed as
illusory, 3 95 the court instead opted for a more conventional analy390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
ment of

See supra notes 351-59 and accompanying text.
266 S.E.2d 792 (W. Va. 1980).
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id. at 794.
SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 4-17, at 161-62 (requiregiving notice constitutes detriment and is consideration); IA A.
CORBIN, supra note 14, § 163 (same). See also supra note 357 and accompanying
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sis. The court cloaked its opinion in traditional property doctrine
and emphasized that the lease provided for a definite durationfifteen years-subject to earlier termination by the tenant's giving
39 6
of the required notice.
Thomas' requirement of a combination of both a definite duration and a notice requirement as necessary to take the case out
of the tenancy at will category represents a hybrid method of decision. In property law, the rule that a lease terminable at the will
of one party alone is a tenancy at will is not applied when the
39 7
unilateral right to terminate is attached to a definite term.
Form dominates substance, inasmuch as the mere setting of a
term, even though the term set is subject to earlier termination,
avoids the at-will classification; it is not necessary that the right to
terminate be limited by a notice requirement. In contract law, the
notice requirement alone would be sufficient to avoid the tenancy
at will classification since it provides valid consideration for the
landlord's promise to allow the tenant to remain in possession
until the tenant elects to give reasonable notice.3 98 Because the
Thomas decision requires that the right to terminate be burdened
by a notice requirement, it is responsive to the underlying mutuality of obligation issue. Yet, in adding the term requirement, the
court also embraces the formalism of the property approach, and
399
thus fails to achieve a straightforward contract analysis.
text (discussing possibility of inferring term in contract that requires giving of
notice).
396. 266 S.E.2d at 795.
397. See, e.g., Peoples Park & Amusement Ass'n v. Anrooney, 200 Wash. 51,
57, 93 P.2d 362, 365 (1939). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.6
comment g (1977) ("Such a lease is an estate for years determinable if the power
to terminate it at the will of one of the parties is engrafted on what would other").
wise be an estate for years ..
398. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
399. An interesting parallel to the Thomas court's "property" approach on
the duration issue is the court's position on the landlord's unconscionability argument. Given the rather traditional approach employed by the court on the
duration issue, one might have expected the unconscionability argument to have
been rejected by the court as inapplicable to leases. See, e.g., Division of Triple T
Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 728, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 200
(App. Term 1969) ("The [Uniform Commercial] Code provisions governing
sales are limited in scope to 'transactions in goods' . . . and by no mean application ofjudicial sophistry can the lease of real property be deemed to fall within
its intendment."), afd mem., 34 A.D.2d 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1970). The
Thomas court did seem to face an apparent temptation to pursue the compartmentalized approach. See Thomas, 266 S.E.2d at 794 (instant case involves "lease
of property, not the sale of goods, and is not controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code"). Notwithstanding that temptation, the court in Thomas disposed
of the unconscionability argument on the merits:
The trial court erroneously held that the lease agreement was uncon-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/1

110

Chase and Taylor: Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and Contract

1985]

LANDLORD AND TENANT

In L.E. Cooke Corp. v. Hayes, 40 0 the lease called for rental payments based upon the amount of coal removed by the tenant with
a minimum rent of one dollar per acre per year. As for duration,
the lease provided: "This lease shall remain in full force and effect for one year and thereafter until notice is given by lessee of
its intention to cancel said lease. ' 40 1 During the first year, no mining occurred. At the end of that year, when the tenant undertook
to pay the minimum royalty, he was notified that the landlord was
terminating the lease. 40 2 In the landlord's action to cancel the
lease, the trial court held for the landlord. Relying on Killebrew v.
Murray,40 3 which according to the court subscribed to the Foley
scionable, there having been no showing that it was entered into as a
result of oppressive or unfair conduct. As herein noted the thirty-day
termination clause alone does not render the lease void or create a tenancy at will.

Id.
400. 549 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
401. Id. at 838.

402. Id.
403. 151 Ky. 345, 151 S.W. 662 (1912). In Killebrew the landlord promised
to lease the premises for ten years and
so long thereafter as phosphate or phosphate-bearing rock may be
found in what shall be considered by the... [tenant] as paying quantities [and w]hen the . . . [tenant] shall conclude that phosphate or
phosphate rock is not found on said premises in paying quantities, he
shall notify the party of the first party thereof in writing, and such notice shall terminate this lease, which however, shall continue until such
notice.
Id. at 346, 151 S.W. at 663. The tenant in return promised to pay a set amount
per ton of phosphate mined and a minimum of five dollars per year whether the
land was mined or not. At the end of the second year, mining had not yet begun
and the landlord refused to accept the minimum five dollar payment and
brought an action to cancel the lease.
In upholding the lower court decision in favor of the landlord, the appellate
court relegated the minimum payment obligation to a position of insignificance
and declared:
[The lease] obligates the lessor, in unequivocal language, to continue
the lease for 10 years, all the while holding the leased premises in readiness for the lessee's mining operations, but gives her no right to terminate the lease, to compel the lessee to begin mining the land, or to
continue the work, if abandoned after being commenced. On the other
hand, the lease does not bind the lessees to do anything. It permits
them to begin the work of mining phosphate on the leased premises at
anytime within 10 years that may be selected by them; to quit when they
choose, or not to begin at all; and also the right to terminate the lease
at anytime upon their mere ipse dixit that the land does not contain
phosphate in "paying quantities;" it being left to them alone to decide
whether it is in quantity sufficient to make the mining thereof profitable
to them.
Id. at 349, 151 S.W. at 664. From this analysis, the court reasoned that the tenant's promise was illusory and that it did not provide consideration to support
the landlord's promise. Thus, the landlord was free to terminate as her promise
was not legally enforceable.
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rule, the trial court held that a lease terminable at the will of the
tenant is also terminable at the will of the lessor. 40 4 The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky reversed, offering the following rationale:
[I]t is quite apparent that the heart of the holding [in
Killebrew] is directed to the necessity for good, sufficient
and valid consideration to have passed between the parties. Failure at that point is what made the lease there a
unilateral agreement. Thus, when it was said that a lease
which is terminable at the will of one of the parties is also
terminable at the will of the other, it was enunciating a
correct principle of law regarding unilateral agreements.
This is sound, and it is still the law today. But, where
consideration is good and sufficient (and one dollar per
acre per year is) then rights relative to termination may
be expressly contracted by either party without bringing
40 5
such instrument under the unilateral rule.
Like the courts in Myers and Thomas, the court in Cooke correctly-and far more directly-saw the Foley problem as an issue
of consideration. 40 6 Unlike Myers and Thomas, however, Cooke actually decided the case on consideration grounds. The only difficulty is that the court's reasoning as to the presence of
consideration is tenuous at best. The Cooke court regarded either
the payment of the one dollar per acre per year or the promise to
pay as sufficient consideration to support the landlord's promise
to lease the premises to the tenant for, in effect, as long as the
tenant wanted the premises. On this basis the court distinguished
Killebrew, which had held that the tenant's promise was illusory
and thus failed to provide consideration for the landlord's promise. 40 7 However, little meaningful difference exists between the
404. 549 S.W.2d at 838.
405. Id.

406. Id.
407. For the Cooke court's explanation of how Cooke differed from Killebrew,
see supra text accompanying note 405. While the court is not clear in its application of the consideration doctrine, it seems to say that the yearly one dollar per
acre payment by the tenant was the consideration for the landlord's promise to
deliver possession to the tenant until the tenant gave notice of termination.
Viewed in this manner, the exchange perceived by the court was a promise by
the landlord to provide the premises for an indefinite period in exchange for an
annual payment based upon a one dollar per acre amount. Thus the landlord
essentially agreed to keep the lease in effect so long as the tenant made the
required annual payment. Another way of reaching the same result by focusing
on the annual one dollar per acre payment would have been to have viewed the
tenant as having promised to pay the one dollar per acre amount each year until
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tenants' obligations in Killibrew and Cooke. In Killebrew, the tenant
agreed to lease for a definite period of ten years, and to pay a
minimum of five dollars per annum. In Cooke, the tenant likewise
agreed to a minimum duration, one year, and to a minimum
rental, one dollar per acre per year. The cases appear to be distinguishable only on the dollar amounts. The five dollar rent in
Killebrew could be categorized as nominal, and thus a sham, while
the one dollar per acre rent in Cooke could be viewed as significant
enough to take it out of the token class. 40 8 However, when one
takes into account that the five dollar per annum obligation was
contained in a 1908 lease and the one dollar per acre amount was
40 9
contained in a 1973 lease, this distinction is questionable.
Our analysis of these three modern cases on the terminability-at-will problem suggests the following conclusions. On one
hand, all three cases recognize, with different degrees of directness, that the at-will lease problem is really a facet of the contract
requirement of consideration. That recognition is an important
and promising development in landlord-tenant law. On the other
hand, only Cooke approaches the full potential of the modern notion that a lease should be treated as a contract in all respects,
although its dubious distinction of Killebrew and its murky apprecinotice of termination was given. Under this view the promise of payment, rather
than the acts of payment, would be the consideration for the landlord's promise.
Simpler applications of the consideration doctrine were available to the
court in Cooke. First, the existence of consideration generally is tested at the
outset of the agreement. Thus, the tenant's promise to remain as a tenant for at
least one year and pay the minimum rent could be viewed as consideration for
the landlord's promise to provide the premises for an indefinite duration. This,
of course, is the same method of analysis that was available in Myers to find consideration, had that been viewed as the proper basis for decision. See supra note
380 and accompanying text. Second, the court could have focused on the promise to give notice to effect termination as the consideration for the landlord's
promise. Under this view, the exchange for the landlord's promise to provide
the premises for an indefinite duration would be the promise of the tenant to
give notice of termination. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 59, § 2.14, at 78.
408. There is support for the proposition that nominal consideration will
not suffice to make a promise enforceable. See, e.g., Fischerv. Union Trust Co., 138
Mich. 612, 101 N.W. 852 (1904); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71

illustration 5 (1979) ("Being advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A
offers to buy B for $1,000 a book worth less than $1. B accepts the offer knowing that the purchase of the book is a mere pretense. There is no consideration
for A's promise to pay $1,000.").

Contra RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84 illus-

tration 1 (1932).
409. Even if the court in Cooke had utilized more precise contract reasoning
to support its decision by focusing on the minimum lease duration along with
the minimum rent, or on the notice requirement for termination, see supra note
407, the court would still have had difficulty in distinguishing Killebrew, because
the tenant in Killebrew also had agreed to a minimum duration and to give notice
as a requisite to termination of the lease.
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ation of the consideration doctrine do little to clarify Kentucky
law. Myers and Thomas, by contrast, produce variations of traditional property doctrine. Myers, perhaps the least progressive of
the three cases, converts the rigid but certain property rule of Foley into a vague and uncertain presumption; the change achieves
the desirable goal of flexibility of approach, but at the cost of considerable unnecessary doctrinal uncertainty. The reasoning of
Thomas suggests a jurisdiction in transition. By requiring consideration in the form of notice to terminate, Thomas directly addresses the underlying consideration problem posed by at-will
leases. Unfortunately, however, the court retains a significant
remnant of property law by also requiring that the lease provide a
definite term, even if it be a terminable definite term.
We discussed Foley to show that the application of traditional
property doctrine can produce decisions justified by very rigid
rules that are insensitive to the transactional intentions and reasonable expectations of the parties. The three more recent cases
indicate that a degree of confusion still permeates modern lease
law, because that law has not yet rid itself of the disabling property influences illustrated by Foley.
2.

Good Cause Termination and Leases: The Franchise Cases

Foley and the more recent cases provide the background for
our assertion that property doctrine inhibits the ability of courts
to impose a good cause termination requirement in lease cases.
Recent franchise cases, which focus on the question of whether
the franchisor can terminate or refuse to renew longstanding
business relationships with the franchisee, provide more direct
support for this assertion.
Atlantic Richfield Company v. Razumic4 10 furnishes a fact pattern
and resolution that is typical in franchise cases. Atlantic Richfield
(Arco) had created a comprehensive scheme for the "selling, displaying, promoting and merchandising" of Arco products. 4 1' Defendant Razumic leased and operated an Arco service station for
seventeen years under several "dealer lease" arrangements with
Arco. At the end of the seventeen years, the parties entered into
another agreement, also designated a "lease," but which differed
from the previous agreements in that it set a three-year term.
One month prior to the end of the three-year term, Arco notified
Razumic that the "lease" would not be renewed and directed him
410. 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978).
411. Id. at 377, 390 A.2d at 742.
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to vacate by the last day of the term. When Razumic refused to
vacate at the end of the term, Arco sued for possession. The trial
4 12
court entered judgment for possession for Arco.
41 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed.
As a preliminary step in determining the duration of the agreement, the court concluded that the arrangement between Arco
and Razumic was a franchise, and not a lease. Following standard
contract methodology, the court reached its conclusion by looking not only at the writing embodying the parties' agreement, but
also at their course of performance under the writing. Both the
language of the agreement and the parties' performance under it
revealed a comprehensive marketing scheme which imposed obligations on Razumic and granted rights to Arco beyond those of
an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship. The court held that the
designation of the transaction as a lease did not accurately indicate its legal import, and concluded that the transaction created a
4 14
franchise.
Having characterized the parties' arrangement as a franchise,
the court proceeded to address the issue of its duration. Arco, no
doubt on the basis of the designation of the agreement as a
"lease," contended that the relationship terminated of its own accord at the end of the three year term, and that Arco, as lessor,
41 5
was free to refuse to renew, for any reason or no reason.
Razumic, relying on cases and commentary imposing a duty on
franchisors not to act arbitrarily in discontinuing franchise agreements, contended that Arco could not end the relationship at will
after the expiration date. 41 6 In finding for Razumic, the court first
noted that while the agreement set a duration of three years, and
hence indicated that the parties could not terminate before that
time, it was silent on the question of renewals after the expiration
date. 41 7 To fill this perceived gap in the writing, the court again
reviewed the same factual circumstances that had prompted its
classifying the arrangement as a franchise in the first place. The
court noted that "Arco here has over the years sought every assurance from Razumic that he will use his best efforts in selling,
displaying, promoting, and merchandising Arco products and attracting, serving, and satisfying Arco customers," and that "[i]n
412. See id. at 369-71, 390 A.2d at 737-38.
413. Id. at 384, 390 A.2d at 745.

414. Id. at 372-76, 390 A.2d at 739-41.
415. Id. at 372, 390 A.2d at 739.

416. Id. at 376-79, 390 A.2d at 741-42.
417. Id. at 372, 390 A.2d at 739.
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exchange, an Arco dealer such as Razumic can justifiably expect
that his time, effort, and other investments promoting the goodwill of Arco will not be destroyed as a result of Arco's arbitrary
decision to terminate their franchise relationship." 4 18 Concluding that Arco was under an obligation "to deal with its franchisees
in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner," the
court held that Arco could not "arbitrarily sever its franchise rela41 9
tionship with Razumic.
While there is little to quarrel with in the court's result, its
two-step method of analysis is curious. Initially, the court took
great pains to classify the arrangement as a franchise before addressing the duration issue. Yet, the terminability question exists
regardless of whether the arrangement is a lease or a franchise.
The vital question would appear to be not whether the arrangement was a lease or a franchise, but whether any arrangement
which specifies a definite term can be construed to require renewals. Like the majority, the concurring opinion concluded that the
court could impose an obligation to continue the franchise only if
the parties themselves had not agreed upon its duration. 4 20 The
concurring opinion, however, differed in its determination of
whether the three year term provision did constitute such an
agreement. It regarded the setting of the three year term as answering-negatively-both the question of whether termination
prior to that time could occur, and the question of whether con42
tinuation of the arrangement after that term was necessary. '
The majority read the term provision more subtly, as answering
418. Id. at 377-78, 390 A.2d at 742.
419. Id. at 378, 390 A.2d at 742. The court also stated that "the writing's
leasehold terminology stating a three year term of occupancy does not govern
the duration of the comprehensive contractual business relationship between
Razumic and Arco. Rather, the language establishes a right of occupancy which
the franchisee Razumic can reasonably expect will not be abruptly halted." Id. at
381, 390 A.2d at 743.
420. Id. at 384-85, 390 A.2d at 745 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
421. Id. at 385-86, 390 A.2d at 746 (Pomeroy,J., concurring). According to
the concurring opinion:
The parties in the case before us entered into an agreement which
was to continue for a three-year period. No provision was made as to
renewal of the contract. The majority, relying on authority which deals
with franchise agreements having no fixed term, in effect excises the
three-year term provision from the contract and reads into the contract
a duty on the franchisor-lessor to keep the agreement in force indefinitely, with no provision of any sort for termination, so long as the franchisee fulfills its obligation to provide good service to the public, and
otherwise performs as required by the agreement. I cannot agree.
Id. (emphasis added).
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only the first question, leaving the second to be answered in favor
of the franchisee if circumstances or policy so indicated.
But while the majority and the concurrence disagreed on the
interpretation of the three-year term provision, they agreed on
the more basic point that for our purposes makes Razumic an interesting and revealing case. The majority concluded that a
franchise for a term cannot be arbitrarily discontinued, 4 22 while
the concurrence concluded that the courts should impose a prohibition against arbitrary termination only when the franchise is for
an indefinite period; 4 23 but the concurring judges agreed that the
promisee is entitled to relief against arbitrary termination only
4 24
when the parties' arrangement is something other than a lease.
In short, the entire court in Razumic regarded the preliminary
classification step as vital. The classification step is vital, however,
only on the assumption that designation of the transaction as a
lease would foreclose the possibility of implying or constructing
an obligation on the landlord not to arbitrarily terminate the arrangement. The necessary assumption of the Razumic discussion
is thus that the property classification prevents the free exercise
of contractual interpretation of the transaction.
Razumic's distinction between leases and franchises pervades
the case law, with courts refusing to impose a good faith obligation in transactions that are labelled leases. In Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
Cutter,42 5 for example, the plaintiff oil company brought a forcible
entry and detainer action when the tenant service station operator
refused to yield possession after a termination notice. Thelcourt
found the franchisor-franchisee argument unpersuasive, stating:
It has consistently been held that if the relationship is
that of lessor-lessee, . . . courts will not imply a good
cause requirement in order to terminate the lease, but
will permit the lease to be terminated in accordance with
the contract provisions. We adopt the majority view that
a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties, and that termination of the lease is to be determined by the traditional principles of real property and
422. Id. at 381 & n.12, 390 A.2d at 743-44 & n.12.
423. Id. at 387-88, 390 A.2d at 746-47 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
424. Id. at 384-88, 390 A.2d at 745-47 (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (case cannot be treated as if only dealing with a lease).
425. 564 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1977). See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Lione, 66 Misc.
2d 599, 322 N.Y.S.2d 82 (3d Dist. Ct. 1971) (court reluctantly allowed landlord
to terminate service station tenant without cause after 19 years of annual renewal of the lease).
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4 26
contract law.

While the Kerr-McGee court offered no explanation to support its
conclusion, it is clear that if a transaction is categorized as a lease,
an automatic and unyielding consequence attaches. Neither the
landlord's right to terminate in accordance with the terms of the
lease nor his right to refuse to renew a lease upon its expiration
are encumbered by a good faith requirement. On the other hand,
if the transaction is classified as a franchise, the termination or
nonrenewal right is magically transformed from one without re42 7
striction to one bridled with the requirement of good faith.
Again, the modern lease has not been fully absorbed into general
contract law.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

PROPERTY AND CONTRACT

ANALYSES IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW

Traditionalists advance two arguments. First, the claim that
conveyance reasoning is fundamentally different from contract
reasoning; second, they claim that the application of contract reasoning to landlord-tenant disputes would lead to the more just
resolution of those disputes. 4 28 The first is a descriptive and the
second a normative or prescriptive claim. 42 9 Together, these
claims provide a useful framework for summarizing our discussion, and for stating our position on the significance of the property-contract theme.
A.

Traditionalistsand Revisionists

A lease is, in part, a conveyance. 4 30 "[A] conveyance is regarded as an executed transaction by virtue of which something is
transferred from one person to another." 4 3 1 That deceptively
simple statement contains two ideas of great importance for the
426. 564 P.2d at 217-18.
427. Id. at 217.

428. For a discussion of this traditionalist assertion, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
429. See Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113,
1115-16 (1981) ("[Traditional] doctrinal analysis has always been at once positive and normative. It analyzes what the law is but often it also advocates changing some rule of law to make it conform better to the central trends, themes, or
concepts that are revealed in the positive analysis.").
430. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.11; J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 19, at 434; C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 69 (1962). See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 1, at 22.
431. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 comment k, at 2909 (1936). See also

id. § 522.
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property-contract theme. First, as an "executed transaction," a
lease is regarded as complete, insofar as the landlord's performance obligation is concerned, no later than the date set for the
tenant's entry into possession. 43 2 Second, the "something"
which is created and transferred by the conveyance is an "estate"
in the tenant. 4 3 3 An estate has two essential characteristics. It is a
"possessory" interest, characterized by an exclusive right to enjoy
and control access to the space covered by the lease; 4 34 and it is a
possessory interest "in land," such that, at least historically, use
by the tenant of structures or improvements on the premises is
secondary to use of the land, and not the main purpose of the
4 35
transaction.
In addition to being a conveyance, however, a lease is also a
bilateral contract that expressly or impliedly imposes on the landlord and the tenant executory obligations-that is, obligations to
be performed after the tenant has received possession. 43 6 For example, the landlord impliedly promises to protect the tenant's
quiet enjoyment of the premises during the term, 43 7 and he may
make additional express promises, such as to repair the premises. 4 38 The tenant almost universally promises to pay rent at
stated intervals during the term, and generally will make additional promises with respect to the use and transfer of the leased
440
premises, 4 39 and to avoid committing waste.
432. For a further discussion of the "executed transaction" idea, see infra
notes 449-53 and accompanying text.
433. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 9 (1936) ("estate" is an interest in
land which "is or may become possessory"); id. §§ 19-22 (defining term of years,
periodic tenancy, tenancy at will, and occupancy at sufferance as "estates").
434. Id. § 7 & comment b (possession entails "control" over land and
power "to exclude other persons therefrom").
435. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (agrarian economy concepts are dated); Boston Housing Auth.
v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973) (land was the

essential part of the lease transaction at common law); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.11, at 203 (in an agrarian economy, land was the
principal goal).
436. See supra note 430 (citing authorities explaining bilateral contract aspects of leases).
437. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 3.47.

438.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY

§ 11.3 & comment a (1977)

(duty to keep property up to health codes).
439. Id. § 12.1 (rent); id. § 13.1 & comment c (repair).
440. See, e.g., id. ch. 12 introductory note, at 383-84 ("The obligations of
the tenant inherent in the landlord-tenant relationship which arise without the
aid of any express promise by the tenant are to pay the rent reserved, not to
commit waste, and not to use the leased property for an illegal purpose."); id.
§ 12.1 comment b, at 386 (obligation to pay fair rental value if no reservation of
rent in the lease).
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Comparison of the conveyance view with the contract (i.e.,
bilateral contract) view of the lease indicates that to call a lease a
conveyance is not to deny that it is a contract, but rather to classify the lease as a particular type of contract, or, at least, to apply
contractual ideas in a particular way. Some writers have suggested that the conveyance component of the lease makes it essentially a unilateral contract, with the tenant promising to pay
rent in return for the landlord's act of executing the lease or delivering possession to the tenant. 44 1 This theory, in effect, treats
the lease as a sale for a specified duration, a transaction "in which
transfer of ownership in a physical thing is complete and is the
sole concern of the parties to the contract." 44 2 As we have discussed, the sale analogy-with its allocation of risk of loss to the
tenant-purchaser after delivery-has figured prominently in the
443
law of destruction of the leased premises.
Confronted with these opposing views, Williston has chosen
44 4
a middle course, labeling the lease a "partly bilateral" contract.
While that unique description appears anomalous, it avoids the
conceptual difficulties inherent in the unilateral contract theory.
Under that theory, as we just noted, the tenant promises to pay
rent in return for the landlord's act either of executing the lease
or delivering possession to the tenant. This act-for-promise conception, however, does not stand up to analysis. Property law
does not regard the landlord as having fully performed merely by
executing the lease. Rather, the landlord is considered to have
fully performed only if legal or actual possession is available to
the tenant on the day the lease term is to begin. 445 The delivery
of possession is an obligation of the landlord, not merely a requested act, and breach of the obligation allows the tenant a damages remedy. 4 46 It is true that the landlord's affirmative
obligations under the lease can be regarded as substantially satisfied very early in the transaction, by the mere delivery of possession at the outset of the lease term. It is perhaps for this reason
that Williston defined the lease as "partly bilateral," highlighting
441. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 166 (lease is complete upon execution);
Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279, 1283-84 (1960) (tenant must pay rent even if property is destroyed).
442. Note, supra note 219, at 470.
443. See supra Part II-A.
444. S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 890, at 580.

445. See 1

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 1, § 3.37 (discussing

landlord's obligation to deliver legal or actual possession, or both).
446. Id. § 3.37, at 251-52.
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the fact that after delivery of possession only the tenant has material executory obligations. 44 7 Nevertheless, under no accurate
conception can the lease be regarded as a unilateral arrangement,
under which the landlord is under no executory obligation at all
4 48
after agreeing to the lease.
Although Williston's formulation is thus preferable, both he
and the unilateral contract theorists appear to be striving to make
essentially the same point: The significance of the conveyance
view of the lease is that it interferes with the application of normal
bilateral contract analysis to the lease transaction. For our part,
we prefer to make the point in a somewhat different way. We
think it is preferable to say simply that a lease is a bilateral contract-wholly rather than partly-but that the "conveyance" view
operates to restrict judicial determinations of what comprises the
landlord's agreed exchange for the tenant's rent obligation, and
when this is received by the tenant. Thus, under the "executed
transaction" component of conveyance reasoning, 4 49 the landlord
has substantially performed when possession is delivered at the
outset of the lease term. That, of course, is the conveyance view
that Williston emphasized by describing the lease as a "partly bilateral" contract. Williston's description is a useful, though incomplete, 4 50 explanation for results in various landlord-tenant
cases. On the one hand, the view that the landlord has substantially performed by delivering possession can be used to explain
why the landlord traditionally has no implied obligations concerning the habitability of the premises. If the landlord's essential promise is the delivery promise, which is performed by the
landlord's making possession available to the tenant at the start of
the lease, it would be unnecessary for courts to infer or construct
other covenants to perfect the tenant's bargain; 4 5 1 the bargain is
already substantially complete upon delivery. Moreover, if the
447. Our textual discussion does not approve, but merely attempts to explicate, the unilateral contract conception as applied to leases. As we note below,
the view that the landlord has substantially performed merely by delivery of possession is inadequate to explain the results in many lease cases favoring the tenant. See infra notes 454-61 and accompanying text.
448. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 19, § 1-10, at 17-18 ("Every
contract involves at least two contracting parties. In some contracts, however,
only one party has made a promise and therefore only he is subject to a legal
obligation. Such a contract is said to be unilateral. If both parties have made
promises, the contract is bilateral.") (footnote omitted).
449. See supra note 431 and accompanying text.
450. See infra notes 454-61 and accompanying text.
451. See, e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 143, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970)
("A covenant in a lease can arise only by necessary implication from specific
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tenant's main inducement to the bargain is the receipt of a possessory interest, any other express promises made by the landlord, such as promises to repair or not to compete, would have to
be classified as nonessential or collateral, the breach of which
would not justify rescission. 4 52 Finally, if receipt of the object
constitutes the essence of the tenant's bargain, risk of loss would
appropriately be on the tenant after delivery of the premises by
453
the landlord.
On the other hand, the "partly bilateral" description is incomplete because property law does regard the landlord as having
a material obligation during the lease term to protect the tenant's
quiet possession of the premises. 454 Thus, another and different
consequence of conveyance reasoning must be identified to illustrate fully the differences between property and contract reasoning. The conveyance idea that the tenant receives a "possessory"
interest "in land" 4 55 guarantees the tenant not merely a right to
initially receive possession, but also a right to have and "enjoy" it
during the term of the lease. In protecting the tenant's "possession" during the term, primarily under the rubrics of "eviction"
and "constructive eviction," 4 56 the conveyance view gives the tenant more rights than it logically must, since the landlord could be
regarded as having performed substantially or fully by mere delivery of possession. Yet, at the same time conveyance reasoning
gives less than it could, since it limits, or can limit, the determination that an actionable eviction from possession has occurred, as
we noted in comparing the property doctrine of eviction with the
4 57
contract doctrine of material breach.
Moreover, the notion that the tenant has a protectable interest during the lease term is necessary to account for the result,
language of the lease or because it is indispensable to carry into effect the purpose of the lease.").
452. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 290 comment a (1932) ("because
the grantor of a lease... has performed the major part of his side of the transaction," any other covenants "are subsidiary"). For a discussion of the impact of
the landlord's breach of "subsidiary" promises on the determination of whether
the landlord has substantially performed his or her lease obligations, see supra
notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text (under analogy to sale
of goods, risk of loss is on tenant after delivery of possession).
454. See supra note 437 and accompanying text. For a discussion of cases
that address whether eviction of the tenant is a breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 433-34 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 70-117 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text.
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reached in some cases 45 8 and entertained in others, 4 59 that the
tenant is excused from his rent obligation upon destruction of the
leased premises after delivery, a consequence that cannot be explained by the standard "lease as sale" view adopted by some of
the decisions. 4 60 If, as a result of fortuitous events, the tenant
loses the principal use of the premises for which he contracted, he
can be excused. However, while this component of the conveyance view gives the tenant an advantage that the "executed transaction" component does not, it also operates to limit that material
advantage. As we discussed above, destruction of buildings on
the leased premises or the supervening illegality of one particular
use of the leased premises will not excuse the tenant unless the
lease contract specifically states that use of the buildings, or use
for a particular purpose, is the essence of the transaction. In the
absence of such a lease specification, conveyance reasoning ascribes to the tenant a primary purpose to use the land rather than
the buildings, or to use the leased premises for some remaining
legal purpose.

46 t

When it is understood that "conveyance" and "contract" are,
in essence, two conceptions of contract, rather than totally different legal concepts, the exact nature of the dispute between traditionalists and revisionists comes more into focus, as does the
partiality of each view. The gulf between conveyance and contract posited by traditionalists and the unity of contract and conveyance asserted by revisionists are both more rhetorical than
real. The asserted chasm between property and contract analyses
gives the advocate a strong argument for urging reform of outmoded property rules, and it gives the court a justification for
adopting the reform. In fact, however, the results typically lamented by traditionalists as outmoded can be explained as restricted applications of contract doctrines, such as material breach
or frustration of purpose, as the revisionists have noted. On the
other hand, to point out that the conveyance rules abhorred by
the traditionalists are in essence contract rules only superficially
answers the traditionalist critique of landlord-tenant law. The
gravamen of the traditionalist critique centers on the unfortunate
results often reached by the courts in landlord-tenant cases in de458. See supra notes 177-97 and accompanying text (discussing minority

common
459.
460.
461.

law destruction rule and the American "exception" to that rule).
See supra note 160 (tenant is excused if land is destroyed).
See supra notes 146-48 & 182 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-72 and accompanying text.
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nying, for example, that the tenant is entitled to rescind for the
landlord's breach of promise to repair, or upon the destruction of
the leased premise. That the argument in support of that critique
is wrong does not make the critique wrong. For instance, while
the revisionists contend that constructive eviction is material
breach, in an important sense it is not material breach as that concept is worked out generally in contract cases other than leases.
Also, while the destruction cases admittedly apply frustration of
purpose reasoning, they do not apply it the way that a court dealing with a transaction other than a lease might apply it. To avoid
the claim that we have chosen outdated examples, we have also
noted that lease cases still lag behind general contract cases on
two important current problems-the scope of the warranty of
habitability, and the need for an obligation of good faith dealing
by the landlord. Thus, the revisionists at best have shown, correctly, that conveyance reasoning is essentially contractual; but
they have overlooked the equally fundamental point that conveyance reasoning is essentially idiosyncratic or limited contractual
reasoning, and as a result, the traditionalists' fundamental claim
of doctrinal lag between property and contract analyses is valid.
B.

Property Law and Reform

Round one-the debate over whether there are important
differences between the analyses employed in landlord-tenant
cases and in contract cases generally-thus goes to the traditionalists. Round two-centering on the traditionalists' additional
claim that contract reasoning is necessarily superior to property
reasoning 46 2-has hardly yet occurred. On this second issue, the
traditionalists blithely seem to assume that contract reasoning
solves the problems they identify in lease cases, while the revisionists apparently have rested their case by demonstrating that
the traditionalists' abhorred property reasoning is really contract
reasoning. While it would be inappropriate, given both the embryonic current state of this portion of the debate, and the length
of our essay already, to offer a full analysis of this dispute, we will
venture a few remarks.
The traditionalists' claim that contract reasoning is superior
to property reasoning can be assailed on two fronts: First, by attempting to show that contract reasoning does not necessarily
produce the results that traditionalists seek; and second, by dem462. See supra notes 2 & 11 and accompanying text.
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onstrating that property reasoning does not intrinsically inhibit
those results. 463 Since we have argued elsewhere that the former
approach works best with regard to the role of contract ideas in
summary dispossess proceedings, 4 64 we will confine ourselves
here to arguing that property reasoning does not necessarily prevent the achievement of results favorable to the tenant on the topics canvassed in this essay.
With respect to the "independency" of lease covenants, we
suggested in Part I that the property doctrine of constructive eviction serves as a substitute for the contract doctrine of dependency. Thus, constructive eviction doctrine allows the tenant to
rescind when the landlord fails to substantially perform his obligations to the tenant, just as contract doctrine allows the promisee to rescind upon the promisor's material breach. 4 65 Property
doctrine, however, refuses to find a material breach in lease cases
unless the landlord's failure of performance undermines the tenant's "possession" of the premises. 46 6 The expectations protected under this "possession" concept are generally confined to
the tenant's presumed expectation of physical access to the leased
space, and differ from the transactional expectations that might
be indicated by the tenant's needs and the landlord's promises in
a particular case-for example, the expectation that the landlord
will keep the premises in repair, and not merely available; or that
he will refrain from defeating the tenant's economic prosperity by
competition. Because of this different approach, the property
version of material breach differs in quite a few cases from the
46 7
contract version.
However, we believe that this divergence is not necessitated
by the concept of "possession," even as that concept has been
developed by the cases. It seems to us that a critical conceptual
movement in property law occurred when the law moved from
the view that the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment protected the tenant from acts of dispossession by the landlord (the
463. One could also attempt to argue both that the traditionalist's contract
law does not produce the desired results, and that property law, properly understood, could produce them. In so doing, one would be making the exact opposite case from that of the traditionalists, and arguing in effect for the superiority
of property over contract reasoning in landlord-tenant cases. As we have noted,
we do not think that such a strong thesis can be maintained successfully,
although that is a topic for another day. See supra note 12.
464. See Chase, supra note 11, at 206-25.
465. See supra notes 70-117 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 75-105 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text.
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doctrine of actual eviction) to the view that the covenant protected the tenant from acts and omissions short of actual eviction
but having the same practical effect (the doctrine of constructive
eviction). 46 8 With this transition, property law moved from the
view that the covenant of quiet enjoyment protected the tenant's
sheer physical possession to the view that it protected the tenant's
beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises. Admittedly, in
practice "use and enjoyment" is often read with a heavy possession gloss, so that acts or omissions that did not have the effect of
making the premises unusable might not count as a constructive
eviction. 4 69 But to us, the significant point is that property law
now imposes an obligation on the landlord to protect the tenant's
"use and enjoyment" of the premises. This injects a potentially
expansive variable into the determination of the scope of that obligation. Once "enjoyment" enters the picture, it becomes just as
possible to read the covenant of quiet enjoyment broadly, by defining possession in terms of enjoyment, as it is to read it narrowly, by defining enjoyment in terms of possession. 4 70 As we
have noted, some courts have chosen the former view and defined
the covenant broadly, making it essentially a transactional bargain-protecting device. Under this approach, the covenant protects the tenant from any act or omission of the landlord that
"renders the premises substantially unsuitable for the purpose for
which they are leased." 4 7 1 When the covenant of quiet enjoyment
is read this way, it is certainly no narrower than the contractbased warranty of habitability. Ironically, given the recent restrictive interpretations of the warranty, 4 72 it actually seems more expansive. To be sure, we agree that it is generally easier for a court
to frame a material breach question in the contract terminology of
material breach and rescission than in the more circuitous vocabulary of quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction. We also think
that doing so avoids the possibility that the court's analysis will be
tainted'by the intrusion of restrictive meanings that have encrusted the property concepts. Our point, however, is that while
it may be preferable to employ a straightforward contract analysis,
it is not necessary to do so.
468. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
471. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 457, 251 A.2d 268, 274
(1969). For a further discussion of the expansive definition of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment, see supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 263-68, 279-92 & 314-23 and accompanying text.
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With respect to destruction of the leased premises, discussed
in part II, much the same point can be made. The basic doctrine
that can be used on behalf of the tenant is already in place when a
court adopts the Baker "subject matter" version of conveyance
reasoning. 4 7 3 Under that view, the tenant is not the buyer of an
estate so much as he is the consumer of a product intended to be
used for certain purposes. 4 74 Although the common law usually
irrebutably presumes that the tenant intends to use the land, the
basic construct can be adopted to work for the tenant with a simple redefinition of purpose, as in the minority common law cases
and the American "exception" to the Baker rule.4 7 5 Thus, as in
the covenant of quiet enjoyment cases discussed above, results
favorable to the tenant can be achieved by employing concepts
familiar under the conveyance view of the lease. 47 6 Once again,
translation of the Baker "subject matter" analysis into overt contractual frustration of purpose terms seems preferable, but not
absolutely necessary.
With respect to the warranty of habitability, we attempted to
suggest in part III-A the irony that results when a court, having
adopted a contractual view of the lease as a justification for finding an implied warranty, then turns around and narrowly defines
the scope of the warranty, thus undercutting the initial advantage
of the contract analysis. 4 77 We see more than an echo of the
property approach to determination of the landlord's obligations
in this particular development, since the courts appear to be starting with a very narrow definition of the warranty of habitability
just as they originally started with a narrow definition of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 4 78 Butjust as we see no inherent obstacle to the development of a broad covenant of quiet enjoyment,
we also see no inherent obstacle to the development of a broad
warranty of habitability. Indeed, since cases adopting the implied
warranty of habitability generally start with the proposition that a
lease "should be interpreted and construed like any other con473. See supra notes 152-72 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 170-72, 182 & 219-32 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (minority common law cases
on destruction); supra notes 178-97 and accompanying text (American "exception" to the common law destruction rule).
476. Likewise, results favorable to the tenant can be achieved under the
analogy of the lease to a sale of goods, see supra notes 146-48 and accompanying
text, if the installment sale analogy is employed. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 249-333 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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tract," 4 79 it is not the argument for an expansive warranty that

seems peculiar and in need of special explanation, but rather the
argument for the narrow warranty currently being employed by
480
the cases.
Finally, with respect to the landlord's obligation to deal in
good faith with the tenant, the courts rather woodenly assume, as
we noted in Part III-B, that classification of the transaction as a
lease prevents imposition of such an obligation, while classification of the transaction as a franchise would allow it.481 The apparent rationale for this distinction is that the absence of any
requirement of cause to terminate an existing lease relationship is
a doctrinal incident of the concepts of periodic tenancy, tenancy
at will, and term of years. Yet, it is not at all clear to us that moving the transaction into the franchise category is effective to yield
a different result. 48 2 More basically, it is not at all clear to us that
moving it out of the lease category is necessary to achieve that
result. The courts adhering to this dubious distinction between
leases and franchises have failed to distinguish between historical
and logical incidents of common law tenancies. If the obligation
to deal in good faith were precluded by common law concepts,
then the recent and widely adopted doctrine of retaliatory eviction 48 8 would be quite impossible. That doctrine imposes a negative obligation on the landlord to avoid dealing in bad faith,
which is analytically akin to the affirmative obligation to deal in
good faith, an obligation which we believe should be generally
recognized. It is curious that courts that have no difficulty requiring the landlord to avoid the one should have such great difficulty
479. See supra notes 3 & 242 and accompanying text.
480. The point of our criticism in the text is that since a lease is to be
treated "like any other contract," there is very good doctrinal reason for refusing to limit the scope of the warranty of habitability as recent caes have done.
Additionally, we would point out that there is no doctrinal reason why the covenant of quiet enjoyment itself could not have served as the conceptual means for
recognition of the duty now developed under the warranty of habitability. See
Chase, supra note 11, at 199-206. Nor is there any doctrinal reason why the
abatement remedy could not have been extended to breaches of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 462 n.1, 251
A.2d 268, 277 n.1 (1969).
481. See supra notes 410-27 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 420-21 and accompanying text.
483. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, §§ 14.8-14.9 (1977). The source of retaliatory eviction doctrine is specifically statutory in some jurisdictions. Id. § 14.9
comment f. The seminal retaliatory eviction case, however, is Edwards v. Habib,
which develops the doctrine without the aid of a specific retaliatory eviction
statute.
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in requiring him to achieve the other. Perhaps if courts were to
see this connection, the obligation to deal in good faith would
lose its apparently alien appearance.
C.

Conclusion

In resolving landlord-tenant disputes, courts do, as courts
must, apply doctrines and concepts to the facts before them.
Revisionists suggest that there is less to the property-contract
theme than meets the eye, because the doctrines and concepts
that the courts apply in the areas that traditionalists focus on are
in fact contract doctrines and concepts, or closely akin to them.
But to stop there, as the revisionists have, is to achieve a Pyrrhic victory. The revisionists' "answer" to the traditionalists minimizes the entire property-contract debate, rendering it almost
trivial and uninteresting. The revisionist point that property and
contract cases employ the same or essentially similar doctrines
and concepts is an important insight, but it only begins the analysis. Properly pursued, the traditionalist analysis develops the
point that important differences remain between the standard approach of a court in resolving disputes in lease cases, and its approach in general contract cases. That critique is essential in
order to avoid the complacency that would deny the urgent need
for reform of landlord-tenant law. It is also essential to an understanding of the point, occasionally missed by revisionists, 4 84 that
the need for reform arises because of the inadequacy of the doc485
trines and concepts employed in landlord-tenant cases.
It is thus the essential merit of the traditionalist critique to
steadfastly focus on the substantive doctrines and concepts employed in landlord-tenant cases, and to suggest that those doctrines and concepts need modernization. We think, however, that
the traditionalists have fallen into error in arguing that contract
law is the only means to modernization and reform: Just as the
revisionists have seen too little in the property-contract debate,
the traditionalists may have seen too much. Without at all denying the importance and urgency of the traditionalists' goals, we
prefer to think that the law in both mansions-property and contract-has the resources for achieving these goals.
484. See Chused, supra note 6, at 1386 n.7 ("Property-contract disputes...
have nearly played themselves out. Procedure is the most important area of review for present day lease law afficionados.").
485. See Browder, supra note 11, at 100 ("It must be conceded that current
troubles in this area probably have their origins in traditional property law.").
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